

CONFIDENTIAL

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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5 MARCH 1976

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# Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST  
5 MAR 1976

## CIA Papers Missing; Pike Panel Assailed

By Walter Pineus  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House intelligence committee, which is out of business and under investigation itself for past leaks, came under a new attack yesterday for allegedly losing 232 classified CIA documents.

In a Feb. 27 letter to Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), who chaired the committee, Mitchell Rogovin, special counsel to CIA Director George Bush, listed six categories of documents "that are presumed missing," including top secret material on SALT, the coup in Portugal, procurement by the CIA and the agency's budgeting process.

The allegedly missing documents had, according to Central Intelligence Agency records, been turned over to the committee and cannot be located among committee files now being stored at CIA headquarters.

Pike has asked the CIA to provide him with details on when the documents were turned over to the committee and the name of the committee staff member who signed for them. In a letter to Bush last Monday, Pike wrote: "I will certainly do what I can to help you find them."

Yesterday, Pike said a quick check with his staff showed that in the case of the budget documents, some 103 were alleged by CIA to have been on a single microfilm strip that "no one has any record as having gotten."

The lost documents were discussed at the White House last week, according to a presidential aide, and copies of the Rogovin letter to Pike were sent to White House Counsel Philip W. Buchen and presidential

counselor John O. Marsh Jr. Pike said yesterday he was "suspicious" about the new charge against the committee, saying "they really are out to get me." He added that he believed some missing documents could have been destroyed or transferred to the archives.

When the Pike committee concluded its investigation last month, all documents belonging to intelligence agencies were returned.

At the request of Bush, Pike agreed to store the committee's own files at CIA headquarters. It is from these files that the documents are missing.

According to a Feb. 25 letter to Pike from Bush, the agency "attempted to reconcile our records of documents delivered" to the committee "with the inventory of documents received for storage at CIA headquarters."

At that point, according to the Bush letter, "a number of documents were unaccounted for."

The day after Bush's letter was sent, CIA counsel Rogovin spoke with Rep. Robert McClory (R-Ill.), who was the ranking Republican on Pike's committee. McClory, according to a later Rogovin letter, voiced "concern regarding the missing documents."

Pike received Rogovin's list of missing documents on March 1 and the same day sent Bush a letter asking for more specific information.

The matter rested there until news reports yesterday quoted CIA sources saying—inaccurately—the missing documents were loaned to the committee and had to be returned to CIA.

Government opened their mail or tapped their phone or otherwise had them under surveillance for doing nothing more than exercising their constitutional rights," Mrs. Abzug said. The bill she introduced Tuesday would require Government agencies to advise persons and organizations that files are being kept on them and would permit those under surveillance to have the files destroyed.

Thursday, March 4, 1976

The Washington Star

## House Panel Can't Locate CIA Papers

Associated Press

The House intelligence committee is unable to account for some 230 documents, at least some of them secret, which the CIA says it turned over to the committee to use in its investigation of spy agencies, Chairman Otis G. Pike said today.

But Pike, a New York Democrat, discounted the possibility that the documents have been stolen. "I think it's a nothing, frankly," Pike said. The documents are "either in the archives or were destroyed," he said.

PIKE ALSO SAID some of the documents might have been returned to the State Department by mistake. "We returned to the State Department more documents than they had any record of having given us," the chairman said.

The committee, which had about 35 employees, went out of business after writing a secret report, which was leaked to CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, who in turn released it to the weekly Village Voice in New York for publication.

The Schorr-matter has resulted in an investigation by the House Ethics Committee, which plans public hearings to find out who gave Schorr the report. There is no indication that the leak to Schorr is related in any way to the missing documents.

Pike said most of the documents concern CIA budgetary information. Others, he said, concern CIA operations in Cyprus. The CIA always has regarded information about its budget to be highly classified.

THE COMMITTEE chairman said he received a letter Monday from Mitchell Rogovin, special counsel to CIA Director George Bush, saying the agency could not account for the 230 documents.

Pike said he sent a letter to Bush in reply asking for more specific information about the documents, such as when they were delivered and who on the committee received them.

"If they will tell me what documents they are talking about," Pike said, "I will help them find them."

If the documents were papers which the committee had made no agreement to return, Pike said, they either would be in the archives or would have been destroyed.

NEW YORK  
1 MARCH 1976

## Wit at the White House

At presidential functions, it's SOP for Ford's staff to position the three television networks' camera crews by putting up signs reading "CBS," "ABC," and "NBC." Last week, though, when Ford talked at Fort Myers, Florida, there was a slight change in routine—the signs read: "ABC," "NBC," and "CBS/Village Voice."

WASHINGTON POST  
5 MAR 1976

## British Paper Names 60 Americans in CIA

LONDON, March 4 (AP) — A radical British paper has published a list of 60 names and addresses of persons it says are CIA employees in Britain, presenting U.S. Ambassador Anne Armstrong with a problem on her first day in office.

The paper, Red Weekly, said the list, from embassy sources, included virtually all Central Intelligence Agency employees attached to Armstrong's embassy.

The embassy refused to comment on the publication of an apparent security problem it raised.

Red Weekly said it intended to disrupt CIA operations in Britain. The reporter who compiled the list said: "By publishing their names and addresses we're giving the U.S. an opportunity to take these people back to the U.S."

Ambassador Armstrong, a former aide to ex-President Nixon, and her husband, Tobin Armstrong, arrived in Britain last night. She met the embassy staff today and toured the building on Grosvenor Square. She succeeds Elliot Richardson, now Secretary of Com-

NEW YORK TIMES  
29 Feb. 1976

## Rep. Abzug Wants Persons Told of U.S. Files on Them

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 (UPI) — Government agencies will be required to notify individuals of all files maintained on them if a bill proposed by Representative Bella Abzug, Democrat of Manhattan, becomes law.

"There are thousands of people who may not even be aware of the fact that they

NEW YORK TIMES  
4 MAR 1976

## House Votes Wide Power For Spy Report Inquiry

By RICHARD D. LYONS  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 3—The House investigation into the leaking of the Pike committee's intelligence report gained momentum today as representatives voted overwhelmingly to broaden the subpoena powers that will be used during the inquiry.

By 321 to 85, the House voted to let its ethics committee subpoena and question under oath persons not directly connected with the Government.

The committee already had power to subpoena "members, officers and employees" of the House.

Moderate and conservative representatives easily brushed aside objections of liberals that the scope of the investigation was expanding and that the inquiry itself was senseless.

The vote spread today was 82 votes more than the margin of 269 to 115 by which the House, two weeks ago, had ordered the ethics committee to conduct the investigation.

Representative James H. Quillen of Tennessee, the ranking Republican on the committee, summed up the view of the majority by saying that it was necessary "for the House to give the broadest subpoena power to the committee to carry out the mandate of the House."

"It's important for the ethics committee to go full speed ahead in this investigation without delay," he added.

Representative Stewart B. McKinney, Republican of Connecticut, said that publication of the report "has effected shrive of the report, after the House had voted to keep it secret, had jeopardized "the credibility of a Congress that wants to have more to do with foreign policy."

This is the real issue, Mr. McKinney said, adding that, in the minds of the press, the issue "had been Mr. Schorr."

He was referring to Daniel Schorr, the CBS News correspondent here who has admitted giving a copy of the report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence to the Village Voice, a weekly newspaper in New York City that published excerpts from the report last month.

"I don't think the question is really about a newscaster," Mr. McKinney continued. "It seems to me the problem right now is how did that newscaster get that information. It's for us to show that we can clean our own house."

The vote today gave the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct — the formal

name of the ethics committee—the right "to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers and documents as it deems necessary."

The adopted resolution also stated that "the chairman of the committee, or any member designated by such chairman, may administer oaths to any such witness."

An attempt by House liberals to debate the resolution was blocked, first by a misunderstanding of the parliamentary procedure under which it was brought up, then by a formal vote of 306 to 99.

Liberal Democrats angrily swarmed around the floor manager of the resolution, Representative John Young, Democrat of Texas, demanding that he give them time for debate. Mr. Young asked that the rules be waived to allow an hour's debate, but conservatives—led by Representative F. Edward Hebert, Democrat of Louisiana—objected to the waiver, and the debate was cut off.

The result left many liberals unhappy with the use to which the expanded subpoena power could be used, a portent of what may end up as an ideological battle between left and right over freedom of the press and the depth to which the investigation might go.

Representative Phillip Burton of California, a liberal spokesman who is chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, said the result could be the subpoenaing of "each and every staff member whether or not he had anything to do with the affair, and I think this is an outrage."

Other members, such as Representative John B. Anderson of Illinois, the third ranking Republican, have expressed reservations about having newsmen connected with the Pike committee leak questioned under oath about their sources by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Representative John J. Flynt Jr., the Georgia Democrat who is chairman of the ethics committee, announced yesterday that he would appoint a former F.B.I. inspector, David Bowers, as director of the investigation.

Mr. Flynt also formally requested \$350,000 to conduct the inquiry, an amount some liberals believe is far too much. The investigation itself, which may start in several weeks, will attempt to find out who was involved in the leaking of the report. The document covered a detailed investigation and contained a critique of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Long Island, is the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

WASHINGTON POST  
5 MAR 1976

## FBI Is Ruled Out Of Hill Schorr Probe

By Richard L. Lyons  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House ethics committee has followed the advice of Speaker Carl Albert and decided against using FBI agents to investigate the leak of the secret house CIA report.

Instead, Committee Chairman John J. Flynt (D-Ga.) said yesterday, a staff of 10 investigators will be assembled from private sources—lawyers and accountants—to find out how the report of the House intelligence committee, which the House ordered not be released, reached CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, who passed it onto the New York weekly, The Village Voice.

"We would rather have someone responsible to the committee alone, not someone else," conduct the investigation, Flynt said. He said no pressure had been put on the committee not to use FBI agents. But Albert expressed reservations last week about using an executive branch agency to conduct an investigation for Congress.

Flynt has requested \$350,000 to make the investigation and is expected to get a hearing on the sum next week before a House Administration subcommittee. Some members have criticized the figure as high.

Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), chairman of the intelligence committee whose report was leaked, said he had told Flynt he could save the taxpayers a lot of money by calling up Schorr and asking where he got it. Flynt said the committee had discussed doing that, but Rep. Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.), another member of the ethics committee, said they didn't think Schorr would tell them.

At a meeting of House

WASHINGTON POST  
5 MAR 1976

## Man Named as Spy Leaves Sweden

STOCKHOLM, March 4—An American diplomat accused by an African journalist here of having tried to recruit him as a spy for the Central Intelligence Agency, in Angola, has left Sweden, the Foreign Ministry said today.

Bruce Hutchins, second secretary at the U.S. embassy in Stockholm, left the country two days ago with his wife. On the same day a

Democratic regional whips yesterday morning, Flynt reported on what his committee was doing. One who was present said Flynt's focus is more on who leaked the report to Schorr than on punishing Schorr for passing it along.

Later Flynt told reporters, "The House wants to know what happened to one or more copies of the preliminary draft of the report of the select committee on intelligence. This will be neither an inquisition nor a witch hunt. There is no intention to go after one person."

Pike has offered to cooperate fully with the investigation, Flynt said, and Pike said he wants to find out where the leak began. He had suggested earlier that the source might have been the CIA, which was given a copy of his committee's report.

Flynt told reporters he hasn't any idea how much time or money will be needed to complete the assignment. In drafting a budget he asked for \$110,000 for investigators—which means paying 10 persons \$100 per day for 110 days, or an investigation that would last through July 31.

The investigation could take two weeks or 10 months, he said, declaring that the committee did the best it could in estimating money needs on the basis of the experience of other House investigations. The ethics committee has never conducted such an inquiry.

Flynt also plans a staff of three attorneys and secretaries and security personnel. He has budgeted a total of \$185,000 for personnel and \$165,000 for travel, equipment, telephones and supplies.

leftist magazine accused him of using veiled threats against relatives of Kenyan journalist Arthur Opat in an attempt to recruit him as a CIA agent.

In a 12-page article, the magazine Fib-Kulturfront said Opat, a free-lance journalist at the Swedish Broadcasting Corp., had accepted money from Hutchins to travel twice to Angola, and had fed him false information about the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and about Swedish journalists working in Angola.

BALTIMORE SUN  
1 March 1976

# Secrets law should apply to press, spy figure says

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY  
Washington Bureau of The Sun  
Washington—Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, says new laws protecting intelligence secrets should apply to the press as well as to federal employees.

His proposals on a controversial issue, published by an organization of retired officers and others promoting defense studies, appeared to go beyond those President Ford made 10 days ago in connection with intelligence reforms requiring legislation.

"Legislation is required which recognizes the right of the United States government to have a secret and which provides practical means to apply criminal sanctions to those persons entrusted with secrets who abuse their trusts," General Graham wrote.

"This means that the public media must not remain immune from responsibility for publication of national secrets and from protecting the insider who has provided the information and violated his trust."

Elaborating in a telephone interview, General Graham said: "I don't want a law that

says put newsmen in jail." But he opposed a right not to reveal sources of information that the government has labeled secret. If legitimately classified information is published, he said, "you shouldn't expect protection from the law." Reporters should be required to name their sources in such circumstances, General Graham said.

William E. Colby, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who also has expressed deep concern about spillage of secrets during the past year of spying investigations, has a different view from that of General Graham, who retired as head of the Pentagon's intelligence agency (DIA) after Mr. Colby and James R. Schlesinger, the former secretary of defense, were dismissed.

Mr. Colby told reporters at a February 20 press conference that he had sympathy for their desire to protect news sources and would not oppose a federal law assuring that right.

The secrecy issue has been a matter of growing debate since President Ford proposed, as one of his intelligence reforms, legislation to impose criminal

and civil sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of intelligence secrets.

Mr. Ford said the legislation "would affect only those who improperly disclose secrets, not those to whom secrets are disclosed." There have been assertions, however, that reporters could be called before grand juries as witnesses to felonies, under such laws, and be ordered to name sources.

General Graham, a longtime intelligence officer who served in both the CIA and DIA, gave his views in the course of a lengthy article, "U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads," published here by the United States Strategic Institute, which describes itself as a non-partisan organization promoting study of national security problems.

The article was written before Mr. Ford announced the intelligence reorganization, which, among other things, put George Bush, new head of the CIA, in general charge of U.S. intelligence activities as chairman of a foreign intelligence committee.

Analyzing several possibilities for reorganizing U.S. intelligence, which is spread over several agencies with differing

and overlapping functions, General Graham indicated little confidence in a "dual-hat" arrangement under which one man serves as both CIA director and general overseer. That appears to be Mr. Bush's new position, and he has told reporters he expects some conflicts to develop.

General Graham said it would be too much to expect objectivity from such an officer, in examining various agencies' intelligence programs, given the pressures on him or his own agency, the CIA.

The general urged establishment at White House level of a "coordinator of U.S. intelligence," independent of the various agencies and principal intelligence adviser to the President and the National Security Council.

This officer would have an inspector general for intelligence, outside any agency's chain of command and responsible both for protecting against abuses and for seeing that "disgruntled individuals" had no excuse to take their complaints outside the secret channels of the intelligence system to the public.

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY  
JANUARY 12, 1976

## A MAN CALLED INTREPID:

*The Secret War.* William Stevenson. Foreword by "Intrepid" (Sir William Stephenson). Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, \$12.95 ISBN 0-15-156795-6

What makes this book difficult to put down is the excitement of the story and the importance of the events dealt with. In 1940 Churchill confronted the possibility of a successful Nazi invasion of Britain: he provided against it by locating the HQ of his intelligence and dirty-tricks organizations in New York. This was possible only because the man in charge was already known to FDR and trusted by him. He was William S. Stephenson (code name "Intrepid"), a Canadian scientist and self-made millionaire. Before the illegalities of his operation the recent activities of the CIA pale in comparison. The book makes a good case that this "secret war" was as effective as the war fought by the more visible armies. Parts of the story have already been told in "Room 3606," "The Code Breakers," etc; but without doubt this book, the first written with full access to the records, gives more of an overall picture, though some readers will wish it were written from a less conventional World War II viewpoint. Author Stevenson ("The Yellow Wind," etc.) is no kin to his subject, Sir William Stephenson. Photos, maps. BOMC featured alternate. May selection History Book Club. [March 12]

NEWSDAY

14 FEBRUARY 1976

## Editorials

### The CIA's Bylines

Representative Otis Pike says that publishing the names of reporters who worked for the CIA would serve no useful purpose. Maybe not, but we think the reporters who didn't—and the people who read their reporting—would rest easier if the stigma were removed from the many and attached solely to the few who earned it. Newspapers in a free society are most effective when people have some degree of faith in their independence. That independence doesn't come easy, and it doesn't take much to shake some readers' faith.

The media have little enough credibility as it is. If people believe that a great many journalists received part of their salaries from the CIA, that credibility would be damaged even more. The press depends as much as any government institution on the appearance of fairness. So long as a cloud hangs over part of it, everyone's hurting.

The announcement by the new CIA director, George Bush, that neither journalists nor missionaries will be enlisted to gather intelligence is welcome, but it does nothing to remove the suspicion against past or present moonlighting agents. The agency should make public the names, not only for its own sake but for the sake of a free press in this country.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1976

# Inside Church's Bunker

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, March 3—The atmosphere in Senator Frank Church's intelligence subcommittee is that of a bunker under siege. Senators and staffers furtively dart about, clutching parts of the forthcoming three-volume report to their palpitating bosoms, worried lest leaks make the Senate appear as unable to keep secrets as the House.

Since you cannot tell the heroes from the villains in a Senate report without a program, here are some items to look for:

The committee will not recommend a special prosecutor to prosecute C.I.A.-F.B.I. abuses; Senator Church has called for this, secure in the knowledge that it has no chance. Senators Tower and Goldwater oppose it, and Senator Gary Hart—explaining why he, too, sees nothing wrong on having the F.B.I. investigate itself—has informed me: "We intend to address the question of how to deal with illegal activities, including those that occurred in the past, in our report."

That Church report will open with some zingy rhetoric about preserving civil liberty while preserving national security, then go into long and separate sections on foreign and domestic intelligence. The reason Republican Senator Tower has made a doormat out of himself, acquiescing in the most flagrant cover-ups of the Democratic abuses of power, will become apparent: Mr. Tower has traded this to Senators Church and Hart in return for their support of a strong executive C.I.A. covert capability in the future.

A fascinating part of the report will deal with Senator Richard Schweiker's "retaliation theory." This holds that Fidel Castro, irritated at the C.I.A.-supported efforts of Mafia mobster Sam Giancana and friends to

assassinate him, had a hand in the assassination of one or more Kennedys. Then come the eleven "appendices" to the report:

¶Operation CHAOS, the C.I.A.'s illegal domestic intelligence operation first exposed by Seymour Hersh in The New York Times.

¶The C.I.A. mail covers; the C.I.A. drug tests;

¶Defense intelligence practices and abuses, as seen by Robert McNamara's former son-in-law;

¶The Internal Revenue Service's intelligence activity; this is a subject not previously investigated by the Rockefeller Commission or House Intelligence Committee, and is a section that Senator Church may have reason to be proud of.

¶One appendix on the F.B.I.'s use of informers; another on wiretaps and electronic surveillance, and another on the F.B.I.'s COINTELPRO.

¶The 1967 Doar Plan to spy on dissidents, which Ramsey Clark put into effect, will be glossed over, while the 1970 Huston Plan, which J. Edgar Hoover blocked, will be examined at length.

¶The section about the wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.—the worst abuse of police power in our time, which was ordered by Robert Kennedy and continued by Nicholas Katzenbach—was written by Michael T. Epstein, a hatchetman on Attorney General Kennedy's "get-Hoffa" squad in those days, and lately a staffer for Ted Kennedy. Not surprisingly, the Epstein version heaps all the blame on the F.B.I. and pictures Messrs. Kennedy and Katzenbach as babes in the wood.

Mr. Epstein was also used by Senator Church to inveigle lawmen into giving the impression that the murder of Sam Giancana had nothing to do with his impenitent testimony.

"Shortly after Mr. Giancana's

death," Senator Church wrote Attorney General Levi on Jan. 29 of this year, Mr. Epstein met with Justice Department officials to determine "whether there was any relationship between this committee's desire to examine Mr. Giancana and his murder."

"Shortly," my foot: According to William Lynch, chief of the Organized Crime Section, the Church staffer did not show up at Justice until 21 days after the mob had wiped out Giancana. Mr. Epstein, in that strange meeting, did not ask Justice to investigate a possible obstruction of justice. Without a request, not one F.B.I. agent could be assigned to the case.

To accommodate the Senator's need for the appearance of diligence, Criminal Division chief Richard Thornburgh (a Pittsburgh protégé of Senator Hugh Scott) sent the requested reply saying "all the information" at Justice indicated that the England slaying was merely "intended to settle problems within the syndicate." The artful Mr. Thornburgh could say that with a straight face because "all the information" was sparse and second-hand, the result of no Federal investigation; and thus is a criminal division politicized to save a Senate face.

Why can the Church report claim "no indication" of a connection? Because there was no Federal investigation of a connection. Why was the F.B.I. not put on the case? Because Mr. Church and Mr. Epstein decided not to put them on the case. Why not? Because Frank Church did not want to know anything more about the first murder of a Senate witness and the Mafia penetration of the Kennedy White House.

In protest, this space will accept no more leaks from anybody inside the Church Senate bunker until the report is issued. In the Duke of Wellington's words: "Publish and be damned!"

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
23 February 1976

## 65 MORE CIA AGENTS NAMED BY MAGAZINE

By Our Washington Staff  
Fifth Estate, the group of Leftists and former American intelligence officers who oppose the Central Intelligence Agency, has carried out its threat to name more CIA agents stationed abroad. The latest issue of its magazine *Counterspy*, names 65 men stationed in Canada, Finland, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Zaire and Sweden. Included are men said to be station chiefs in each country except Denmark and Finland. Mr. Richard Welch, identified in the magazine as the CIA chief in Greece, was murdered last December.

Those who run Fifth Estate from a small office in Washington have been widely denounced since the killing. President Ford has proposed legislation to make it illegal for a former intelligence officer to name agents but for the moment, there is no law to stop the practice.

ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT  
20 February 1976

## Revamping U.S. Intelligence

The three-part plan to reorganize and upgrade the United States' intelligence gathering operations announced Tuesday night by President Ford appears to be constructive and well thought out.

It calls for placing all policy direction for foreign intelligence under four officials — the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense.

It calls for combining all the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency and other intelligence units under one command structure headed by the new director of the CIA, George Bush.

It also would create a new Oversight Board made up of private citizens "to monitor the performance of our intelligence operations."

To prevent possible abuses, Mr. Ford said his office would propose "a comprehensive set of public guidelines" to safeguard civil rights, plus eventual legislation "to provide judicial safeguards against electronic sur-

veillance and mail openings."

President Ford said he also seeks a law against peacetime assassination attempts, and laws that would make it illegal for a government employee "who has access to certain highly classified information to reveal that information properly."

Adoption of this plan should go a long way toward rebuilding the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations and restoring confidence in the CIA and other agencies engaged in this activity.

Congress should carry out its end of the bargain to help restore the greatly diminished effectiveness of government agencies that have been hampered by non-stop congressional probes and constant leaking of damaging information. Certainly a law is needed as soon as possible to prevent the improper disclosure of classified information. Unless Congress acts to protect secret intelligence information, it shouldn't be trusted with secret information whose release could hurt U.S. intelligence operations.



THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1976

# Bill Paley's Big Secret

By William Safire

WASHINGTON—CBS board chairman William Paley has been looking for an excuse to discipline correspondent Daniel Schorr for two years.

Mr. Schorr may be the best television newsmen in the field today, figures Mr. Paley, but he is not a "team player." Not only does he refuse to follow the news judgments laid down by the major morning newspapers, but he has been known to criticize network actions at college lectures.

More important, Mr. Paley needs his own Big Enchilada to toss to local affiliate owners who reflect the resentment of what used to be known as the silent majority.

Does the opinion persist that CBS was the fiercest pursuer of Mr. Nixon and even today has a distinct liberal

## ESSAY

salant to its campaign coverage? If so, figures Mr. Paley, getting rid of Daniel Schorr will help the network "get well" with Middle America, while removing a burr from under the CBS saddle.

As usual, Mr. Paley is out of touch with the way a great many people on the right really feel. When Mr. Nixon was riding high, it is true that correspondent Schorr was a vigorous inquisitor; but after the Nixon power began to wane, and many other reporters rushed in savagely when it became the journalistic fashion, Mr. Schorr was regarded by most of the "Nixon people" as eminently fair in his reports. With no need to suddenly establish anti-Nixon credentials, he covered the news hard, straight and clean.

Conservatives have also noted how Mr. Schorr's curiosity does not desert him, as it does so many others, when it comes to the power abuses of liberals. He has a way of following a story wherever it leads.

I suspect that CBS plans to use the current furor over the publication of the Pike committee report in The Village Voice as its excuse to publicly chastise Mr. Schorr.

Other journalists have provided Mr. Paley with necessary cover. The Washington Post (which still preserves its "Deep Throat" fiction about sources) smoked out The Voice's source, and covered its embarrassment about being beaten by making the story about the story more important than the story itself. And a New York Times editorial unfairly accused Mr. Schorr of "laundering" funds—when, as it turns out, he was trying to prevent any commercial publisher from profiting in the publication of the suppressed report.

But wait: Mr. Paley's apparent excuse may evaporate. Reporters have learned that the attorney recommended to Mr. Schorr by the Reporters' Committee was also the attorney for

The Village Voice, and did not reveal this to him. And it is safe to assume that a reporter, looking for a place to get a document into print, first offers it to his own employer, who happens to have a book subsidiary.

Soon the truth will dawn: Mr. Schorr's "last straw" was not in publishing Mr. Pike's report in The Voice, but in exploring Mr. Paley's big secret on CBS.

Here's that story: A few weeks ago, former CBS News president Sig Mickelson told reporters of a time Mr. Paley called him into a meeting with two C.I.A. men to discuss C.I.A.-CBS cooperation. That was a sensitive story; Mr. Schorr did not turn discreetly away, but directed a query to the chairman of the board for his reaction.

Walter Cronkite, to his credit, put the Schorr report on his evening news program, including the Paley reply calling Mr. Mickelson's statement "absolutely untrue" and, in Mr. Schorr's words, "Mr. Paley said he never called news personnel into his office for any discussion with C.I.A. officials."

To me, that little-noticed report was one of the great moments of television news. But the airing of the charge, and the daring of the reporter to penetrate his privacy, must have caused Mr. Paley to burn. It is my guess that from that moment, Mr. Schorr's future at CBS was decided;

SUN-TIMES, Chicago  
16 Feb. 1976

## CIA must be dismembered

Two weeks ago we ran an editorial calling for the virtual dismemberment of the Central Intelligence Agency, the abolishment of all government capability to carry out "dirty tricks" abroad and the parceling out of most CIA activities to the State and Defense departments. We argued that only a very small CIA should be maintained to co-ordinate and monitor the work of information gatherers elsewhere in the government and make certain that objective information finds its way to the President and other policymakers.

Since then, the House intelligence committee has issued its recommendations for reform, which, while welcome, do not go far enough. Also, one of the most respected intelligence experts in the country, Ray S. Cline, has taken issue with our views.

We reprint the full text of Cline's response on the CIA on this page today and commend it to our readers. At the same time we disagree with him.

Cline is critical of congressional investigators of the intelligence community, but he appears to agree with the proposed House Committee reforms.

One is that the CIA be split into two organizations, one to collect and analyze intelligence information and the other to carry out espionage and dirty tricks. These organizations would be watched over by a beefed-up House Intelligence oversight committee with a rotating membership (to prevent co-opta-

tion). Committee members would be penalized for leaking secrets.

We don't think Congressional oversight is enough to control the intelligence community. Neither do we think there is any justifiable role for noninformation-gathering, covert operations the agency has conducted in the past and would continue to conduct in the future. If the United States is going to succeed as a world leader, it will not be through adopting the worst aspects of a totalitarian nation's foreign policy. It will succeed because of the record it sets as an open, democratic, freedom-loving, opportunity-granting nation that practices the morality it preaches.

Assassination, secret war-making, bribery, dissemination of misinformation, and clandestine government-shaking do not besit this country's professed moral standards.

Cline says the danger of splitting up the CIA is that State and Defense Department analysts could be too easily corrupted in their judgments. We think the small CIA staff of monitors outside the departments could guard against that.

More importantly, this new setup would protect against abuse of the CIA by Presidents. The House committee report, we are told, indicts the White House under Presidents since the early 1960s for instigating the worst excesses of the CIA. Breaking up the agency would add an important check against such abuse—and nothing in this area is more important.

Fat chance of that. If and when Daniel Schorr gets Mr. Paley's heat, every newsmen in every network will get the message: Rock all the boats, except your own boat; tell the people the truth, except when the truth hurts.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1976

# Senate Panel Likely to Urge Strong Curbs on Domestic Spying

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 3—The draft of the final report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will contain strongly worded recommendations to control the domestic intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the electronic eavesdropping capabilities of the National Security Agency, Congressional sources familiar with the draft said today.

Two subcommittees of the select committee are putting the final touches on sections covering the committee's findings and recommendations that will be placed before the full committee for approval next week.

The final report of the committee's year-long investigation into abuses by United States intelligence agencies is expected to be about 1,500 pages in three separate volumes. One volume,

the findings and recommendations, is expected to be made public by mid-March, according to committee sources.

Two other sections, one on foreign and military intelligence and the other on domestic intelligence activities, will be made public later, committee sources said.

## Comment by Church

Senator Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat who has led the committee through its exhaustive inquiry into the intelligence activities, declined to confirm whether the subcommittees preparing the draft would offer strong language on either the F.B.I. or the N.S.A.

He said, however, that he would support such recommendations and he hoped the other members would.

Mr. Church also said that he would urge his committee to support legislation to bar the Central Intelligence Agency or any intelligence arm from covertly intervening in the do-

mestic affairs of democratically elected foreign governments. The select committee, of which he is chairman, issued a report last year in which it detailed the C.I.A.'s efforts to manipulate the internal affairs of Chile after a democratic election brought a Marxist Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, to the Presidency in 1970.

Senator Church said he would also "personally favor" laws to keep the C.I.A. from infiltrating American educational, religious and news media institutions to conduct secret foreign operations.

His committee and the press have uncovered evidence that the C.I.A. used the news media and religious institutions as a "cover" for agents and intelligence officers.

Earlier this year the Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush, ordered the C.I.A. to stop recruiting agents from or infiltrating religious groups or news organizations that are owned or generally circulated

in the United States. An executive order by President Johnson in 1967 barred the C.I.A. from infiltrating educational groups.

Mr. Church said, however, that he believed these prohibitions would be more effective if they were solidified by legislation.

The Senator said he would urge members of his committee to back recommendations in the draft calling for legislation to set limits on the term of service of the directors of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. According to committee sources, they are weighing recommendations that would set terms of office and appointment dates for these two posts that would remove them from the normal political patronage of changing Presidential administrations.

The committee, the Congressional sources said, is not expected to make public any new information about C.I.A. covert operations. In addition to its investigation of Chile operations it looked at activities in six foreign countries.

address is not listed in the telephone directory and the Federal Information Center will not give it out. A call to the listed number will get you a taped voice telling you to call back tomorrow as often as not.

That's all right with Culhane. Serious applicants will not be deterred, he said, and a measure of inaccessibility is not out of order when you work for the CIA.

"In intelligence, you attract all kinds of peculiar people," he said. There are about three crank calls a week and some of them, he said, are from people who think the CIA can pull strings in any federal agency to help the caller get what he wants.

"The other day some one called us about a problem with his Veterans Administration pension. 'You fellas are supposed to know everything,' he said. I said I couldn't help him."

Culhane said most applicants fall into two groups: Those just getting out of college and those seeking a change in mid-career, such as military personnel leaving the service. The agency is actively seeking inquiries from women and minorities, he said, and recruitment figures are up in these categories.

"We're getting more minorities because more minorities are thinking of us as being able to use their talents," he said. "And our most productive recruiter is a woman."

ord as a career federal employee, served on the task force that helped set up ACTION, the agency for which he now works. He has been told to find another job because his former employment by the intelligence agency makes him persona non grata. Biddle and his attorney, Irwin Minahberg, call it a violation of his constitutional rights.

Margaret Carroll

PORTLAND OREGONIAN  
15 FEBRUARY 1976

## CIA recruiting booms despite critics, probes

By STEVEN CARTER  
of The Oregonian staff

The Central Intelligence Agency may be under attack in Congress and the press for alleged misdeeds abroad, but the attacks haven't hurt recruiting.

"On the contrary, it's increased it," said Tom Culhane, the CIA's man in Portland. "The average number of written inquiries (about employment) was about 800 a month before the congressional investigations. Since then, it has almost doubled. We're getting anywhere from 1,500 to 1,700 inquiries a month now."

Those are the national figures, he said in a recent interview, but the local statistics are just as good.

Why should interest in working for America's spy agency increase just when it is under some of the heaviest criticism it has faced?

Culhane thinks it is because there are many Americans who are inclined to defend the agency at a time when it is under siege.

"I think underneath some place in the American character there is a reservoir of patriotism," he said. "There are still people who want to serve their country. They don't say so but you can tell in their manner of presentation. They feel there's a moment of crisis for the agency."

Culhane has been with the CIA for almost 25 years, most of that time in personnel work. From Portland, he is responsible for CIA recruiting in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana and Alaska. Occasionally he pitches in in California to help his colleague based in

Los Angeles who covers the whole state. His is one of six CIA recruiting offices in the country, and he is on the road a great deal.

Anyone looking for a cloak-and-dagger career, he said, can forget about the CIA. Self-styled James Bonds need not apply.

"The individual who is seeking the adventurous agent life is largely misled because that isn't what we are looking for."

What is needed, Culhane said, are accountants, chemists, economists, electrical engineers, foreign language specialists, journalists, PhDs in psychology and other skilled — if less glamorous — applicants.

The CIA recruiter said he has had no trouble in employment visits to colleges and universities in Oregon — a recent flap about advertising in the Portland State University Vanguard notwithstanding. (Editors Kathleen Hawkins and Ray Worden face possible dismissal from their posts for refusing to accept recruitment ads from the CIA and military in the student newspaper.)

Culhane's downtown Portland

CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
2 MARCH 1976

## People

A former CIA agent is now a central figure in what promises to be a landmark discrimination case with touches of "Catch-22." A U. S. District Court has ordered the Civil Service Commission to hold an open hearing in early April on the complaint of Eric Biddle, Jr., Biddle, a Harvard graduate with a superior rec-

Los Angeles Times

Sun., Feb. 29, 1976

# Ford's Intelligence Reform Plan

## Modest Changes at Top

BY HARRY ROSITZKE

After an almost solid year of congressional inquiry into the "abuses" of the President's intelligence community, the President beat Congress to the draw 10 days ago with his own proposals for "reform." He did not solve "the CIA problem" or any other problem, for the main issues, such as they are, lie between the Congress and the executive, not within the executive itself.

What the President has done is make some modest changes in his top intelligence hierarchy, propose public guidelines and legislation to provide

*Harry Rositzke retired in 1970 after 23 years with the CIA. His book on CIA secret operations will be published next winter.*

"stringent protections for the rights of American citizens"—which no one will argue with—and sponsor a law "to safeguard critical intelligence secrets"—which many will argue with.

The President's reorganization of the intelligence community focuses on the role of the Director of Central Intelligence. The CIA director has always worn two hats: head of the intelligence community and head of his own agency. In practice, no director has been able to carry out his first role with any clout. Presidents Kennedy and Nixon formally instructed him to do so, but he faced an impossible task: to tell the secretary of defense what to do with his intelligence agencies. Military intelligence, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, service intelligence and the National Security Agency, has five times as many people and more than 10 times the budget of CIA and State Department intelligence combined. The CIA director could coordinate and cajole. He could not give orders to the community.

The President now proposes to place the management of intelligence in a high-level Committee on Foreign Intelligence chaired by CIA Director George Bush and including a deputy secretary of defense. He has rightly rejected the notion of an "intelligence czar" sitting in the White House and giving orders to the intelligence chiefs. Neither Congress nor the public would be likely to go along with a further concentration of power in the White House itself.

It remains to be seen what effect the new arrangement will have. One test will come up with the next budget: Can Chairman Bush do what most needs to be done—cut down the overgrown intelligence bureaucracy to a more economical and efficient size? Will he examine the recommendations of the leaked Pike Committee report that the Defense Intelligence Agency be eliminated?

Will he review and possibly curtail the enormous scope of electronic interception carried out by the National Security Agency? These are among the larger issues a director with clout should deal with.

There remains a basic weakness in the present command structure. If the director of CIA is to spend most or all of his time running the intelligence community as a whole, his deputy must take on the task of running the CIA itself. That deputy, by long-term practice, has been a senior general or admiral when the director is a civilian—as he has been for many years.

Perhaps it is time to give the No. 2 job to a civilian intelligence professional who will simply run the shop, and not get into the high-level Washington politics that diverted both directors Richard Helms and William E. Colby from their intelligence job and ended their CIA careers.

The President had little to say about the handling of covert action proposals, a major issue in Washington ever since the exposure of CIA activities in Chile. He has simply raised the level at which such proposals will be considered within the executive—by the secretaries of State and Defense, and no longer by their deputies, as in the 40 Committee.

No one will cavil at any laws designed to limit domestic surveillance. The judicial review of proposed intercept and monitoring operations even in "national security" cases is an indispensable check on our sometimes overzealous guardians. The time may even come when all forms of "preventive counterintelligence" like searches and surveillance will be banned and employed solely in criminal investigations.

Nor, apparently, will anyone in the present climate object to a law prohibiting the U.S. government from killing foreign leaders. Yet I find it an affront to our nation's dignity. It is triggered, of course, by the aberration that led two Presidents to authorize or condone attempts on the life of former Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba and Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. We will now, almost 15 years later, tell our Presidents not to assassinate anyone in peacetime—as though killing their foreign colleagues were a natural impulse to be curbed by criminal sanctions. In a cooler time a law like this would appear ridiculous.

In another item of his proposed legislation the President abruptly turns the tables on the many vigorous opponents of government secrecy. He wants to make it a crime for federal employees with access to highly classified information to reveal that information "improperly." After a year of wholesale leaks, fished

documents, and book-length exposes, he understandably wants to tighten the federal sieve. Is he going too far?

Even though equating secrecy with abuses has been fortified by the Watergate episode and by some of the revelations in the intelligence hearings, it is an impossible equation for the citizens of a democracy to accept. If everything their government does in secret is *ipso facto* suspect, that spells the end of its effectiveness in secret diplomacy, espionage and counterespionage, advanced military research, and coded communications. A line must be drawn somewhere between good and bad secrets, and only the President, checked by Congress, can draw that line.

He has drawn that line in his present proposal. Government employees with access to highly classified information, particularly those in the intelligence community, must take an oath of secrecy (as many of them now do) and be subject to punishment if they violate it. The oath will be a condition of their employment in sensitive agencies. If they are unwilling, for moral or other reasons, to take an oath of secrecy, they need not take a sensitive job. If they give their word, let them keep it.

I don't find this too much for a chief executive to ask of his employees. Yet the alarms have already rung. The President is trying to impose a British-style Official Secrets Act, some say; he is violating the First Amendment; he is clearly trying to muzzle the press.

This is nonsense. The law would affect only federal employees who leak information related to intelligence sources and methods. It would not affect congressmen who receive the same information from the executive and decide to leak it to the press—and it is worth noting that almost all the leaks of the past year have come out of congressional committees and their staffs. It would affect the media only in those historically rare cases when their sources are federal employees. Nor would any newsman or other citizen be liable for receiving the information.

What the law would do for the intelligence operators, for example, is to prevent an intelligence professional from exposing acts or operations he happens personally to disapprove of, or publicizing the names of intelligence officers and agents he has learned about in his career. If the example of Victor Marchetti, chief author of "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," or of Philip Agee, author of "Inside the Company," were to be followed by a dozen others, however noble or patriotic their reasons, that would spell the end of our secret intelligence capability.

There now are on the books federal laws forbidding the unauthorized disclosure of classified atomic energy information and of communications intelligence, the product of the National Security Agency. These are



tee—and he will get at least two.

What Congress will or can do on its own for reform of the intelligence community is an open question. It is unlikely to do much more than set up two separate oversight committees and possibly act on the President's proposed legislation.

Time is running short for the present Congress, and the election campaign is upon us. After a year of hard committee work, dramatic open hearings, and televised expressions of shock and indignation, its first examination of federal intelligence in 30 years may end up as so many congressional investigations have in the past: a rich record of past sins, a sheet empty of concrete remedies.

## A License for Abuses

BY MORTON H. HALPERIN

With all of the abuses by the CIA that have been brought to light in recent months, it might have been expected that the President would take the lead in overhauling the U.S. intelligence machine.

Instead, President Ford proposes to tinker a little with the tuning, squirt in some oil, polish up the outside, and make sure that disquieting squeaks do not reach the public's ears. As a used-car cleanup, this would be a fraud.

A look at how the President's Executive Order to control the intel-

*Morton Halperin, director of the Project on National Security and Civil Liberties, sponsored by the ACLU and the Center for National Security Studies, formerly was a deputy assistant secretary of defense, and on the staff of the National Security Council.*

ligence agencies was written will help to understand its implications.

The White House decided to act after months of procrastination in the wake of publication of the Rockefeller Commission report. Congress appeared to be in disarray over the fiasco of the leaked report of the Pike Committee, and the President's political advisors thought it would be good to have the President do something.

So the heads of the intelligence agencies were called in and told that an Executive Order would be issued restricting and regularizing their activities. Good bureaucrats all, they sensed that the President did not want them, just before the New Hampshire and Florida primaries, to complain that he had undercut their ability to protect the nation by giving in to those who would undermine our security.

The bureaucrats were prepared to accept the limitations proposed by the White House, subject only to a few "reasonable" exceptions to permit them to get on with the job. And in return they asked for and got the criminal and injunctive powers they had long sought and a promise that their past misdeeds would not bring criminal indictments or other corrective actions.

The opening comments of the Pres-

"official secrets," and no one has publicly challenged them as hiding abuses.

The President's wide-ranging package probably will do more to stimulate than pacify congressional demands for "reform." He has not waited for the congressional intelligence committees to come up with their proposals. He has not made any concessions to congressional review of covert political operations. His appointment of a three-man oversight committee of senior citizens, headed by Robert D. Murphy, will not, justifiably, convince the Congress that the President now has "abuses" under control. He has requested a single congressional oversight commit-

tee's public remarks set the tone. One year of intelligence investigations, he said, was enough; just as his predecessor had told us that one year of Watergate was enough. We must not become obsessed with the past, Ford warned. His hope, as Richard Nixon's had been, was that the crimes of the past would be buried.

It was no accident that on the next day the Justice Department decided that former CIA director Richard Helms would not be indicted for burglary. We now can expect that if the President has his way, the perjury, break-ins, mail openings, wiretaps, cable interceptions and other crimes will remain unpunished.

If past abuses were buried, future abuses would not occur, the President assured us, and if they did they would be ferreted out by inspectors general and general counsels of the various agencies supervised by a three-man Oversight Board.

The third plank in the President's program was in many ways the most remarkable. It was a 32-page Executive Order which restructured the management of the intelligence agencies and appeared to put restrictions on what the agencies could do. In his nationally televised press conference the President referred to the order as providing "stringent protections of the rights of American citizens." Only the next day when the order was released did it become clear that far from providing protections for constitutional rights, it actually authorizes most of the abuses of the past.

As the order was being written, each intelligence agency was represented around the table, and each managed to protect its interests.

Atty. Gen. Edward H. Levi and FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley were the most successful. The restrictions in the order apply to "foreign intelligence" agencies. The definition of such agencies concludes as follows: "... Nor shall it include in any case the Federal Bureau of Investigation." Thus the restrictions on intelligence operations at home, such as they are, do not apply to the agency which most of us thought was the only such agency legally free to operate at home.

The other agencies fared almost as

well and in some cases better, since they secured explicit approval for their operations.

The order includes a remarkable section which says in so many words: that electronic surveillance, burglaries (described as "unconsented physical searches," examination of tax returns, and opening mail or examining of envelopes "in United States postal channels" shall be carried out only according to existing regulations and only as "lawful." One can only conclude that other techniques are not limited to "lawful" methods or applicable regulations.

The National Security Agency illustrates very well the real effects of the Executive Order. Responding to the demand for public charters, there is for the first time a full-page description of the functions of this agency. It is gobbledegook of an advanced kind which tells the reader only that the agency has responsibility for "signals intelligence." What the agency in fact does is to make and break codes and to intercept all other messages in the air, including those connected with Soviet missile tests.

So far so good, but NSA like the other intelligence agencies was unable to resist intruding on communications within the United States. Since the end of World War II, NSA, with the cooperation of the cable companies has been scanning all of the cable traffic leaving the United States. NSA claims that the cooperation of the cable companies ended last year, but NSA is still intercepting cable traffic.

This raised two problems. First, there was a presidential directive in 1967 limiting electronic surveillance in the United States to the FBI. The Ford order changes that, authorizing other agencies, except the CIA, to conduct electronic surveillance with the approval of the attorney general.

The second problem seemed more serious. NSA of late has concentrated on searching the cable traffic for what is called economic intelligence. The agency was reading cables sent abroad by American business firms to learn what it could about economic conditions in foreign countries, including their plans for purchasing American goods.

Ford's Executive Order, in a carefully written paragraph, seeks to authorize such interceptions without anyone realizing what is going on. A careful look is instructive, since it gives an insight into what is going on in every line of the new order.

The key paragraph appears in the section labeled "Restrictions on Collection" which begins as follows: "Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in any of the following activities." Item No. 7 in the list reads: "Collection of information, however acquired, concerning the domestic activities of United States persons except . . ." And then in the first exception comes the authority sought by NSA: "... information, concerning corporations or other commercial organizations which constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence." A look back to the list of definitions reveals that "foreign intelligence" means "info-

NEW YORK TIMES  
29 Feb. 1976

# Reform of Intelligence Is No Longer A Certainty

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

WASHINGTON — There has been a perceptible change in the political atmosphere here which has left Congressional critics of the intelligence agencies in confusion and disarray and which threatens to materially hamper an effort to legislate new controls of intelligence activities.

The turning point in public opinion, or at least in the Washington view of the public's opinion, appears to have been shortly after the murder of Richard S. Welch, a Central Intelligence Agency official, in Athens last Dec. 23.

From the beginning of the investigations of the intelligence agencies, nearly 15 months ago, the then director of Intelligence, William E. Colby Jr., had warned that injudicious disclosure of operational information might endanger the lives of the agencies' officers. The warning was part of the strategy of the Ford Administration and the intelligence "community" at fending off critics and Congressional investigators.

There is no evidence that Mr. Welch's death resulted directly or indirectly from the investigations.

But neither Mr. Colby nor President Ford chose to rule this possibility out, and some executive branch officials were saying privately that "the dismantling" of the intelligence agencies had somehow been responsible for the killing.

With or without justification, Mr. Welch's death remained associated with the inquiry into intelligence methods. His death was followed shortly by unauthorized disclosures of information on C.I.A. activity in Angola and Italy and then by what Mr. Colby called a deluge of leaks when the news media published the findings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. For more than 60 days the drumfire of these events has kept the two Congressional investigating committees on the defensive. Indeed, in the case of the House committee, it has become the investigated rather than the investigator.

Mr. Ford and his advisers sensed the Congressional disarray two weeks ago and chose that moment to publish a conservative plan for reorganization and reform of the intelligence community. The plan would have been far less palatable six months earlier. He also proposed a law against intelligence leaks which alarmed many civil libertarians because it appeared to drape even more secrecy over government.

## Evidence Ignored

What many on Capitol Hill find most dismaying is that the change in atmosphere has obscured the extensive evidence of abuse and wrongdoing unearthed by the investigations, at a time when this information should be generating pressure for legislative controls on the intelligence agencies. In late 1974 and early 1975, they argue, there was strong public support for stopping secret-police activities. While the investigations of the agencies never amounted to a Watergate nor attracted that level of public attention, several Representatives and Senators said they believed that the public strongly disapproved of unregulated wire-tapping, break-ins and other intrusions on privacy.

"I think there was a substantial reservoir for support of this investigation," one senior aide on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said. "But I think that this committee and the House committee

mation concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of any foreign power, or of any non-United States person, whether within or outside the United States, or concerning areas outside the United States."

Put all that together and translate it into English and one learns that NSA is authorized to monitor the overseas cable traffic of Americans for the purpose of learning about their dealings with foreign governments or companies, their activities in foreign countries, and the information that they may have obtained about foreign countries.

CIA also receives authority from the President in the Executive Order to continue carrying on many programs in the United States. The agency intended by Congress to operate abroad, if at all, is given permission to conduct clandestine operations in the United States to gather information from foreigners and from Americans in a wide variety of circumstances and to conduct Cointelpro-type operations against organizations in the United States whose members are primarily foreigners associated with a foreign government.

Most of the rationales used by the CIA to justify domestic spying in the past are specifically endorsed. Thus the agency is authorized to investigate present and former CIA employees, people who come in contact with them, those who threaten the security of its installations, and those who are potential sources of information. Americans abroad may come under CIA surveillance if they threaten national security.

The CIA's much-debated covert operations come off almost unscathed. They are specifically authorized and new procedures are instituted for their approval. The only limit put on them is a ban on political assassinations. Bribery, kidnaping, creating false propaganda, interfering in free elections, all activities carried on in the past by the CIA are unmentioned and hence unrestricted.

If the Executive Order puts few restraints on the intelligence agencies, the fourth part of the President's package is designed to ensure that information about abuses will not again leak to the Congress or the public. The President proposes a statute making it a crime for a member of an intelligence organization or a former employee to disclose information about intelligence sources and methods to an unauthorized person. Disclosure to a member of Congress is included unless it is pursuant to a lawful demand of a regular committee.

As the phrase "sources and methods" is defined by the intelligence community, the individuals who released each of the following pieces of information would have been guilty if the proposed law were on the books: the Pentagon Papers, the secret war in Laos, the American inter-

vention in Angola, the plots to assassinate foreign leaders, the CIA CHAOS program, the NSA cable-reading program, the budgets of the intelligence agencies, and the failure to destroy biological toxins. Basically, no former or present official of the U.S. government could talk about any activities of the intelligence agencies or any information learned by them about foreign governments, without running a grave risk of violating the statute.

Nor would members of the press who ran the leaked stories be free from prosecution. It is true, as the Administration emphasizes, that the journalist would not be subject to the criminal penalties in the bill. However, a reporter who ran a story exposing intelligence sources or methods could be called before a grand jury and asked to reveal the source of the story. A refusal could lead to a contempt citation.

The President sought to tie up his package by persuading the Congress to leave the intelligence agencies alone. His proposed solution was a small joint committee which would replace all existing oversight committees. The joint committee would receive information in secret and agree not to make it public without the consent of the President.

The Ford program is well designed to accomplish its objective of freeing the intelligence agencies from any supervision but that of the President. Ford assures us that he and future Presidents will prevent abuse, but his own conduct in putting forward this plan, not to speak of the activities of his predecessors, argues forcefully for the need for outside controls.

The Senate Government Operations Committee took the first step forward last week by reporting out a resolution setting up a Senate intelligence committee with control over the budgets of all intelligence organizations and with the right to make information public. The full Senate ought to support the creation of this committee, and the House should set up a similar body.

Much more remains to be done:

—A special prosecutor should be appointed to examine the crimes of the intelligence agencies which the President seeks to sweep under the rug.

—Those who have been subject to surveillance in the past must be notified of their rights.

—Congress should establish clear charters for each intelligence agency which restricts them to activities consistent with the Bill of Rights.

—Congress should make it a crime for officials of intelligence agencies willfully to violate their charters or to lie about the activities of their agencies.

President Ford has put the country on notice that he is unwilling to bring the intelligence agencies under control. Now Congress must act.

have squandered a good deal of it away." He and several others argue that both should have completed their jobs more quickly and passed the authority to permanent oversight committees. Senate and House aides condemned the leaks and said that if they did come from Congress they have irreparably lessened the chances that the legislative branch share in national security information.

There is also considerable opinion on the Hill that both Senator Frank Church, Idaho Democrat, and Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk County, L.I., directed the investigations with their Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations. The belief is that this may well have eyes on their political careers as well as on the resulted in delays or direction changes.

### Reformers Worry

The Senate Select Committee is now expected to make its report and recommendations public in mid-

March. Most informed sources, both in the Administration and on the committee, see little chance of reform legislation before 1977 except for creating oversight committees. Some members of Congress fear that laws to regulate wiretapping, prohibit burglaries, limit computerized dossiers, and otherwise control the government's ability to spy on American citizens will fall entirely by the wayside.

"It would be the final irony," one Capitol Hill aide said, "if all that resulted from this year of investigations is a new secrecy law."

The main hope, one critic of the intelligence agencies suggests, is that President Ford will prove to have overstepped himself by offering such a limited program for reform and reorganization, provoking enough new debate to return the public's attention to the abuses rather than the leaks.

Nicholas M. Horrock is a reporter in the Washington bureau of The New York Times.

THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS  
27 February 1976

## Swinging Pendulum

"I GOT hit," says Daniel Schorr, "by a swinging pendulum." He may be right. If so, it was high time the pendulum got to swinging.

Schorr, of course, is the CBS correspondent who turned over to the Village Voice the officially suppressed report of the House Intelligence Committee, for which act he is under investigation by the House. The investigation led to his suspension by CBS.

"There have always been in our country two great urges," Schorr said in a news conference apologia Wednesday, "one toward security, one toward liberty. The pendulum constantly swings between them. . . But security always comes back. And the pendulum appears to have started its return course. . ." The veteran correspondent aches where the pendulum struck him.

One reason for the violence of the blow is the vast distance the pendulum had to travel for it to find Daniel Schorr. For months the two congressional committees investigating the U.S. intelligence establishment—aided and egged on by much of the media—have thought fit to tell national security secrets that only a few years ago would never have been let out.

Disclosure after disclosure has eroded the prestige and effectiveness of once-respected organizations like the FBI and CIA. Not only has their effectiveness been damaged here at home but also abroad. All too little thought has been given to the rather fundamental proposition that the American public's "right to know" means, by extension, the world's "right to know." We have hung our dirty laundry out in view of the whole planet, and the

sight has been manifestly unappealing.

But now the pendulum has begun swinging back. The House overrode its intelligence committee chairman's objections and voted to keep secret the committee's report until it could be edited with a view to the national safety.

Enter Schorr at this point. He has a copy of the report. The House will not publish the report, will it? Very well; Daniel Schorr will see that the Truth Comes Out. The Village Voice, a somewhat seamy Greenwich Village publication, is eager to strike a blow for liberty. And so the Truth Comes Out.


One point in Schorr's analysis of the ensuing flap is regrettable.

He poses a dichotomy between freedom and security. There need be no such dichotomy—not if responsible freedom is what is aimed at and not the brand of who-cares-let-it-all-hang-out freedom espoused by Schorr.

There most assuredly exists a right to know. But as The News has observed before, that right is far from absolute. The safety and security of the nation is a consideration that matters, if only because without public safety, there can be no real freedom—something Schorr would know had he ever read Thomas Hobbes.

Ideally, the pendulum ought to dangle somewhere midway between liberty and security; between the right to know all and the right to know nothing. By no means ought security to become a secular deity. Balance is what we need; balance, sad to say, is what we have so conspicuously lacked for so many months now.

NEW YORK TIMES  
20 Feb. 1976



by Ohlsson

### The C.I.A.'s Helpers

To the Editor:

I am absolutely appalled at the furor being created in the media and in the Congress over revelations that certain journalists, missionaries and other Americans traveling overseas in years past assisted the C.I.A. by reporting to that agency certain of their observations overseas. I am appalled that the rendering of such assistance to our Government is described as an act of wrongdoing, the perpetrators of which must be exposed and humiliated. In my judgment, those who have assisted our Government by serving as its eyes and ears overseas should be honored, and the practice should be encouraged. Equally appalling is that reporting of the discourse respecting this matter does not even include reference to the possibility—however ridiculous the arbiters of discourse might view it—that in the cold, cruel world in which we live, a world in which our adversaries don't comport themselves according to any law other than the law of the jungle, it might just not be immoral for an American citizen to have the temerity to tell the American Government what he saw and heard overseas.

STANLEY W. KALLMANN  
Morristown, N. J., Feb. 11, 1976

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1976

# Senate Panel Acts to Prevent Leaks in Spy Study

By NICHOLAS M. HORRUCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28. — The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will take extraordinary precautions next week to prevent its final report from being leaked to the news media, committee sources say.

The chapters of the draft report, which have been prepared separately, will be put together in closed session as the committee begins editing its findings on abuses by intelligence-gathering agencies.

It was in a similar editing period that portions of the House Intelligence Committee's report were leaked to the press in late January. That report has not yet been officially released, and the disclosures have touched off a controversy over security.

To avoid any leaks this time, the sources said, the Senate Committee will mark each page of each draft chapter with the name of the Senator who is to receive it. The name will be emblazoned across the text to make it difficult to photocopy the material without revealing the original recipient of the document.

## Copies to Be Restricted

Unlike the Senators on the committee, who will be able to keep the report in their possession at all times, the staff will be issued copies of the report on a restricted basis and all staff copies will be retrieved each night.

The Committee has agreed not to issue advance copies of the report to the Ford Administration or the intelligence agencies, but it will permit Administration and intelligence officials to read the report on the Senate's premises.

The committee also plans to control sternly all document-copying machines in its offices, perhaps placing guards at the machines, and guards are expected to spot-check packages of employees as they leave the offices.

"We simply cannot let happen to us what happened to the House committee," one senior staff member said. "It have them selectively leaked into the news media."

Other committee sources also obscure the committee's work by creating controversy over the security of the documents and could lend credence to the view that Congressional

## Conversations Also Limited

The committee has also warned staff members not to have any unauthorized conversations with reporters and not to discuss the substance of their work with outsiders.

Some of these security precautions have already affected the give and take between the committee and reporters.

The committee security officer, Benjamin Marshall, said through a committee spokesman that he would not even discuss the security proposals for fear of compromising them. Other committee sources urged reporters to publish the precautions so as to deter unauthorized disclosures.

Part of the problem has

been the committee's apparent confusion over when and how to bring its investigation to a close. Recent interviews with committee sources indicated the tentative but likely schedule.

The committee hopes to prepare a full report and turn it over to the full Senate around March 15. This report will carry a wide range of "recommendations" to reform and reorganize the intelligence agencies, but the committee will not actually submit any bills.

## Oversight Panel Proposed

The committee has already recommended that the Senate form a new 11-member committee to oversee the intelligence apparatus. This bill is wending its way through the legislative process.

The committee's final report is not expected to expose new covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency or break unusual new ground in the areas of domestic surveillance, but the final report will contain new detail and explanation on both C.I.A. and Federal Bureau of Investigation activities.

It is also expected to make some fresh disclosures about the C.I.A.'s manipulation of foreign and domestic news media. Committee sources said that the staff do not yet know the names of major American news media that were infiltrated by the C.I.A. These sources said even if the committee obtained these names, it would be unlikely that they would be made public.

Several staff studies may not be ready by the mid-March date and will be published in the subsequent weeks. The procedure is similar to that adopted by the Senate Watergate Committee.

## National Security Data

The committee is expected to have less difficulty than the House Intelligence Committee did on the question of whether its report contains national security data. It has worked closely with the White House and the intelligence agencies over the last two months to iron out questions on national security data in the report.

Interviews with members and staff members have disclosed that many are deeply concerned that the yearlong investigation would, in the end,

have little effect on the intelligence agencies. One aide said that the investigation "established that Congress could make inquiries into these areas and get answers" but he wondered out loud, as have others, whether the investigation should have established "something far more concrete."

Several sources said that unless the committee's final report touched off new debate and discussion, the responsibility for reform and reorganization would rest mainly upon the new Congressional oversight committees.

Even if those committees are created by Congress before the coming election, these sources said that there was little chance they could get down to serious business before 1977.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1976

# After Investigating U.S. Intelligence

By William E. Colby

WASHINGTON—A year of unprecedented investigation of United States intelligence has ended. It has not been the first investigation. Others followed Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs and the exposure of Central Intelligence Agency assistance to foundations and voluntary associations. But those were conducted, as other nations do, by special boards of inquiry that made their investigations and took testimony in secret.

This year's investigations looked into the secret recesses. But they also brought the klieg lights of television to them as they probed. They did not result only in a final set of conclusions and recommendations.

Were they necessary? Were they effective? Were they damaging? Did something new emerge? The final assessment cannot yet be made, but I believe they have provided the foundation for a new meaning for the much-abused initials C.I.A.—constitutional intelligence for America.

Necessary? After Vietnam, Watergate and sensational allegations that a rogue elephant was loose threatening our citizens and our good name—

certainly. The public would no longer "shut your eyes" (as one member of Congress once suggested) to intelligence. And it would not be satisfied with a covering of "national security." Some public review and exposure was indeed necessary.

Effective? Yes. The investigation was facilitated by intelligence's own looks at itself. In 1973 it looked back for any "questionable activities" in its past, and directed that they be corrected for the future. On several occasions it criticized its own performance to find ways to improve itself. These self-examinations were made available to the investigating committees, which then checked them independently, and with sworn testimony, to find that indeed they were comprehensive.

Damaging? Yes, to a degree. The sensational atmosphere frightened many foreign friends of American intelligence. It caused a number of sources to withhold their cooperation. Leaks and even formally published reports of activities long since corrected provided enemies of America with a cornucopia of details with which to assail our country and its friends for years to come.

And selective exposure of some of intelligence's own self-criticism gave

a totally false impression of American intelligence as a whole.

But intelligence did essentially succeed in protecting its individual sources and its sensitive relationships with foreign intelligence services from exposure, at the price of running battle with committees and staff members.

Did something new emerge? Yes. Intelligence has traditionally existed in a shadowy field outside the law. This year's excitement has made clear that the rule of law applies to all parts of the American Government, including intelligence. In fact, this will strengthen American intelligence. Its secrets will be understood to be necessary ones for the protection of our democracy in tomorrow's world, not covers for mistake or misdeed. The guidelines within which it should, and should not, operate will be clarified for those in intelligence and those concerned about it. Improved supervision will insure that the intelligence agencies will remain within the new guidelines.

The American people will understand and support their intelligence services and press their elected representatives to give intelligence and its officers better protection from irresponsible exposure and harassment.

The rate of the past year were high.



THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday, February 24, 1976

but they will be exceeded by the value of this strengthening of what was already the best intelligence service in the world.

William E. Colby was Director of Central Intelligence.

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 Feb. 1976

## SCHORR 'LEAK' HURT SECURITY, BUSH SAYS

WASHINGTON, Feb. 22 (UPI)—George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, said today that national security had been harmed by a leak of parts of a report by the House Select Committee on Intelligence to The Village Voice newspaper, but he did not know if damage could be proved "in a court of law."

Asked if there was anything damaging in the report purchased from Daniel Schorr CBS newsmen by the New York weekly newspaper, Mr. Bush said that there are certain things in there, but if I told you those specifics that would highlight those and make things worse."

He said on NBC's "Meet the Press," that "the fundamental question is that Congress voted by almost 2-to-1 that the report not be made public, and it was made public . . . That's just plain wrong."

Mr. Bush acknowledged that "there were clearly abuses, there were awful abuses" in the C.I.A. involving both domestic spying and foreign tactics, but he praised President Ford's proposals for tightening C.I.A. oversight in the legislative and executive branches and new laws making it a crime for a Government employee to leak secret information."

"There will be, I think, a better and more responsive system for people [within Government] . . . to safeguard the people of this country from the kinds of abuses that offended me and offend you," Mr. Bush said.

The Washington Star  
Monday, D-7  
March 1, 1976

## 'I never fingered Richard Welch . . .'

The comment accompanying your front-page photograph of me on Jan. 16 was in error. I never "fingered" Richard Welch to Counter-spy, the Athens News or to any other publication or person. However, I continue to help other journalists, and would have helped the Athens News in identifying the CIA people if asked.

Welch was identified in print as a CIA officer as early as 1968, and several times thereafter. The view that I am behind the rash of identifications is inaccurate. Increasingly, journalists and others opposed to the CIA's promotion of repression are determined that CIA people accept personal responsibility for their acts and those of the institution to which they belong.

Exposing CIA people and their Role Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410002-0

## Wrong Problem at the CIA

Given the type of attention that has been focused on the Central Intelligence Agency over the last year or so, it has been predictable enough that efforts at "reform" would center on greater centralization of the intelligence function. No type of reform could do more harm.

The attention has defined "the CIA problem" as "dirty tricks." This problem has been real enough, and a tighter scrutiny of covert operations is clearly in order. The committee supervising such operations ought not to authorize them without holding a real meeting, for example. No doubt the attention and debate will sensitize officials to the danger of excesses, and a committee specifically charged with oversight is a prudent idea. But beyond that, proposals to solve the dirty tricks problem are bound to have a certain cosmetic quality.

This is because no one has any solution. Aside from a few newspaper columnists still rioting against Vietnam, no one really wants to outlaw all covert operations. And no one has any very good suggestions about which to outlaw and which to sanction. The truth is that there is no way to program a computer to make such decisions; some things still must be left to the judgment of responsible officials. No doubt they have made and will make mistakes, but taken as a whole the revelations of the last year do not lead us to believe that the dirty tricks problem is a crisis for American society, or even the chief problem of the intelligence services.

Yet in trying to frame cosmetic solutions to this problem, nothing is more natural than to centralize. The notion is that dirty tricks result from loose controls, and can be prevented by more centralized control. Thus the main feature of President Ford's reforms is to give the Director of Central Intelligence "resource control" over all intelligence services, or in other words, budget authority over not only the CIA but intelligence functions in the Pentagon and elsewhere. Otis Pike's House Select Committee on Intelligence has proposed going even further, entirely abolishing the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Representative Pike's committee ought to read its own report. At least in the version leaked and now in the public domain, it is in many ways a sloppy and shallow report, but it does show some sense of the real problem. It notes for example, untimely and continual personnel change-overs, with no danger of violence if exposed people return to Langley, Va. Thus, the policy underlying the CIA's work — which shows no possibility for change until fundamental internal changes occur — can be blunted, to some degree at least, by weakening the instrument through which the policy is applied.

Philip Agee

Cambridge, England

(NOTE — Mr. Agee, a former CIA officer, is the author of "C.I.A. Diary.")

that covert operations "have been forced on a reluctant CIA." It concludes, "All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs."

Even more importantly, the Pike Committee report provides plenty of evidence that such responsiveness by various intelligence agencies extends not merely to covert operations, but to the shaping of intelligence itself. In Vietnam, for example, "pressure from policy-making officials to produce positive intelligence indicators reinforced erroneous assessment of allied progress and enemy capabilities." On the current dispute over possible Soviet violations of the strategic arms agreements, similarly, it remarks on "Dr. Kissinger, with his passion for secrecy and his efforts to consolidate ultimate control of important intelligence functions, through his various bureaucratic roles."

This, not dirty tricks, is the classical problem of intelligence. In debating what later proved to be deliberate German violations of the naval disarmament treaties in 1935, Winston Churchill complained, "somewhere between the Intelligence Service and the ministerial chief there has been some watering down or whittling down of the facts." Prime Minister Baldwin defended his policies by explaining that in any event rearmament was not politically realistic, especially since the pacifist issue had just cost the government the by-election at Fulham.

Intelligence indicators are always murky and subject to different interpretations, after all, and intelligence communities are by nature inbred. The danger is that what will prevail in the murk, consciously or not, are subtle pressures for conformity and above all the political needs of policymakers to win public support for their policies or simply to get past the next election.

This problem can never be wholly solved, but clearly it will be exacerbated by abolishing some of the present intelligence agencies, or even by centralizing the budget control crucial in any bureaucracy. Quite the contrary, the real solution to the problem of the CIA would concentrate on ways to keep the analysis of intelligence decentralized and as independent as possible.



Monday, Feb. 23, 1976

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Out of the Shadows

## Proposals Clarify CIA's Role

By Walter Pincus  
Washington Post Staff Writer

"The American intelligence service," former Director William E. Colby of the Central Intelligence Agency said in a speech last week, "will now come out of the shadows on the edge of the law."

The shadows were cast by the National Security Act of 1947. It established the CIA and forbade it to exercise "police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal security functions."

At the same time, however, it provided that the CIA director "shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

The shadowy area was thus created. What actions could a CIA director take in the United States to protect his agency's sources and methods, without undertaking police and internal security functions from which he is legally barred?

President Ford attempted last Wednesday to remove the law's ambiguity by an executive order.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, said of the Ford action: "I think the President reaches beyond his powers . . . you cannot change law by executive order."

Church's committee immediately began to plan hearings for early March to review the Ford order.

The public, and most members of Congress before December, 1974, believed that the CIA did not operate inside the United States.

Presidents and intelligence officials knew otherwise, but because they had doubts about how far the agency could go, they wrapped CIA domestic operations in a cloak of secrecy.

On Dec. 22, 1974, The New York Times published a story describing "a massive, illegal domestic operation" against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups. Among the operations described were the maintaining of files on 10,000 U.S. citizens, break-ins, wiretapping, covert mail openings, physical surveillances and infiltrations of dissident groups.

Public concern sparked immediate action. The President appointed a commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller to look into the charges. The Senate and later the House

intelligence investigating committees.

The Rockefeller commission's report confirmed that illegal mail openings had taken place, and that the CIA violated its own charter in a six-year program called Operation CHAOS, a project "to collect, coordinate, evaluate and report on foreign contacts with American dissidents."

CIA's amassing of 7,200 files on Americans, infiltration of domestic groups, wiretapping, bugging, break-ins, and using reviews of tax returns all were listed by the Rockefeller panel as being outside the CIA charter.

Indicative of the CIA's own concerns were several actions described in the Rockefeller report.

In November, 1974, according to the report, the CIA "turned to the National Security Agency 1100 pages of reports of interceptions of international communications of Americans 'because a review of the materials had apparently raised a question of as to the legality of their being held by CIA.'"

In a footnote, the Rockefeller report noted that the CIA's security director in the early 1970s warned at meetings that "surveillance of newsmen was improper" though surveillances were being carried out in 1971 and 1972 at the direction of then CIA Director Richard Helms, in an attempt to track down news leaks.

The Rockefeller commission found, "a great majority" of CIA's domestic activities permissible under the ambiguous law. It noted, however, that by giving the CIA the task of determining foreign influence on domestic groups, the agency inevitably "on some occasions (would) exceed the legislative restrictions."

The commission recommended that the CIA destroy files "which have no foreign intelligence value" from programs such as CHAOS and its own security office's infiltration of dissident groups.

President Ford's order dealing with the issues raised by news reports and the Rockefeller commission about spying on Americans has the following effects:

- **Wiretaps.** The CIA is barred from any wiretapping inside the United States except to test equipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

NSA and CIA, however,

are still permitted to intercept international communications to or from the United States and of Americans abroad, though only under new procedures approved by the Attorney General. A Justice Department official said these procedures are classified.

- **Within the United States,** according to the Justice spokesman, only the FBI is permitted to carry on foreign-intelligence wiretaps. The President will seek legislation to require warrants for such taps. In the interim, a procedure has been established by Attorney General Edward H. Levi that requires written requests and approval by an advisory panel as well as the Attorney General.

- **Break-ins.** The order bars all break-ins within the United States. However, it permits break-ins "directed against United States persons abroad" by the CIA under "procedures approved by the Attorney General." Those procedures, according to a Justice spokesman, are classified.

- **Physical surveillance.** Such surveillances can be undertaken in the United States without warrant by CIA against present or former agency employees, and present or former contractors but only for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of "foreign intelligence, or counterintelligence sources or methods or national security information." The last category includes almost all classified material.

The agency is also permitted to maintain surveillance of U.S. citizens "who contact" present and former CIA personnel or foreigners who are the subject of CIA investigations. A limitation is that the surveillance may continue "only to the extent necessary to identify such U.S. person."

White House aides say that under this provision surveillance may unknowingly include a journalist, but would cease once the person under surveillance is identified as a journalist. The aides said there are classified guidelines applicable to investigations involving journalists.

Overseas, the CIA is permitted to carry on investigations, including surveillance of Americans who are "reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities or activities threatening to the national security."

In the 1960s antiwar and black groups were presumed by the Johnson and Nixon administrations to have received support from North Vietnam, Cuba and other

carrying on activities that threatened the security of the United States.

- **Mail openings.** The CIA is barred from opening any mail "in the United States postal channels." The order does not carry any prohibition against the CIA opening mail to or from Americans in other countries—a practice it carries out, according to intelligence sources.

- **Tax returns.** The CIA is not allowed to inspect tax returns except with Treasury Department approval.

- **Infiltration of domestic groups.** The CIA is prohibited from covert infiltration of U.S. organizations except those "composed primarily of non-United States persons which (are) reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power."

- **Domestic Activities of U.S. citizens.** The CIA is permitted to collect, under the umbrella of protecting classified material, information on the domestic activities of American citizens who are present or former CIA employees, contractors (including their former employees,) applicants for CIA employment and the much wider category of "persons in contact with the foregoing."

The agency is also permitted to gather such information on individuals "reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts" for CIA, but only to determine their "suitability or credibility," apparently to work for the agency.

The CIA can also collect information on domestic activities of Americans if it is done overseas, or if done from "cooperating" U.S. sources as part of foreign-intelligence gathering.

NSA is specifically authorized to collect information on domestic activities of Americans through its international communications intercepts.

CIA is permitted to gather information on Americans who "pose a clear threat" to its facilities or personnel—an authorization that could have covered questioned actions in the past, and apparently would permit inquiry into Counter-Spy, the publication that recently has listed names of CIA employees.

The President's order permits a category not publicly mentioned before. It specifically allows collection of information on the domestic activities of American corporations and other commercial organizations "which constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence."

- **Maintaining files.** The CIA is permitted to maintain files on Americans—even those files developed in intercepts which in

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1976

## Cherne Unit Not Tied to C.I.A. Fund

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20—

Frank Weil, president of the Manhattan-based Norman Foundation, said today that he erred in his assertion yesterday that the Central Intelligence Agency had passed about \$15,000 through his organization to the International Rescue Committee in the mid-1960's.

Mr. Weil said in a telephone interview that on checking the foundation's records, he had discovered that none of the \$27,000 it gave to the I.R.C. from 1961 to 1965 had been provided by the intelligence agency.

He said that the \$50,000 in C.I.A. funds passed through the foundation in that period had gone instead to four other organizations—the American Society of African Culture, the African-American Institute, the Pan American Foundation and the International Development Foundation.

Leo Cherne, one of President Ford's three appointees to a new intelligence oversight board set up to check for possible abuses of authority by the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies, is board chairman of the I.R.C.

Mr. Cherne, a professional economist, said the I.R.C.'s work involves assistance to political refugees round the world. The I.R.C. project funded by the Norman Foundation was

a medical-service unit set up in the Belgian Congo to aid Angolan refugees and others.

Mr. Weil said today that he "misrecalled" himself yesterday in recollecting that "a mysterious gentleman" from the C.I.A. had approached him in 1963 or 1964 with a specific request to pass agency money to the Congo medical project. He said he had also erred in recalling that the foundation had agreed to serve as a pass-through for the funds only after deciding that the I.R.C. project would have been worthy of a contribution from its own endowment.

## 'I Was Wrong'

"Let me make it very clear," he said in the interview, "I made a mistake. I was wrong."

Although he spoke to Mr. Cherne last night and again this morning, he said, Mr. Cherne "did not ask me to do anything" with respect to setting the record straight. He is amending his earlier statements because "harm has been done," he emphasized.

Mr. Cherne was appointed in 1973 to sit on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which The New York Times reported erroneously today was abolished by Mr. Ford this week. It was the United States Intelligence Board that was abolished by executive order on Wednesday.

The President's Intelligence

Board, created by President Eisenhower in 1956, is a group of private citizens responsible for reviewing the functions of the Federal intelligence community and reporting to the President on the conduct of those agencies.

The United States Intelligence Board was a high-level coordinating group within the intelligence community, presided over by the director of Central Intelligence. In the past it met as often as each week to coordinate intelligence data available from all members of the community.

In a related development Freedom House, an organization with which Mr. Cherne has also been closely associated for many years, asked George Bush, director of Central Intelligence, whether the C.I.A. had ever given it funds "directly or through any other entity."

The request was in a letter sent to Mr. Bush that mentioned a report, also in today's Times, that Freedom House received \$3,500 from the J. M. Kaplan Fund between 1962 and 1964.

The Times article quoted executives of the Kaplan Fund as having said that while they had passed C.I.A. money to the now-defunct Institute for International Labor Research, all the funds paid by them to Freedom House or to the I.R.C. had been their own.

1974 were considered so problematical that they were returned to NSA.

The President's order, in the field of files, creates an ambiguity. At one point it specifically prohibits distribution of information on individuals who present "a clear threat" to a CIA facility outside the agency. But in the next section of the order, it states that nothing shall prohibit dissemination of just such information to all other agencies gathering foreign intelligence.

• Dissemination. Agencies are permitted to disseminate to "appropriate law enforcement agencies," information picked up "incidentally" to any operation when there may be "a violation of law."

There is no prohibition on distributing "incidentally gathered information" such as political gossip.

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 Feb. 1976

# Laws, Men And the C. I. A.

By Anthony Lewis

WASHINGTON, Feb. 22—The C.I.A. activities brought to light during the last year—domestic spying, assassination plots and the rest—troubled many Americans as not only immoral but illegal. It concerned people, it frightened them, that a powerful secret agency seemingly operated in large areas without any authority in law.

For example, the National Security Act of 1947, the C.I.A.'s basic charter, had been generally understood to bar it from any domestic activities. Yet the Rockefeller commission found that the agency had run a massive domestic probe of antiwar groups, Operation Chaos, that "unlawfully exceeded the C.I.A.'s statutory authority."

Seen against that background, President Ford's intelligence reorganization plan is disturbing. For it does not try to establish a clear basis in law—in statutes—for what the intelligence agencies can and cannot do. It leaves most of the controls to executive orders, and it even purports to authorize by order some things that had been considered unlawful.

Mr. Ford's order says that foreign intelligence agencies generally may not operate inside the country. But then follows a long list of exceptions.

One exception is that the agencies may conduct "physical surveillance" of present or former employees, or employees of contracting firms to stop unauthorized disclosure of "national security information." In other words, the C.I.A. can spy on a former official

to keep him from disclosing that the United States is running a secret war in Laos or intervening in Angola.

Another exception indicates that the C.I.A. may on occasion examine Americans' tax returns. Another allows it to infiltrate organizations in this country if they are made up largely of foreigners and are "reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power." Another allows collection of corporate information when it "constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence."

Now it may be that some or all of those things have to be done. But is it clear that they should be done by our foreign intelligence agencies rather than by a domestic police organization?

An even more important question is whether the C.I.A. should—or can—be given such powers by executive order. This is not just a narrow question of law. It is a fundamental question of constitutional legitimacy.

In the American system of government, the exercise of power must always be linked to some authority in law. We do not, like the British, put our faith in individuals and unwritten traditions; we believe in formal rules and institutions.

When President Truman seized the nation's steel mills to stop a strike during the Korean War, the Supreme Court reflected a deep public instinct in deciding that such a step went beyond any "inherent powers" of the President. Similarly here, political wisdom as well as the Constitution coun-

sels that President Ford go to Congress for legislation. Otherwise he will appear to be saying that the way to deal with intelligence illegalities is to declare them legal.

What the intelligence community needs above all is to restore the public confidence that has broken down. The legislative process, whatever its faults, is a powerful way to build consensus in this country. An order imposed suddenly by a President, without public debate, and subject to sudden change by future Presidents, is never going to restore a sense of legitimacy.

It is just as important to establish rules of law for covert action abroad as for the domestic side. Relying on "inherent powers" of the President for legal authority, as Mr. Ford has done, is too uncertain and too dangerous. There has been real doubt that the 1974 act authorized any covert action aside from intelligence-gathering. Those doubts can only be settled, and legitimacy established, by carefully drawn legislative limits.

Legitimacy should also be an aim in planning oversight of the C.I.A. and the other agencies. That the Executive should scrutinize its own operations is fine, but experience has shown the foolishness of relying entirely on any institution to police itself, especially when shielded from public scrutiny.

As a major reform after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy reconstituted the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. It failed utterly to stop abuses and illegalities. Now Presi-

WASHINGTON POST

23 FEB 1976

# The President's Secrecy Legislation

IF YOU AGREE with Philip Agee, whose letter appears on this page today, you will find the reforms of the Central Intelligence Agency and the secrecy legislation proposed by President Ford wholly inadequate. Mr. Agee—and some others—believe the CIA is an organization whose agents and activities should be publicly identified and exposed because, in their view, its operations are wholly inimical to our true national interest. On the other hand, if you believe, as we do, that there is a place in this imperfect world for secret government activities—as long as they are properly directed and controlled—you may find the President's proposals a reasonable starting point. We have already expressed some views on those reorganization proposals. Today we intend to focus on the details of the President's secrecy legislation which is aimed—rather precisely—at people like Mr. Agee.

The secrecy legislation, as we understand it (it is printed on the opposite page so that you can judge for yourself how narrowly it is drawn) attempts to deter or discourage leaks of information relating only to the *sources and methods* of collecting foreign intelligence and the *methods and techniques* used to evaluate it. It is not a proposal to create an Official Secrets Act (which would punish anyone for revealing any government secrets) or, even, to protect the general run of secret intelligence information, as Mr. Ford seemed to suggest in his press conference. It is not, for example, directed at the *content* of foreign intelligence or information that relates to past or future government policies (except as the publication of a specific piece of intelligence might, by itself, reveal the method by which the information was obtained). Thus, it does not appear to cover such material as the nation's negotiating position on the SALT talks or most of the contents of the Pentagon Papers. It would cover, however, such information as the names of CIA officers and agents, the ways in which they gather information, and such techniques as the use of submarines for intelligence purposes. As fascinating as this kind of information is, it is information we think the government has a legitimate need and, as far as secret agents are concerned, a moral obligation to keep secret. The public identification of such an agent, as in the case of Richard Welch, not only destroys his effectiveness but also may endanger his life. This is a point which Mr. Agee disputes in his letter but which he seems to concede tacitly by suggesting that Mr. Welch should have come in from the cold once his cover was blown. In any case, in a democratic system there is a better way, we think, to work out one's antipathy toward CIA operatives, and that is for Congress to bring them home by outlawing their activities and/or refusing to vote the necessary funds.

In many ways, President Ford's proposal can be regarded as the modernization of a law that went on the books 25 years ago to protect the government's

cryptographic and communication intelligence activities. That law made it a crime for anyone—in or out of the government—knowingly to communicate to unauthorized persons any information concerning codes, ciphers and methods of intercepting communications and analyzing them. Mr. Ford's proposal puts other ways of gathering intelligence on an equal footing with code-breaking and communications interception, but with some differences. The most important of these is that Mr. Ford does not propose to try to punish private citizens, such as journalists, who have no relationship with government, for revealing this kind of information; the old code statute does.

Once this much is said about the general thrust of Mr. Ford's secrecy legislation, some specific problems need to be recognized. One is that, while agencies like the CIA need to protect legitimate sources and methods, they should not be able to hide illegitimate secrets under so stringent a secrecy statute. Missing from the President's proposal is anything to make legal, indeed to encourage, low level personnel's revealing information concerning illegal or unauthorized activities, such as some of those undertaken by the CIA in the past. Congress should put such a provision into the statute and, to make it workable, spell out in more detail than does the new executive order, what the limits are to be on intelligence-gathering methods.

A second troublesome area that the proposed legislation does not address is the old bureaucratic trick of placing a small amount of highly classified material in a document made up mostly of unclassifiable but embarrassing information—and giving the whole package the highest classification. That can perhaps be best handled in terms of this statute by broadening the scope of judicial review of the legitimacy of the classification of the specific information that was or is about to be revealed. Similarly, Congress needs to broaden somewhat, and clarify, the part of this proposal that says revelation of information already in the public domain cannot be punished.

Unlike most other secrecy statutes that have been proposed in recent years or adopted in the past, the President's version, if modified as we have suggested, would balance reasonably well the conflicting needs for some secrecy and much freedom of information. It is sharply limited in the kind of information that can be kept secret and it avoids First Amendment problems by placing its barriers on those who chose in the first place to engage in secret work. There may come a time in the history of the world when distrust and aggression among nations diminish so much that the need for government secrecy will disappear. But that time is not yet. And until it arrives, the government can quite properly take stringent steps to protect at least the sources and methods by which it learns what is going on elsewhere in the world.

WASHINGTON POST

23 FEB 1976

## Philip Agee on Exposing CIA Agents

President Ford has appointed a new oversight board: three private citizens, average age just under 70, who will be available part-time. Pollyanna would have trouble finding any hope in that.

In sum, the Ford intelligence plan cried out for Congressional attention. The Senate, at least, appears likely to set up a meaningful oversight committee. That committee should have jurisdiction over intelligence budgets: the key to making the Executive listen. And its first duty should be to start through the legislative process the laws by which the intelligence community will live.

The Washington Post's indignant accusation that I or others engaged in exposing the CIA were responsible for the death of Richard Welch suffers the inadequacies of many a first, emotional response.

There was no "invitation to kill him" nor was his death inevitable once he had been identified. In my view his identification, as well as all the others, should be taken as an invitation to return to Langley. No harm will occur there.

By what right does the CIA promote political repression and subvert the institutions of other countries in the first place? That personal accountability of government officials found so lacking during Vietnam and Watergate is no less required of CIA people. But as long as they operate with impunity under cover, their accountability will be restricted to bureaucratic channels subject to the same cover-ups that have dominated the Rockefeller Commission's report and the reports of the

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
22 February 1976

## Harnessing the CIA

congressional committees.

No one can deny the family tragedy. But what about the other families whose members have been lost to the CIA-supported security services in South Korea, Indonesia, Iran, Brazil, Chile? Need Greece be mentioned?

The Post is concerned with "extra-legal punishment" of Welch who was "accused of no crime" but where is The Post's call for details of his work and others' that would provoke such violence? Did The Post call for "congressional processes of review" of the CIA's work in Greece? Does The Post for one minute think Congress or any other reviewing authority would dare investigate the CIA's work with the security services of these countries in the interests of "freedom, democracy and national security"?

The CIA is a secret political police that protects the interests of The Washington Post's owners and those of every other American company. The Agency's operations in Chile were necessary, as they were in Greece and many other countries, given the traditional definition of American national interests. Until fundamental change comes within the United States, political repression will continue to be the work of Mr. Welch's colleagues. We ought to know who they are.

PHILIP AGEE.

Cambridge, England.

The writer is the author of the recently published book, "Inside the Company—A CIA Diary."

(See editorial)

NEW YORK TIMES

22 Feb. 1976

### 'Ineffective' Oversight

To the Editor:

If any of the much-needed proposals to control the United States intelligence agencies are to succeed, they must be accompanied by one revision: a regular rotating committee membership. Failure to include this revision will lead inevitably to cronyism between Congressmen and the intelligence agencies and to ineffective oversight.

EDWARD S. DERMON

Roslyn Heights, N.Y., Feb. 11, 1976

WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)

20 FEBRUARY 1976

### Commentary

Eric Sevareid (CBS TV News): "At this point, a serious problem arises, of a moral nature. While the names of past and present agents working as journalists should be provided to the companies by C.I.A. if they are to trace the pattern of the practice and clean it up, who else is entitled to know these names? Should they be published by a press that has generally insisted on full disclosure about the C.I.A. Should they be given to the Senate committee which would almost certainly mean publication, given the inability of the Congress to keep secrets secret. Some leading journalists and press executives think the answer is yes, to both questions, if their credibility is to be restored. But this act in itself would not allay suspicions that the list is not complete . . ."

The essence of President Ford's reorganization of the foreign intelligence services lies in the focusing of responsibility on the President and on a three-member oversight board which will receive continuing reports on all intelligence activities and will report directly to the President.

The other changes and restrictions, sound though they may be, will be only as effective as the President and the oversight board make them. It is impossible, after all, to foresee all of the methods an intelligence agency might use. Mr. Ford's restrictions cover only a few of the more common or shocking tricks of the spy trade that surfaced during last year's hearings: planned assassinations of foreign leaders, illegal opening of the U. S. mail; infiltration of domestic groups, and so on. Next time it could be something entirely unforeseen.

The past sins of the CIA were committed under a system of supervision so loose as to be nonexistent. Vague suggestions from the White House were translated into sinister plans and activities which, in many instances, the President didn't want to know about and would never have specifically approved. The new system will work only if the President and the oversight board use their judgment as well as the rules in determining what activities are justified and what are not.

The highly controversial question that remains is how deeply Congress will become involved. It is quite proper and indeed essential that Congress be represented in the mechanism for overseeing intelligence operations. It always has been, through the agency of certain committee chairmen. That things got out of hand under the old system was as much the fault of these congressmen as it was of the executive branch.

Mr. Ford's proposal is that Congress create a joint intelligence committee to be kept fully informed of all intelligence activities. This would be better than the old system in that it would provide a more formal and systematic means of

supervision. The question is whether the committee members would have the necessary maturity and proved discretion, and whether the committee's activities could be kept totally free of politics, which would be essential if the haggling and leaks of the recent House Intelligence Committee are to be avoided.

These are big questions. Already some Democrats are referring to Mr. Ford's changes and proposals as a "first step" in the "reform" of our intelligence operations. What are the next steps? When some of them say "reform," we're afraid they really mean "emasculatation" by indiscriminately publicizing every activity that they happen to disapprove.

A good illustration is the decision of the House to consider holding CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr in contempt for the recent publication of the intelligence committee's report. We don't defend Mr. Schorr's behavior for a minute, as we've already made clear. But the duty to protect the secret information was not Mr. Schorr's; it belonged to the members and staff of the intelligence committee. It was they who violated their trust. It is they who should be identified and punished. Yet, so far, the House seems more interested in looking elsewhere for its villains.

Obviously Mr. Ford is right in wanting Congress to patch up its own leaks before it is made privy to any more secrets.

Most members and employees of Congress, we're sure, can be trusted. The trouble is that it takes only one leak to do the damage. So before scrambling for a place in the line to receive further CIA secrets, we suggest that congressmen move slowly—first by demonstrating a willingness to impose the same restraints on themselves that they want imposed on the CIA and that the President wants imposed on employees of the executive branch, and then by setting up a committee like the one Mr. Ford has proposed and making certain that its members and staff are of the highest caliber available.

Los Angeles Times

Sun., Feb. 22, 1976

## CIA Not as Dangerous as Soviet Spy Apparatus, Peking Says

TOKYO (P)—China said Saturday that the CIA is not as dangerous to the world as the KGB, the Soviet secret police and spy apparatus.

Although allowing that crimes committed by CIA agents may be "too numerous to be listed anywhere," Peking's People's Daily said Soviet spies in recent years have outmatched their U.S. counterparts.

The article claimed that more than 90,000 KGB spies are "working in all corners of the world," some disguised as diplomats and journalists, others manning spy planes and ships.

The KGB men collect political, military and economic intelligence as well as engaging in subversive activities, it said. "In West Europe, a major target region, the Soviet espionage activities are ceaseless," the paper charged.



ABC

Mexico City, 15 January 1976

## NAMES OF CIA AGENTS ABROAD DISCLOSED

LE FIGARO considers this information dangerous and not very journalistic.

For the second consecutive day, the extreme left newspaper LIBERATION, started by Jean Paul Sartre, published a list of supposed CIA agents assigned to the French network with headquarters in Paris. In all, the names, code names, addresses, phone numbers and registrations of 44 persons, most of them U.S. Embassy personnel, were publicly exposed. The paper further stated that the head of the Parisian network was Eugene F. Burgstaller, registration A33037371, living at 47 Avenue Georges Mandel, telephone: 727-5293. Eugene F. Burgstaller is listed with the accredited diplomatic corps as an embassy attache.

The U.S. Government called the publication of this list "an irresponsible, abject and seditious act." The Department of State declared that, in its experience, the publication of such lists can incite all sorts of fanatics to attack diplomats personally. This statement alludes to Richard Welch's case; he was assassinated on the doorsteps of his home by three individuals. One month prior to this event, on 25 November, just as LIBERATION is doing now, the extremist newspaper ATHENS NEWS published a list of nine members of the U.S. Embassy, accused of being CIA agents; Richard Welch was prominently named as "head of the Greek network."

## MOTIVES

For LIBERATION, the publication of this list "is part of the democratic role to be assumed by a free press." It added: "Similar lists were published in Mexico, London and Stockholm. Last week, CAMBIO 16 disclosed the names of nine CIA agents in Madrid. The Italian press will shortly publish a list of 45 U.S. agents who are supposed to be diplomats in Rome."

Who is supplying such a detailed account of names and data? LIBERATION says its lists were compiled after "3 months of investigation" in Paris, in collaboration with a team of Americans "disgusted with their government's clandestine operations throughout the world. Philip Agee is one of the leaders of that enterprise. He is a former CIA agent who upon leaving office in 1969 spent some time in Cuba where, it appears, he organized his whole plan of action. The publication of his book now adds to the press campaign. It is published in Paris by Le Seuil under the title "Diary of a Secret Agent. Ten Years with the CIA." As an appendix to the work, several hundred names are listed for 20 full pages, "chiefs, agents and CIA collaborators, as well as the organizations controlled, financed and influenced by CIA."

LIBERATION states that "the disclosure of the secret criminal activities (of CIA) takes on the characteristics of a good deed for public welfare." It stresses: "We shall be asked: why are you concerned with CIA and not the KGB?" The answer is strange: "Because it is easier to locate the CIA officials than the honorable Soviet agents."

It further adds: "Nevertheless, any member of the Soviet Embassy's personnel is generally regarded as a suspect."

For LE FIGARO, this public disclosure of a list of CIA employees with positions in the U.S. Embassy is not a journalistic success. In these times of "Clockwork Orange, Sharon Tate, hostage, blackmail and kidnapping, to act in this manner is equivalent to delivering respectable men and women into the hands of some dangerous fanatics."

# ABC EN PARIS

## UN DIARIO DE EXTREMA IZQUIERDA REVELA LOS NOMBRES DE LOS AGENTES DE LA C.I.A. EN FRANCIA

«Le Figaro» considera peligrosa y poco periodística esta información

PARIS, 14. (Crónica recibida por télex.) Por segundo día consecutivo, el diario de extrema izquierda, «Liberation», fundado por Jean-Paul Sartre, ha publicado una lista de supuestos agentes de la red francesa, con centro de operaciones en París, de la Central Intelligence Agency. En total, 44 personas, miembros de la Embajada norteamericana en su mayoría, se han mostrado en esa picota pública con sus nombres, apellidos, dirección, número de teléfono, matrícula. El jefe de la antena parisina es, según dicho periódico, Eugen F. Burgstaller, matrícula A 33037371, domiciliado en el número 47 de la avenida de Georges Mandel, teléfono 727-5293. En la lista del Cuerpo Diplomático acreditado en París, figura como jefe de la antena, Richard Welch.

El Gobierno norteamericano ha calificado la divulgación de esas listas, de «irresponsable, abyecto e incendiario». «La experiencia muestra —advirtió el Departamento de Estado— que la publicación de tales listas puede incitar a los fanáticos a toda suerte de ataques personales contra diplomáticos.» La alusión se refiere al caso del primer secretario de la Embajada norteamericana en Atenas, Richard Welch, asesinado por tres individuos el pasado 25 de diciembre cuando entraba en su domicilio. Un mes antes, el 25 de noviembre, el diario extremista «Athens News», igual que ha hecho ahora «Liberation», publicaba una lista de nueve miembros de la Embajada norteamericana, acusados de ser agentes de la C.I.A. y, en primer lugar, Richard Welch.



THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 25, 1976

# The Disinformation Game

By C. L. Sulzberger

**MOTIVOS.**—Para «Liberation», la publicación de estas listas «forma parte del papel democrático que debe desempeñar una Prensa libre». «Listas similares—agrega—han sido publicadas en México, en Londres y en Estocolmo. La pasada semana «Cambio 16» reveló el nombre de nueve agentes de la C.I.A. en Madrid. En breve, la Prensa italiana va a publicar una lista de 45 agentes norteamericanos que figuran como diplomáticos en Roma.»

¿Quién facilita esos nombres y esos datos precisos? «Liberation» dice que sus listas son el resultado de «tres meses de investigación» en París, en colaboración con un equipo de norteamericanos «asqueados por las intervenciones clandestinas de su Gobierno a través del mundo». El periódico no indica que ese equipo es el titulado Fifth State, que publica en los Estados Unidos un boletín confidencial, «Counterspy», dedicado a la divulgación de toda suerte de informaciones sobre las actividades de la C.I.A. en el mundo. Una de las cabezas de esa empresa es Philip Agre, ex agente de la C.I.A., que una vez que salió de dicho servicio, en 1969, pasó cierto tiempo en Cuba, donde, al parecer, organizó todo su plan de acción. Ahora, a la campaña de Prensa, se une la salida de su libro, editado en París por Seuil, titulado «Diario de un agente secreto. Diez años en la C.I.A.». Como apéndice de esa obra, a lo largo y lo ancho de 20 páginas, se citan varios centenares de nombres, «jefes, agentes y colaboradores de la C.I.A., así como las organizaciones controladas, financiadas o influidas por la organización».

«La revelación de las criminales actividades secretas (de la C.I.A.)—dice «Liberation»—adapta el carácter de una obra de salud pública». Y subraya: «Se nos dirá: ¿Por qué se ocupan ustedes de la C.I.A. y no de la K.G.B.?» La respuesta es inaudita: «Porque es más fácil de localizar a los responsables de la C.I.A. que a los honorables corresponsales soviéticos.»

«No obstante—apostillan—todo miembro del personal de la Embajada de la U. R. S. S. es, por principio, un sospechoso.» Para «Le Figaro», esta divulgación pública de una lista de funcionarios de la C.I.A. con puestos en la Embajada norteamericana, no es un éxito periodístico. «En los tiempos de las «naranjas mecánicas», de las Sharon Tate, de los rehenes, de los chantajes y de los secuestros, actuar de ese modo equivale a librar a hombres y mujeres respetables en las manos de unos peligrosos exaltados.»—INTERINO.

**BRUSSELS.**—All rival intelligence services practice private propaganda wars against each other. These feature smear campaigns, efforts to discredit each other's agents, blackmail, traps designed to have opponents declared persona non grata in foreign countries, et cetera.

The branch of the Soviet Union's K.G.B. which handles such affairs is called the Disinformation Department or simply Department D. It is an imaginative and efficient body and its importance is growing. Only recently its roster has been approximately doubled and placed under the command of a full general.

In 1968 Department D arranged publication of a book in East Berlin called "Who's Who in the C.I.A." and subtitled "A Biographical Reference Work on 3,000 Officers of the Civil and Military Branches of the Secret Services of the U.S.A. in 120 Countries."

A foreword explained: "Never in the history of the U.S.A. has the influence of its intelligence system on home and foreign policy been as great as it

spected but the twinned traumas of Vietnam and Watergate largely blemished this image. The C.I.A. was shown to have distorted facts in Vietnam and to have engaged in brutal operations. It was also shown to have violated its charter in Watergate.

These disclosures shook the C.I.A. itself and undermined public respect for it. The atmosphere consequently developed presented Department D with what is called a "target of opportunity" at a moment when the C.I.A. was weakened by lame duck leadership. A curious spate of information concerning C.I.A. operations was published in Greek, French, English, Italian, Spanish and Dutch papers and magazines.

Some of this clearly derived from American muckraking publications, some from the East Berlin "Who's Who," some from shrewd scrutiny of diplomatic lists showing which Americans held diplomatic passports, and some from K.G.B. plants. Names tabulated were often accompanied by addresses and telephone numbers in order to encourage harassment. The purpose was clearly to discredit C.I.A. and to destroy its agents' cover.

Undeniably this further eroded agency morale—a morale already undermined by the sudden fall from public esteem. Anonymous telephone calls in Europe warned: "Your daddy's next" or "You come after Welch." Children were bewildered and embarrassed; wives started to ask husbands if they shouldn't change careers.

This is exactly what Department D had hoped for. To destroy the reputation of the C.I.A. inside the United States, to strip it of cover abroad and to impair its morale can be assumed to be the K.G.B.'s goal with respect to its best-known adversary.

And that this should be abetted by an upright body of citizens in the United States and other democracies, properly outraged at the C.I.A.'s widely publicized mistakes, was something the Disinformation experts could hardly have imagined. Such voluble public indignation is unfamiliar to K.G.B. officialdom.

Department D wants to wreck the C.I.A. for the following reasons, carefully listed in the East Berlin "Who's Who": (1) [It is] "The largest and most influential intelligence service in the imperialist world." (2) "Following a NATO Council decree of December 1956 the intelligence service of the U.S.A. is the directive body for all intelligence services of the NATO Pact countries." And (3) "The intelligence service of the U.S.A. has always been the domain of the fanatical enemies of democracy [sic] and a stronghold of the anti-Communists."

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

is today," a contention now echoed by many facets of non-Communist American opinion.

This book was a sloppy job. Its alphabetical listings included innocent people who had nothing to do with the C.I.A. or its predecessor, the O.S.S. It also failed to name persons then believed to hold important jobs in the United States intelligence community.

Its publication was largely ignored in the West but it was assiduously distributed in the third world. Department D had it called to the attention of almost every Afro-Asian chief of government. The impact was extensive and stirred considerable suspicion of America.

Together with a sizable roll of genuine C.I.A. employees—such as the unfortunate Richard Welch, recently murdered in Athens—the book listed as "agents" the following: Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Cyrus Vance, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, James Killian, Dean Rusk, George Meany, Robert McNamara, Senator Eugene McCarthy, Bill Moyers, Lawrence Eagleburger and Clark Clifford.

The presence of some of these names on the list was not as funny as it then seemed. When unfair suspicions were ignited, it disadvantaged American relationships abroad. It also hampered C.I.A. operations in some third world areas.

In 1968, the C.I.A. was widely re-

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
16 February 1976

## US DIPLOMAT'S ASSASSINS 'ARE PALESTINIANS'

By Our Athens Correspondent

Greek security authorities are reported to have identified the two masked men who assassinated Mr Richard Welch, the American diplomat, in Athens last December. They are said to be Palestinians, identified by a young Lebanese woman.

It is believed that the woman hoped to receive part of the £72,000 reward offered by the Greek Government. An Athens newspaper *Vradini* which on Saturday reported details about the case had to withdraw its first edition to avoid breaking the law which currently forbids public comment on the case.

Mr Welch, 47, was "personal assistant" to the American Ambassador—though it was alleged he was the head of the CIA operations in Greece. He was shot dead in front of his home, after returning, with his wife, from a Christmas party.

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 Feb. 1976

## Of Secret Documents

To the Editor:

Let's look more closely at the issue of commerce in secret documents, raised in the form of an attack on me in your Feb. 15 editorial, "Selling Secrets." What you are really accusing me of is not selling secrets in the customary, or Times way.

Distribution of information, like other economic activities in a capitalist society, generates profit. That is true of information derived from governmental sources. It is especially true of information whose value is enhanced because it is not generally available.

The Times, having had access to the same unreleased report of the House Intelligence Committee which is now a subject of controversy, reported extensively on its contents, reaping profit in prestige, and possibly circulation.

Do you consider that The Times was "selling secrets"?

Or, do you wish to narrow the question (though why?) to the text of the report, published elsewhere than in one's place of usual employment?

Then we are talking about something like the paperback book published on the Pentagon Papers after they had been so brilliantly covered by The Times. Did that book represent "selling secrets"?

My problem, which seems to have landed me in so much trouble, at least on The Times editorial page, was how to avoid making a profit.

I found myself unexpectedly, because of a surprise action by the House, in possession of possibly the only available copy of a report, bearing no classification on its face, its principal sensations already divulged, tied up in a confused parliamentary situation.

My problem was that doing nothing would mean that I would be suppressing a report that might be interesting as a matter of public record. It had nothing more of national security significance, certainly nothing that would endanger any individual.

But, because of the current climate about "secrets," I was advised that finding a book publisher would be difficult. I was told that the one clear opportunity for publication was offered by Clay Felker, publisher of The Village Voice.

I had then to consider, since taking money was unthinkable to me, whether Felker should be the sole beneficiary. If our system inevitably creates profits, should Felker enjoy them exclusively?

So, I suggested it would be appropriate for him to make some gesture to the free press idea which had animated me by a "voluntary" contribution to the Reporters' Committee, which provides legal defense in First Amendment cases.

Is it not really unbecoming, if not downright hypocritical, for a paper that has so successfully profited from secrets to apply a term like "laundering" to one who is trying to avoid a profit and divert it to a cause he believes in?

DANIEL SCHORR  
Washington, Feb. 16, 1976

THE NEW REPUBLIC  
6 March 1976

## Legitimizing The CIA

To say, as some commentators have, that the Ford intelligence plan is only a small step forward is to miss the point. In fact the President is part of the problem. As the public and much of the Congress saw the issue, it was that American intelligence agencies had violated their charters, the laws of the land and the Constitution, and had succeeded in keeping their actions secret for many years. From the point of view of the intelligence agencies recent controversies were interfering with their ability to gather and use information. They felt the need to clarify their right to act and to be sure that future leaks would not occur to undermine their morale and restrict their actions. The Ford intelligence program, embodied in an executive order and a proposed bill, purports to deal with the problem of abuses. In fact it provides the intelligence agencies with clearer authority than they have ever had to conduct surveillance programs in the United States and to hide their activities behind a shield of secrecy backed up for the first time by the threat of criminal penalties.

Perennial dissatisfaction with the intelligence agencies became acute in late 1974 when *The New York Times* reported that the CIA had conducted massive illegal domestic surveillance programs. A 14-month investigation of the charge confirmed it, the Rockefeller commission and the Church and Pike committees supplying documentation. The President in response would now specifically authorize activities that appear to violate the CIA charter.

The executive order issued by President Ford authorizes the CIA to conduct a wide variety of programs in the US to gather information clandestinely from Americans and foreigners. The CIA will be free to conduct any legal activity it chooses within the United States aimed at foreigners. It is also authorized to infiltrate organizations, student groups for example, composed primarily of foreigners and connected with a foreign power, and to seek to manipulate the activities of such organizations. Its new right to investigate American citizens is almost as extensive. The CIA is authorized by the President's order to conduct physical surveillance (including eavesdropping on conversations) of present or former employees or contractors to protect intelligence sources and methods, individuals in contact with former employees or foreigners for the purpose of determining their identity, and American citizens outside the US acting on behalf of foreign powers or threatening national security.

The CIA is now to be permitted to collect information on American citizens who are acting on behalf of foreign powers, who pose a threat to CIA installations and personnel, or who are believed to be potential sources or contacts. Such rationales were used by the CIA in the past to justify gathering information on individuals who had no connection with the agency. The Ford executive order also repeals *sub silentio*, as the lawyers would say (that is, without acknowledging that it has done so) one of the few existing restrictions on the CIA. In 1967 when it was revealed that the CIA had had secret dealings with the National Student Association, foundations and universities, President Johnson issued an executive order prohibiting the agency from having secret dealings with nonprofit organizations. The new order permits such connections subject only to the proviso, in the case of universities, that appropriate senior officials of the university and the CIA know about the arrangement.

We learned about past abuses because present and former officials of the CIA gave information to the press and Congress. The President's proposed secrecy legislation is designed to deal with that problem by

with doubts about what is going on are to report to the CIA's inspector general, who in the past has been concerned mainly with the preparation of cover stories, or to the CIA general counsel, who has specialized in developing theories to justify CIA activities. If either of these officials is equally distressed, he can report to a new oversight board of three members who have reached the average age of 71 without exhibiting the slightest concern for past intelligence abuses.

If an official or former official takes his case to the Congress (except upon lawful demand of a committee) or to the press, he is subject to indictment under the new criminal law proposed by the President. The proposed statute covers only intelligence "sources and methods," but the CIA defines that phrase to cover virtually all of its activities.

Much is made of the fact that members of the press would not be subject to the new criminal penalties. Less has been said about the fact that journalists revealing intelligence secrets could be called before a grand jury and held in contempt for refusing to divulge sources.

While the President did not presume to dictate to his former colleagues in the Congress how they should organize themselves he did suggest the creation of a small joint committee that would be told what the

executive branch wanted it to know and that could release any information the President authorized it to release. Fortunately the Senate Government Operations Committee, in reporting out a resolution last week to set up a permanent Senate intelligence committee, refused to take the President's advice. Its resolution, in contrast to the President's program, is a significant first step toward bringing the intelligence agencies under constitutional control. The resolution directs the intelligence agencies to keep the committee fully informed and authorizes the committee to release information that in its judgment should be made public subject to an appeal to the full Senate by three members of the committee requested to do so by the President. It urges officials of intelligence agencies to report evidence of wrongdoing to the committee. The resolution directs the new committee to consider drafting legislated charters for each of the intelligence organizations.

In light of what the President has authorized the intelligence agencies to do at home, we need such legislated charters, enforced by criminal and civil penalties. Only Congress can undo the harm of the Ford reforms.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1976

## Protecting the Culprits, Punishing the

## Accusers

### IN THE NATION

By Tom Wicker

One day after President Ford sent legislation to Congress proposing the criminal prosecution of Government employees who disclose certain kinds of classified information, the Department of Justice announced that it would not prosecute Richard Helms, the former Director of Central Intelligence, for his role in a 1971 burglary.

The Helms decision is being defended on two grounds—that there was "insufficient evidence" and that the break-in might have been within the C.I.A.'s authority. The contrast between this judgment and Mr. Ford's proposed legislation is nevertheless striking and symbolic of the instinct for self-preservation that seems to pervade the Government's actions, no matter what President or which party dominates it.

The net effect of Mr. Ford's proposals for "reforming" the C.I.A.—an effect dramatized by the Helms decision—is to give greater protection to those known to have abused their statutory powers, while proclaiming that those who disclosed those abuses will be prosecuted as felons if they do it again. The next time the C.I.A. exceeds its authority, anyone who "blows the whistle" in the public interest will be committing a criminal offense; while those who perpetrate the abuse will be protected by enforced secrecy, and, in most cases, will be guilty only of violations of an executive order rather than of the criminal law.

They may not even be guilty of that limited transgression. For what this President orders today—that, for example, the C.I.A. should not open and read your mail—he or some other

President can revoke tomorrow, and in secrecy at that, under pain of criminal prosecution of anyone who might make an unauthorized disclosure of this development in the collection and evaluation of information.

White House briefers contend that it will not be necessary in future for public-spirited intelligence officials who want to prevent abuses to make public disclosures. Instead, they argue, such officials could make authorized complaints to the new oversight board appointed by the President to act as a brake on the C.I.A. and other agencies.

But there's been a somewhat oversight board—the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board — since the early 1960's, without noticeable effect on massive illegitimate domestic operations by the C.I.A. Look what would happen, moreover, if in the future some C.I.A. man took a complaint about illegal activities to the new oversight board:

¶ The board, receiving such a complaint, is supposed to recommend to the Attorney General that he punish or prosecute those involved.

¶ But the Attorney General could decide only to report the matter to the President.

¶ In that event, sanctions—if any—would be decided upon within the executive branch.

The case of Richard Helms tells us a great deal about the likelihood that an Attorney General appointed by a President would prosecute rather than turn the matter over to that President—who would have an obvious interest in keeping as secret as possible abuses carried out by an agency for which he was responsible, perhaps by officials he had appointed, and—witness Richard Nixon—in which he himself might be deeply implicated. It is not even

certain that the oversight board—itself appointed by the President—would act on complaints of abuses by others of his appointees.

At his news conference, Mr. Ford assured us that he would never tolerate abuses by intelligence agencies. Even if that is taken at face value, it cannot bind future Presidents—Mr. Ford said he "hoped" only trustworthy types would be elected, as if hopes were safeguards—nor even cover Ford Administration appointees who might misguidedly insulate him from knowledge of what was happening in his own house.

If intelligence abuses are to be prevented, narrowly defined missions for and limitations on the agencies involved must be set forth in legislation, not revocable Presidential guidelines; oversight powers must be firmly vested in a Congressional body neither appointed by nor beholden to the executive branch, and capable of influencing policy decisions not just reviewing them; and the right of a public servant, if all else fails, to make public disclosure of secret abuses must be maintained. The Ford proposals fail all three tests so thoroughly that they can only have been designed to do so.

Mr. Ford has contrived, moreover, the strategic myth that the real problem is "the irresponsible and dangerous exposure of our nation's intelligence secrets." Its purpose is to divert opprobrium from the culprits to their accusers, and the culmination of the strategy is in these Kafkaesque "reforms" that would largely prevent further disclosure while doing little about what was actually exposed—not vital secrets but the blunders, abuses and crimes of the C.I.A.

Los Angeles Times

Sun., Feb. 22, 1976

## WHERE IS THE TRUTH?

# The CIA's 19 Years: Successes, Failures

BY GAYLORD SHAW

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Is the CIA, as its supporters contend, a well-controlled agency dedicated to advancing the cause of freedom everywhere?

Or is it, as its critics contend, a reckless rogue trampling into forbidden fields, making America the bogeyman of the world?

Where does the truth lie?

William E. Colby stared into the winter morning outside his living room window and, like a spy in from the cold, talked wistfully of what might have been.

"I had sort of hoped," he said, "that these skeletons might remain in the family closet."

They hadn't. One by one, slowly, painfully, the skeletons were dragged from the Central Intelligence Agency's closet during Colby's three years as director.

Assassination plots. Burglaries. Mail openings. Domestic surveillance. Secret armies. Undercover cash for foreign politicians. Covert attempts to overthrow other governments.

Last month, the revelations ended Colby's quarter-century career with the CIA. He had little to do with most of the misdeeds, but he displays no visible bitterness about his ouster.

Turning from the window to lean back on a gold-colored sofa, Colby argued in quiet tones that the CIA's sins were paraded before an American public ill-prepared for the disclosures because it had "no frame of reference for intelligence, except spy novels."

So, retired to a modest and unguarded suburban home, he is writing a book—not a spy novel, but a serious book he hopes will place the agency's operations in historical perspective.

Too much of the debate raging around the agency, he said, has centered on "diddly little things" such as a "minuscule number" of burglaries committed in the United States by CIA operatives.

Instead the debate should take a broader view, "looking at the sweep . . . at the strategic impact over many years," he said.

A sample of Colby's perspective:

"The Bay of Pigs obviously was a disaster, but take yourself back to the early '60s when we were concerned that the Cuban revolution would spread like wildfire through Latin America.

"That was the day of Che Guevara, the romantic, the guerrilla who would turn the whole continent hostile to the United States—there was a serious assessment that this was a possibility.

"So we put together a program, which was a political program through the OAS (Organization of American States), an economic program through the Alliance for Progress.

"There was some military aid, and there was some CIA work both in intelligence and in support of some of the forces to prevent the rise in terrorism and guerrilla activity.

"At the end of the period, in 1975, Latin America is no garden, but it hasn't been turned totally hostile to the United States under Cuban leadership . . .

"You can't say it was the CIA alone, but the CIA, I think, made a contribution in a number of countries.

" . . . It's been worthwhile."

Across the Potomac, in another Washington suburb, another spy in from the cold has already written a book giving his perspective of the agency's operations. Victor Marchetti, who resigned after 14 years as a CIA analyst and executive, co-authored "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

This is his historical perspective:

" . . . The real CIA is a clandestine organization, as it has been from the very beginning. If one looks at the CIA's predecessor, the wartime Office of Strategic Services, one finds that its primary activities were covert action and counterespionage. Espionage, or spying, was relatively unimportant as the OSS concentrated on trying to create guerrilla movements in occupied territory. When the CIA was formed in 1947, the operatives—most of whom had served in OSS—quickly got control of the agency, and they have held on ever since.

"Over the years, the CIA has, of course, greatly advanced the arts of espionage, counterespionage and covert action. But it has been covert action—interference in another country's internal affairs—which has been the most highly developed . . . partly because the operatives who ran the agency were not very interested in espionage.

"These men preferred causing events to happen in foreign countries, whether 'destabilizing' leftist governments in Chile, Guatemala and Iran, or secretly strengthening repressive regimes in Vietnam, Brazil and the Dominican Republic . . . What the CIA's operatives really like to do is play 'the game of nations' . . ."

Whom to believe?

In an attempt to answer that question, The Times interviewed friends and foes of the CIA, reviewed the findings of investigating congressional committees and examined government documents dating back three decades. The result was a bundle of contradictions:

—The CIA has, in fact, committed some colossal blunders, damaging both U.S. policy and America's image abroad.

—Yet the agency has silently scored some long-term triumphs, helping build a foundation for today's uneasy detente.

—The CIA has strayed far from the limited charter envisioned by its founders, secretly expanding its scope of operations without precise legislative authority.

—Yet the agency has been responsive, perhaps too responsive, to the desires of its presidential overseers.

—The CIA has at times been plagued by waste and bureaucratic bumbling, spending millions of dollars on questionable projects.

—Yet the agency's staff includes the world's foremost experts in fields from architecture to zoology, a quiet corps sincerely dedicated to furthering America's interests.

—The CIA is such a mass of contradictions that it is little wonder that pollster Louis Harris last month found "much doubt and confusion among the American people" questioned about recent intelligence revelations.

"On the one hand, it is clear that the public no longer trusts the CIA and FBI to operate on their own, for fear that they will engage in excesses of the kind that have been revealed," Harris reported. "On the other hand, people are aware that the two agencies need to conduct their activities in a reasonable amount of secrecy."

"Somehow," he observed, "the contradiction will have to be worked out."

But how?

President Ford offered his answer last week, proposing a mild set of reforms such as a new oversight committee within the executive branch, a legislative ban on peacetime assassination of foreign leaders and on domestic snooping, and tougher laws against leaking official secrets.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), will make its recommendations next month, probably calling for much tighter controls of the intelligence Establishment. Tightened controls were urged by the House Intelligence Committee headed by Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) before it died this month in a blaze of controversy over who leaked its yet-to-be-formally-released final report.

Debate on intelligence operations will continue for months, perhaps years. As it does, a study of the still-unfolding saga of the CIA offers clues to how the agency became such an enigma.

Harry S. Truman was unhappy and in a hurry. His 90-year-old mother was lingering near death in Missouri, but he was stuck at Washington National Airport, waiting for aides to bring him just-passed legislation he wanted to sign before take-off.

Minutes ticked by that sultry, 86-degree July afternoon. Finally, nearly half an hour late, the aides arrived with

the National Security Act of 1947. Truman hurriedly signed it, and his DC-3, "The Sacred Cow," rumbled down the runway.

The President's mother died before he reached her bedside the day the CIA was born.

The idea of a central agency for intelligence-gathering was conceived in the ashes of Pearl Harbor—which would not have been such a surprise if a single government agency had then existed to piece together the bits of pre-attack intelligence collected by several agencies.

Its gestation period was World War II, when men of the OSS proved the value of a unified intelligence operation.

In January, 1946, Truman replaced the OSS with a National Intelligence Authority, which would make policy, and a Central Intelligence Group, which would carry it out.

The arrangement did not work. The CIG was run jointly by the departments of State, War and Navy, and before long it was beset by bureaucratic strife.

Truman asked aides for suggestions and eventually settled on a plan for a Central Intelligence Agency, responsible to the President and a new National Security Council. The plan was not universally hailed—Secretary of State George C. Marshall bluntly warned the President that "the powers of the proposed agency seem almost unlimited and need clarification."

Nevertheless, Truman sent the proposed National Security Act to Congress in February, 1947. His legislation was devoid of details on the CIA's duties, stating merely that it would take over the functions, personnel and property of the CIG.

Some members of Congress were skeptical.

Rep. Clarence J. Brown (R-Ohio) said he didn't want any President "to have a Gestapo of his own." He asked at a committee hearing whether the new agency "might possibly affect the rights and privileges of the people of the United States."

"No, sir," answered Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, director of the interim intelligence body. "I do not think there is anything in the bill, since it is all foreign intelligence, that can possibly affect any of the privileges of the people of the United States."

"There is no danger of that," added Vannevar Bush, chairman of the Joint Research and Development Board. "The bill provides clearly that (the CIA) is not concerned with intelligence on internal affairs, and I think that is a safeguard against its becoming an empire."

Congress decided to specify that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions." But another provision of the act—that the CIA was to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security" as might be directed by higher authority—left open the door for the CIA to engage in foreign political action and clandestine political warfare, operations never mentioned in the congressional debate.

"Probably no other organization of the federal government has taken such liberties in interpreting its legally assigned functions as the CIA," says Prof. Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University, one of academia's top experts on intelligence.

"Only by seriously distorting the meaning of the term 'intelligence' is it possible to find statutory justification for the wide range of strategic services that CIA has come to perform," Ransom added.

Truman did not object to the vague "other functions and duties" clause inserted by Congress, and he later regretted it. His second thoughts were recorded by biographer Merle Miller, who quoted Truman as saying many years later:

"I think it was a mistake, and if I had known what was going to happen, I never would have done it. I needed . . . at that time a central organization that would bring all the various intelligence reports we were getting in those days, and there must have been a dozen of them, maybe more, bring them all into one organization so that the President would get one report on what was going on in various parts of the world.

"Now that made sense, and that's why I went ahead and set up what they called the Central Intelligence Agency. But it got out of hand . . . As nearly as I can make out, those fellows in the CIA don't just report on

wars and the like, they go out and make their own and there's nobody to keep track of what they're up to."

Truman's comments are puzzling in light of subsequent disclosures that secret directives issued during his Presidency nudged the infant CIA into political operations abroad.

The key document approved by Truman's National Security Council, known as NSC 10-2 and dated June 18, 1948, remains classified today. But author-journalist David Wise, a leading authority on the subject, has reported that NSC 10-2 ushered in a new era of covert actions by authorizing the CIA to undertake "special operations, providing they were secret and small enough to be plausibly denied by the government."

Covert political operations were Truman's answer to a dramatic escalation in the cold war in 1948. Robert J. Donovan, an associate editor of *The Times* who was then reporting on the Truman Presidency, recalls the mood of the capital at the time:

" . . . The Soviet Union shook Washington to its foundations in February, 1948, by seizing complete control of Czechoslovakia through a coup by the Czech Communist Party. Washington was frantic that the Communists also would gain control of Italy in forthcoming elections . . . By the end of March, Soviet forces blockaded all land and water approaches to Berlin.

"Washington was permeated with the feeling that something more had to be done to influence a dangerous situation abroad . . ."

As one cold war crisis piled upon another, the CIA became the vehicle for doing "something more" about the Communist threat. The seriousness with which U.S. officials viewed the threat is illustrated in this passage written at the height of the cold war by Allen W. Dulles, CIA director from 1952 to 1961:

"In the Soviet Union, we are faced with an antagonist who has raised the art of espionage to an unprecedented height, while developing the collateral techniques of subversion and deception into a formidable political instrument of attack. No other country has ever before attempted this on such a scale. These operations, in support of the U.S.S.R.'s overall policies, go on in time of so-called thaw and under the guise of coexistence with the same vigor as in times of acute crisis. Our intelligence has a major share of the task of neutralizing such hostile activities, which present a common danger to us and to our allies."

In this atmosphere, the CIA's expansion of covert operations was inevitable.

"During the past 25 years," Wise recounts, "there was no year in which some major secret CIA operation was not taking place in some country somewhere in the world."

"It is also safe to assume that if this many covert operations have become public knowledge, many others, both 'successful' and unsuccessful, have not."

Wise has compiled page after page on the CIA's covert operations. Add to it the latest findings of congressional committees, and the list becomes a generation-spanning chronology of clandestine activity. A partial compilation:

**Burma**—From 1949 to 1961, the CIA supported about 12,000 Nationalist Chinese troops who fled to Burma when the Communists gained control of mainland China. The U.S. ambassador, unaware of the CIA's involvement, repeatedly rejected Burmese protests.

**China**—In the early 1950s, the CIA parachuted guerrilla teams into the People's Republic of China. Two American agents were captured in November, 1952, and were held for 20 years, until the United States finally admitted they were CIA agents.

**Iran**—In 1953, the CIA organized and directed the coup which overthrew Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and returned the shah to the throne. Mossadegh had nationalized the Iranian oil industry, but after he was overthrown American companies for the first time were permitted to tap Iran's oil deposits.

**Guatemala**—In 1954, the CIA engineered the overthrow of the Communist-influenced government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. U.S. arms and a CIA-supplied air force brought Col. Carlos Castillo Armas to power.

**Indonesia**—In 1958, another CIA-sponsored air force based in the Philippines supported rebels in the Celebes who were trying to overthrow President Sukarno.

**Congo**—In 1960, the CIA plotted to assassinate President Patrice Lumumba, even sending poisons to the Congo. A few months later, Lumumba was killed by Congo-



lese rivals, and the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded there was no evidence that the CIA was involved in his death. But the CIA remained active in the region, and in 1964 provided planes to help suppress a revolt against the government of the Congo, now known as Zaire.

**Dominican Republic**—During 1960 and 1961, the CIA supported dissidents who, on May 31, 1961, assassinated dictator Rafael Trujillo. Some U.S. agents knew of the murder plans, and American officials furnished the dissidents with three pistols, although it is unknown whether they were used in the assassination.

**Cuba**—From 1960 through 1965, the CIA was involved in several plots to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro, at one point enlisting the aid of Mafia leaders. And in 1961, a brigade of Cuban exiles trained and supported by the CIA landed at the Bay of Pigs in an ill-founded attempt to overthrow Castro. Most of the invaders were captured or killed, and four U.S. pilots flying for the CIA died in the episode, the agency's best-known disaster.

**Brazil**—In 1962, the CIA spent a reported \$20 million to support hundreds of gubernatorial, congressional, state and local candidates in an attempt to deny leftist President Joao Goulart control of the Brazilian Congress.

**Vietnam**—In 1963, the CIA had secret contacts with a group of generals who staged a coup in which President Ngo Dinh Diem was killed. Later, as U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened, so did the CIA's role. Among the activities was the Phoenix program, designed to neutralize the Viet Cong. Colby, who headed it, later told Congress that at least 20,587 persons were killed under the program.

**Chile**—In 1964 and again in 1970, the CIA channeled substantial funds into Chile to oppose the presidential candidacy of Salvador Allende. Allende lost in 1964 but won in 1970. He died in a 1973 coup.

**Laos**—Beginning in the 1950s and continuing until 1973, the CIA was enmeshed in Laos. It equipped and directed a guerrilla army in a secret war which congressional critics charged was waged by "The king's men . . . the President's Army" without congressional authorization.

**Italy**—Starting after World War II, the CIA pumped millions of dollars into one Italian election campaign after another in an effort to thwart Communist candidates. In 1972 alone, the House Intelligence Committee reported, \$10 million went to Italian politicians and political parties—although it was done over the objections of the CIA's station chief.

**Angola**—The CIA told House investigators it spent \$31 million in 1975 to support pro-Western factions fighting Soviet-backed forces in the Angolan war. But the agency said none of its personnel was directly involved in the war.

**Who authorized this string of secret political actions?**

In many cases, the record shows, the orders came directly from the Oval Office.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, wrote in his memoirs that he personally dispatched U.S. aircraft to aid in overthrowing the leftist Guatemalan government in 1954.

President John F. Kennedy gave the final go-ahead for the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. The Church committee said it had no conclusive evidence that Kennedy personally knew of attempts to assassinate Castro. But one CIA official recalled how Richard Bissell, the agency's deputy director in 1961, was "chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President (John Kennedy) and the attorney general (Robert Kennedy) for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime."

President Richard M. Nixon personally ordered the CIA's 1970 Chilean action. Richard Helms, then CIA director, said: "The President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't much care how

"This was a pretty all-inclusive order," Helms told senators last year. "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day."

Colby said the CIA "conducts such activities only when specifically authorized by the National Security Council," a body headed by the President and including such officials as the secretaries of state and defense. "Thus," he added, "CIA covert actions reflect national policy."

In practice, however, many CIA covert projects are approved at a lower level—namely by a panel of subcabinet officials known as the Forty Committee (for the number

on the directive setting its membership) and earlier called the 303 Group (for the room where it met).

The House Intelligence Committee studied the Forty Committee's approval procedures and concluded that during the Watergate era the panel became a "rubber stamp" for Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, then the President's assistant for national security affairs.

"From 1965 to 1972, a majority of approvals (for covert operations) occurred subsequent to a formal committee meeting, although many telephonic approvals also took place during this period," the congressional report said.

"In 1972, the process became quite informal, often involving mere notification to members that an operation had already been set in motion by the President . . . One formal meeting was held in 1972, none in 1973 and 1974. This process did not begin to reverse itself until 1975," it said.

Last week, President Ford changed the Forty Committee's name to the Operations Advisory Group and added two Cabinet members—the attorney general and the director of the Office of Management and Budget—as official observers to help guard against future abuses.

The House committee found that the number of covert operations had dwindled during the last decade. Colby has reported the same trend, saying:

"Our involvement has been reduced in many areas, in part, I might add, by the fact that many of the Communist efforts during those years (the 1950s and 1960s) were unsuccessful . . .

"I do not say that we do not now conduct such activities. I merely state that they . . . require only a small proportion of our effort at this time."

Colby said that only 5% of the CIA's effort is spent "on anything other than pure intelligence." The agency's critics dispute this. Marchetti, for instance, who was executive assistant to the agency's deputy director, contends that roughly two-thirds of the CIA's estimated 15,000 employees and two-thirds of its secret budget—believed to total about \$750 million annually—"are directed toward clandestine operations and their support."

Many former CIA officials say the agency's most vital function is the condensation and analysis of the millions of bits of intelligence flowing daily into its headquarters, a park-like complex in Langley, Va.

This work, performed by political scientists, historians, linguists, engineers, physicists and other experts, "is much closer to academic research than espionage," one former official said.

From the analytical process comes "a digest of what it all means and an estimate of what its consequences could be," said John A. McCone, CIA director from 1961 to 1965.

"Preparing this body of literature in its various forms is, in my opinion, the most important activity of the agency," McCone wrote recently in TV Guide. "It is certainly the least publicized."

Sometimes, however, the CIA's estimates are wrong.

The agency was embarrassed, for instance, by its failure to predict the outbreak of the 1973 Middle East war. Afterwards, an internal CIA study found: "The principal conclusions concerning the imminence of hostilities . . . were—quite simply, obviously and starkly—wrong."

Five years earlier in Vietnam, the CIA erred in assessing enemy strength and intentions. "Warning of the Tet offensive had not fully anticipated the intensity, coordination and timing of the enemy attack," the agency said in a postmortem.

More recently, doubts have been cast on the accuracy of CIA estimates of Soviet arms spending. The Washington Star reported this month that the agency was revising upward, perhaps by 100%, its estimate of the percentage of Soviet gross national product devoted to defense spending.

Ironically, this error reportedly became apparent because of a major intelligence breakthrough. The CIA obtained, by undisclosed means, Soviet leaders' own secret estimates of their country's defense outlays. The figure was double previous CIA estimates, the Star said.

Colby, McCone and others credit the CIA with major technological advances in intelligence-gathering.

High-flying aircraft and new satellites "have been able to look down into fortress societies and record in startling detail what is actually developing," McCone said. Electronic sensing and tracking devices also make it possible to

gather data on tests of nuclear devices and military equipment "beyond otherwise impenetrable frontiers," he added.

Because of these achievements, Colby said, the CIA played a major role "in laying the groundwork for the new period of detente which we pursue in our relationships with the Communist world today."

Some months ago referring to the accord limiting strategic arms, Colby told a Washington seminar, "It is clear that, thanks to some of the intelligence work of the past 10 or 15 years, we now have an agreement which depends upon the fact that we can monitor whether the Soviets are complying with it or not, which we were unable to do when our intelligence was so weak we had to ask for on-the-ground inspections."

"I think that is a triumph for intelligence," he added last week in the living room of his white brick home.

As he sipped coffee from a cup with a delicate oriental design, Colby talked of his new work as an author trying

to place his past life in historical perspective.

He glanced back at the skeletons in the CIA closet.

"None of these cases should have taken place, because it wasn't right . . . but you have to understand the thought processes . . . the atmospherics . . . the pressures of those times."

"That's my major theme . . . At that time, intelligence was thought to be something somewhere outside the law, as it is in every other country. It really wasn't expected to be part of the legal system, the legal structure . . .

"Now . . . it is being said: In America nothing is going to operate outside the law. Intelligence isn't any more than anything else.

"We're in the process of working out the relationship between the law and the Constitution and the needs of intelligence."

Rising from the sofa, he straightened his rumpled blue sweater and escorted his visitors to the door. "Intelligence under the law—that's what we'll have," he said.

Los Angeles Times

Tues., Mar. 2, 1976

## The Fault With Ford's Attack on Leaks

BY JOHN MARKS

If it had been a crime to leak "classified" information four years ago, as President Ford has now proposed, Richard Nixon might still be President of the United States.

Nixon, after all, was forced out of office because he and his associates were caught covering up such crimes as burglarizing a psychiatrist's office, sabotaging the opposition party and wiretapping newsmen. Aside from White House approval, these acts had something in common: All touched in some way government intelligence agencies, and were tied to "secret" operations which the administration claimed were vital to "national security."

Indeed, Nixon's first known step in concealing the Watergate affair was to have presidential assistant H. R. Haldeman order the CIA to inform the FBI that a thorough investigation would endanger CIA operations. To its credit, the CIA cooperated for only a few days and then backed off. But Richard Helms, the agency's director, was not about to become a whistle blower, and for months the CIA withheld important information about the affair. Happily, lesser bureaucrats subsequently leaked out much of the "classified" story, and Nixon had to retire to San Clemente.

Now, as if none of this had ever happened, Ford is urging Congress to pass a law that would jail leakers. Strangely, this is much harsher treatment than the President seems willing to dish out to officials whose abuses of power have been revealed by leaks. He not only pardoned Nixon, but also refused to prosecute those responsible for the illegal acts—domestic spying, assassination attempts, mail openings—unearthed by the Rockefeller commission.

"To protect our security diplomatically, militarily and economically," Ford said in proposing his plan to combat leaks, "we must have a comprehensive intelligence capability." Clearly, the President believes that leaks have endangered that capability. Yet, the recent disclosures that so enraged the Administration had nothing to do with the legitimate collection of intelligence.

The leaks concerning Angola revealed that, once again, the White House and CIA were taking the country into a "secret war," and had already committed about \$60 million of taxpayer money to the fighting. Other leaks indicated that since 1948 the CIA has made \$75 million in secret payments to Italian politicians, and that the intelligence agencies have been understating their budgets to Congress by "three or four times."

Ford may well have the best of intentions in this matter. Indeed, he has pledged that intelligence agencies will not be misused while he is in office. Yet, tens of thousands of people who worked to end the Vietnam war or to guarantee civil rights for all Americans—and who were thereby subject to government surveillance and harassment—have reason to be wary. Even if President Ford really does stop abuses, his proposal that leakers be imprisoned would, if enacted, remain in force under future Presidents who might be more willing to disregard the rights of citizens.

According to Ford, the bill "would in no way prevent people from reporting questionable practices to appropriate authorities in the executive and legislative branches." Nevertheless, under the language of the Ford proposal, it would be a crime for a bureaucrat faced with what he considered an illegal "classified" order or action to complain to a congressman or senator—much less to the press. A bureaucrat could discuss the illegal deed with a congressional committee only if the committee directly asks about it, an unlikely prospect unless the bureaucrat broke the law by tipping the committee in advance.

Within the executive branch, the President has designated the inspectors-general of the various intelligence agencies to be the watchdogs against abuse. Yet, these same inspectors-general were supposed to play exactly

that role during all the years in which the agencies were involved in serious misconduct.

As a final safeguard, the President has appointed a new Intelligence Oversight Board in the White House. It is supposed to perform the same function that the old Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board failed to carry out—in fact, two of the new board's three members served on the old body. Moreover, by appointing only veteran cold-warriors—Robert Murphy, 81, Leo Cherne, 63, and Stephen Ailes, 63—the President seemed to assure that those who may protest possible abuses would find the process difficult at best.

Murphy, for example, was intimately involved in planning covert operations during his long diplomatic career. It is unlikely that he would sympathetically receive a dissident bureaucrat who believed the American people should be informed of new CIA plans to fight a secret war or destabilize a democratically elected government.

Similarly, Cherne, who has been involved with hard-line anti-Communist causes for more than 25 years, might be reluctant to object to a domestic surveillance program supposedly aimed at discovering foreign ties to American political groups. (The CIA's rationalization for its illegal domestic spying was, of course, that it was intended to discover whether antiwar or civil-rights groups were receiving support from leftist governments abroad.)

If the U.S. government is able to jail leakers, the public will probably receive less information about what the government is actually doing. Thus, official spokesmen will play an increased role in shaping the news. Of course, no abuse may occur, as Ford has vowed, but should a President or an intelligence chief want to conceal illegal actions, the Ford bill would make it extremely difficult for the press to pry the truth loose from bureaucrats.

If Congress now passes Ford's bill, it will, in effect, be laying the groundwork for future coverups. It does not require a great deal of imagination to envision Nixon sitting in San Clemente and wishing with all his heart that he had had this bill to protect him.

*A former State Department official, John Marks is currently the director of the CIA Project at the Center for National Security Studies in Washington. With Robert Borosage he is the editor of a new book, "The CIA File."*

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, February 25, 1976

# Reform of the CIA?

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.

The nation is in debt to the Church and Pike Committees for forcing the administration to come up with a reorganization of the national intelligence business. The White House has known about the CIA abuses for a very long time. Another sort of President would have proposed remedial action many months ago. Had Mr. Ford done so, he could have averted the frustration that came to pervade the congressional hearings. It was this frustration that led some on the congressional side to turn to leaks as a means of creating pressure for reform. But Mr. Ford chose to delay. For all we know, he might never have done anything at all without the committees barking at his heels.

The President's proposals, though belated, are considered and deserve a careful hearing. He was emphatic—and rightly so—about the importance of the intelligence community. Of course we must have something like the CIA, with capability for covert political (but not paramilitary) action as well as for intelligence collection. He was less emphatic about the way the agency has misused its power, perhaps because he thinks enough has been made of this elsewhere, perhaps because he does not feel all that strongly about it himself. Indeed, he plainly displays a good deal more indignation about congressional leaks than about CIA abuses. This may not be the best mood in which to approach the problem. Surely any dispassionate observer is bound to conclude that the abuses have harmed the Republic considerably more than the leaks.

The problem of oversight must be considered in three levels. One level is congressional oversight. Here Mr. Ford wisely recommends a single oversight committee, thereby agreeing with Sen. Church rather than with Sen. Tower of his own party. But he insists on the right to control the oversight committee's use of classified information. This would have the practical effect of making the committee informed but impotent. Sen. Church's bill (S. 2893) proposes a different procedure. If the committee thinks that the national interest requires disclosure of classified information, the President is given 10 days to explain why he disagrees; then, if he fails to persuade the committee, the President can carry the question to the full Senate for consideration in executive session. Perhaps in this case the Senate should make its decision, not by the majority vote assumed in the Church bill, but by the two-thirds required to override a presidential veto. All this presupposes that the information would not leak along the way; but the experience of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee suggests that congressional committees, when they do not feel hopelessly frustrated by the Executive, can behave responsibly.

## Mr. Ford's New Laws

Mr. Ford also wants the Congress to pass some laws. These laws, far from reducing the scope of CIA activities, would give the agency new power and protection. He spoke peculiarly in his press conference about statutes providing "judicial safeguards against electronic surveillance and mail openings"; but his legislative proposals in fact seek judicial safeguards for these things, and his executive order expands CIA authority in other ways.

Most ominous is his call for legislation to make it a crime for those with authorized access to intelligence secrets to reveal such information improperly. This sounds plausible enough on the face. However, it assumes the infallibility of the system of security classification. Yet, if we know anything, we know

for the misuse of classification to conceal not only official schemes that could hardly survive the light of day but incompetence and even corruption. Think for a moment what Messrs. Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman could have done with Mr. Ford's

## Board of Contributors

*Would Mr. Ford's changes have in fact prevented the abuses the Church and Pike committees have so usefully put on the record?*

law! Throughout American history aggrieved government employees have felt themselves morally justified in violating a system of secrecy invoked (as they have conscientiously believed) by government against the national interest. In many of these instances history has vindicated those who thought that Congress and the people ought to know what their government was doing.

The only excuse for Mr. Ford's proposal would be a dire and desperate state of national emergency. Yet we went through the Civil War and two world wars without such a law. No disaster resulted. If we did not need it in those infinitely more dangerous times, we certainly do not need it now.

A second level of oversight is within the Executive Branch. Here Mr. Ford proposes to formalize and tighten the process by which covert operations are authorized, replacing the old Forty Committee by a new Operations Advisory Group. The new group, like the old, will consist of overworked and harried officials whose primary responsibilities mainly lie elsewhere. One hopes rather wanly that the formalization of the process may induce them to take these decisions more seriously than they have done in the past. One hopes too that the CIA will submit all covert operations to the new group. It has not bothered to do so in the past.

Then there will be the three outside wise men. The Intelligence Oversight Board, one gathers, will not be a fulltime job but will meet periodically to review control mechanisms and to receive reports from inspectors-general. The basic idea here is sound, but it loses credibility when it is exclusively a presidential instrument. It would be a far, far better idea if it had a statutory base and if the statute required bipartisan representation on the board and senatorial confirmation for its members. Such a statute should also, as Mr. Ford's executive order does not, explicitly enjoin employees who think their agencies may be violating the law to carry their suspicions to the Oversight Board and assure them thorough protection when they do so. They would of course be rather more likely to blow their whistles to a board established by Congress than to one appointed solely by the Executive.

A third level is within the CIA itself. The record makes it indisputable that the agency has been singularly and fatally defective in its mechanisms of internal control. The CIA pretends to have an inspector general, but this officer, the Rockefeller Commission conceded last year, "was sometimes refused access to particularly sensitive CIA activities." The Intelligence Branch of the CIA was never asked to estimate the probable reaction of the Cuban people to the Bay of Pigs. John McCone was never told about the Castro assassination projects until, two years after he had become CIA Director, he read in a news-

ship with a Chicago gangster. Even then he was given to understand that the projects had been terminated, though in fact they were continuing. No one, within the CIA or without, appears to have known at all times all the things the CIA was doing.

## Mr. Bush's Qualifications

In this connection, I must dissent from those who question George Bush's qualifications for the CIA job. He has, in my judgment, the right qualifications—and I mean not just his service at the UN and in Peking but also his service in the House of Representatives and even at the Republican National Committee. What the CIA needs above all is top leadership responsive to Congress and to public opinion and both accustomed and committed to our democratic process and constitutional order. The trouble with professional intelligence operatives—William Colby was a refreshing exception—is that their prolonged immersion in the isolated, self-contained, self-justifying, hallucinatory world of deception and secrecy tends to sever their links to reality. One reads with concern that Mr. Bush's new responsibilities will leave the day-to-day management of the agency in the hands of his deputy director. I trust that this does not mean the recapture of operational control by the professionals.

In sum, this does not appear a very impressive plan of reform. Would Mr. Ford's changes have in fact prevented the abuses the Church and Pike Committees have so usefully put on the record? The answer is probably not. A Nixon Intelligence Oversight Board might well have facilitated the Watergate cover-up. No penalty is proposed for those who ignore the clearance process, as it was so flagrantly ignored in the past; the assassination projects, for example, never came up before the Forty Committee or its predecessors. If Mr. Ford wants to define new crimes, he would be better advised to request a law making it a crime when an official authorizes a covert operation in violation of the procedures set forth in his executive order. Nor, so far as I can see, is there any provision to strengthen the inspector-general system that has performed so lamentably in the past. Nor does the Ford plan do much to make government safe for whistle-blowers.

Moreover, the President totally ignores the most effective way of bringing the CIA under control. That is, of course, to cut its budget. For the obvious fact is that the intelligence community has far too much money. One consequence of having too much money is the temptation to rush into bizarre and profligate projects, like Howard Hughes and the Glomar. Another consequence is a lot of people sitting at a lot of desks and trying to justify their existence by thinking up things to do—like, for example, dusting Castro's shoes, in case he left them outside his hotel room, with thallium salts in the expectation that this would cause his beard to fall out and destroy his charismatic appeal. All the Parkinsonian objections to bureaucracy apply in spades to the intelligence bureaucracy.

Cutting the CIA budget in half would eliminate most of this nonsense, release mindless covert operators for jobs as Hollywood script writers and compel the CIA to concentrate thereafter on serious matters, such as the collection and analysis of intelligence.

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York and winner of Pulitzer Prizes in history and biography. He is also a member of the Journal's Board of Contributors, five distinguished professors who contribute periodic articles reflecting

NEW YORK TIMES  
24 Feb. 1976

## Schorr Suspended by CBS In Leak of House Report

By RICHARD D. LYONS  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23—CBS News formally relieved Daniel Schorr today of all duties as a Washington correspondent pending resolution of a Congressional investigation of his leak of a House committee's intelligence report to The Village Voice.

Mr. Schorr will continue on the CBS payroll and maintain an office in the network's Washington bureau, but is forbidden to cover news events as an employee of the network.

Richard S. Salant, president of CBS News, said in a statement issued in New York that Mr. Schorr was being relieved of duties in "view of the adversary situation in which" he is placed in pending government investigations. He refused to elaborate on the statement, although Marcia Stein, a spokesman, said that the suspension would continue "until all litigation is out of the way."

Mr. Salant said in his statement that the network "will support Mr. Schorr by providing legal counsel insofar as investigations relating to his CBS News activities are concerned."

The statement added that CBS News would back Mr. Schorr "against attempts to require him to reveal the source through which he obtained the report."

"These aspects of the matter involve fundamental issues of press freedom," the statement said.

But Mr. Salant underscored the network's position that in making the report available to The Village Voice "Mr. Schorr acted as an individual."

Mr. Salant's statement, and one by Mr. Schorr, were agreed to today at a meeting in New York. Attending were Mr. Schorr, William J. Small, senior vice president for news of CBS News; Joseph A. Califano, Mr. Schorr's attorney, and lawyers for the network. Mr. Califano is a former counselor to President Johnson.

The scope of Mr. Schorr's legal problems may become known tomorrow morning when a committee of the House of Representatives meets in an effort to determine how to proceed with its investigation of

the newsman. The House called for the investigation last Thursday by a vote of 269 to 115.

In the resolution, which was introduced by Representative Samuel S. Stratton, Democrat of upstate New York, it was specifically stated that Mr. Schorr "may be in contempt of" the House, or to have abused his privileges as an accredited correspondent there.

Representative John J. Flynt, Democrat of Georgia, is chairman of the group that will consider the issue—the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, usually referred to as the House Ethics Committee.

One of the tangential issues involved in the complicated case is whether Mr. Schorr sought to have CBS News broadcast the report, and, if such an offer was rejected, how widely Mr. Schorr sought to distribute the report elsewhere.

### Book Deal Failed

Mr. Schorr has said that he provided the report, that of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, to The Village Voice, a New York Weekly, which published it in two installments earlier this month after the House voted on Jan. 29 not to make it public.

Sources at CBS News said that the network was satisfied that Mr. Schorr had broadcast as much of the report as it had wanted. Mr. Schorr is known to have then approached a book publisher in an effort to have the report printed as a paperback. But the deal fell through, and he delivered the report to The Village Voice, rather than to other newspapers that had requested that he give it to them.

Mr. Schorr's statement, which was released earlier today in New York, said in part:

"Experience has quickly taught me that it is not possible to work as a reporter while personally involved in a controversy over reporters' rights, and I accept that reality. "I do not seek the legal contests which may lie ahead, but I am confident that, as they unfold, it will become clear that what is involved beyond specific details of my action is the public's continued right to know in the face of a secrecy backlash."

Mr. Schorr, who has a reputation here as a tenacious and productive newsman, last appeared on a CBS broadcast on Feb. 18. Last week, CBS News placed him on general reporting duties after the controversy broke out.

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 Feb. 1976

## A.C.L.U. IN DRIVE FOR SPYING CURBS

Favors Punishing Official  
Who Deceive Public About  
Illegal Intelligence Acts

By JOHN M. CREWSON  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 21—The American Civil Liberties Union, in a move reminiscent of its campaign in 1973 for the impeachment of President Nixon, is initiating a national drive to generate public support for the reform of the American intelligence community.

The most radical of the organization's proposals, approved last weekend by a 32-to-18 vote of the union's national board, will be its call for legislation making it a Federal felony for a nonelected Government official knowingly to deceive the public.

Under draft statutes being prepared by A.C.L.U. lawyers, the penalty for such an offense would be the same maximum two-year jail sentence imposed on persons who falsify their Federal income-tax returns.

The 275,000-member civil liberties organization, which will push its drive with a national advertising campaign and lobbying of Congress, is also calling for the abolition of all covert intelligence activity and the appointment of a special prosecutor to watch over the dozen or so agencies that make up the Federal intelligence community.

Charles Morgan Jr., head of the union's national office here, conceded in a telephone interview that, judging by the reaction of President Ford's reorganization this week of the executive's intelligence command structure, he did not expect Congress or the public to accept readily the need for such radical reforms.

### Protected Plan Proposal

Among other things, Mr. Morgan said, the new drive will call for statutory protection for Federal employees, such as Ernest Fitzgerald, who "blew the whistle" to Congress or the public about official wrongdoing. Mr. Fitzgerald, a Pentagon management expert, lost his job, and then regained it through court action, after he had disclosed a \$2 billion cost overrun on the C-5A airplane.

The prospective legislative package, for which Mr. Morgan said no Congressional sponsors had yet been found, would also make it a criminal offense for public officials below the "ministerial" or Cabinet level, to fail to report to the special prosecutor evidence of criminal conduct by intelligence agen-

cies.

Asked why the union considered such matters to be civil liberties issues, Mr. Morgan said that voting for public officials was a constitutional right, that "people have to have information to vote," and that misstatements by public officials or cover-ups of official wrongdoing limited or distorted the information available to the electorate.

The proposal to "make it a crime for a Federal official to deceive Congress or the public willfully about official illegal activities would apply to every employee of the executive branch. It would have its greatest impact, however, on the battalion of public information officers who act as liaison between Federal agencies and reporters.

Such an official, Mr. Morgan said, "works for us."

"He's supposed to tell us the truth," He added, "If he can't tell us the truth, just say 'no comment.'"

The resolution approved last Saturday by the A.C.L.U.'s national board, meeting in New York City, declares the organization's opposition to "the peacetime use of spies in the collection of foreign intelligence," and calls for the ending of "clandestine governmental relationships" with private citizens and corporations.

The Central Intelligence Agency now has a number of "commercial cover" arrangements with American multinational corporations in which its operatives pose as businessmen, journalists and the like in connection with their work.

The union's resolution would not affect the collection of intelligence through technical means, such as reconnaissance satellites, Mr. Morgan said.

### A Limit to Reforms

The reforms made public by President Ford on Wednesday do not affect the clandestine collection of intelligence abroad, nor do they prohibit covert political or military operations aimed at influencing the internal affairs of another country.

Mr. Ford did, however, set up an Operations Advisory Group to approve and periodically review, at formal meetings of its members, any covert activities in progress.

The advisory group replaces in form and function the 40 Committee, which had essentially the same responsibilities. But a new organization established by Mr. Ford is the Intelligence Oversight Board, designed to monitor the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies for signs of illegal or improper activities.

Mr. Ford met today for the first time with the three members of the oversight board—Robert D. Murphy, former Under Secretary of State, its chairman; Leo Cherne, an economist, and Stephen Ailes, a former Secretary of the Army.



The Washington Star

Sunday, February 29, 1976

# Correction of intelligence abuses unlikely under Ford scheme

By Herbert Scoville Jr.

President Ford's prescriptions for reforming the intelligence function are not likely to do the job that is needed.

A strong and effective intelligence community is perhaps the most vital component of our national security system. The recent revelations that our intelligence and law enforcement structure from the president on down has trampled on the privacy and rights of citizens at home and interfered in the affairs of foreign governments have not only damaged American

*Herbert Scoville Jr. is a former deputy director for research at the CIA, and until 1969 was assistant director for science and technology of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.*

influence abroad, but also seriously impaired our essential intelligence capabilities. Moreover, in the course of these disclosures, the secrecy of some sensitive intelligence sources and methods may have been compromised.

On Feb. 18, President Ford issued an executive order which established procedures and restrictions for the conduct of foreign intelligence activities; and proposed legislation that would establish criminal penalties for the disclosure of information that might compromise intelligence sources and methods.

Following publication of the CIA horror stories, the Rockefeller Commission and congressional committees investigated a number of areas where the CIA and later the FBI and NSA carried out operations which either went beyond their charters or exceeded the established concepts of personal privacy or interfered with civil liberties. For example, the CIA carried out for years widespread opening of mail. The FBI, and to a lesser extent the CIA, carried out surveillance and electronic eavesdropping on American citizens, minority groups, and even the press. The National Security Agency monitored international communications of U.S. individuals and business organizations and distributed material collected to other elements of the government.

Recognizing the need for corrective action, President Ford's Executive Order spells out restrictions on intelligence activities, but unfortunately these are hedged with so many exceptions or qualifications that rather than a corrective they could become a justification for what before had been questionable. Just one example:

The collection of information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons is forbidden except "information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations which constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence . . . ; or except the collection of 'information about a United States person who is reasonably believed acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaged in international terrorist or narcotics activities.'"

Under these guidelines, any intelligence

organization could excuse the collection of financial data on any U.S. business and the maintenance of a dossier on any America.

Operation CHAOS, in which the CIA collected, collated and distributed information on the peace and youth movements in the late 1960s, could easily occur again. The preparation of the psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg and the supply of assistance to Howard Hunt in connection with the break-in of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office would now be permitted by a clause which allows a foreign intelligence agency to provide "specialized equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other federal department or agency."

In order to monitor the legality and propriety of intelligence operations, President Ford established a new three-man Oversight Board, which would report to the attorney general and the president any activities that raise serious questions about legality. Does President Ford seriously believe that this would stop any of the illegal activities of the past? Almost all of these were carried out with the approval of the president, and in fact, in many cases the president or attorney general were the sponsors of these activities. His hope that the American people will elect a president who will not abuse this responsibility is not very reassuring.

Furthermore, the appointed members of the board are all veterans of the Cold War. Robert Murphy, the chairman, who has been a member of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board when many of the questionable operations were taking place, in an NBC interview recently endorsed covert actions by the U.S. to replace foreign leaders in countries where our interests were being damaged or subverted or injured in one way or another. It seems very unlikely that this group, with this background, will provide much confidence to people at home or abroad that their rights will now be observed.

Further, it is a basic error to try to correct the abuses of the past, many of which were the direct result of presidential action, solely by executive order. If we are to re-establish confidence in the integrity of our intelligence establishment, then there must be some legislative action so that another president cannot change the rules to suit his own perverted objectives. Then if there are transgressions, there will be legal procedures for insuring accountability at all levels of the government.

Taking advantage of the backlash resulting particularly from the leaking of the secret report of the House Intelligence Committee, President Ford has drafted legislation to apply criminal penalties for divulging information relating to intelligence sources and methods. The law would apply to employees of the U.S. Government, or those outside authorized to possess such information, but not to members of the press who may have been recipients of a leak. However, reporters could now become vulnerable to contempt charges if they refused to divulge their sources.

The limitation to sources and methods is almost no limitation at all since the publication of almost any intelligence can be construed as compromising its source.

For example, one item in the recent public controversy over possible Soviet violations of the 1972 SALT agreements involved the Soviet construction of additional silos which could be either forbidden missile launchers or permitted command and control centers. Clearly the data on this construction was obtained from satellite photography, which is still considered classified by the intelligence community despite widespread disclosure of its existence to the public and even the Russians. Yet, under the proposed statute an individual communicating such information would be criminally liable because it clearly relates to still-classified intelligence methods.

The law would essentially place a gag on the tens or even hundreds of thousands of persons in the government who have access to any intelligence since most of them would have no way of judging when the release of intelligence compromised sources and methods. The press would be similarly constrained by the fear that any publication of intelligence not included in official releases would leave them open to judicial action to disclose their sources.

Furthermore, the proposed law authorizes prior restraint of any person judged by the director of central intelligence (DCI) to be about to engage in any act which will constitute a violation, a principle which was overturned by the Supreme Court in the Ellsberg case. Any court will find it very difficult under the proposed law to invalidate the classification by finding it was "arbitrary and capricious and without reasonable basis in fact."

Secrecy is an important requirement for intelligence. Revealing the details of a conversation involving a small number of foreign officials could endanger the life of the source if it were human or disclose the existence of electronic surveillance if the room were bugged. Our intelligence in many areas would dry up if there were no restrictions on publication. Publishing the names of individuals who may — or may not — be associated with intelligence abroad is unconscionable.

However, in many cases, such as the satellite photography example referred to earlier, disclosure will not compromise either individuals or future intelligence capabilities. Placing an across-the-board gag on all intelligence can only accentuate the all-too-prevalent habit of senior government officials to release selectively that intelligence which they wish to use to justify some specific policy.

Sound information on foreign developments and activities is not a requirement for policy makers alone. The public must have such information if they are to provide informed support or, when needed, criticism of such policies. No better example of this need can be found than the previously mentioned case of the SALT violations. The administration cloaked this problem in a dense veil of secrecy. Persons opposed to any arms limitations spread rumors of Soviet violations so that the public, which is innately suspicious of the Soviet Union, has become convinced that cheating was occurring. Now there is a general consensus, despite belated attempts by administration officials to clarify the situation, that the entire SALT proc-



LONDON TIMES

27 Feb. 1976

# Italian minister views CIA charges lightly

From Our Correspondent  
Rome, Feb 26

Signor Mariano Rumor, the Italian Foreign Minister, today dealt lightly with allegations of political interference by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Italy as fresh charges of intrigues arrived from Washington.

Behaviour which did not make for "clarity in our relations" should not be neglected, Signor Rumor told the Chamber of Deputies foreign relations committee. But he emphasized that Italy's friendship and alliance with the United States were and must remain beyond discussion.

Signor Rumor was speaking as Parliament came to grips with the urgent issues which have been accumulating during seven weeks of inactivity imposed by the government crisis.

Signor Moro's weak Christian Democrat minority Government last night cleared its final hurdle when it received the Senate's vote of confidence. The Government owes its existence to the abstention in both houses of its former allies, the Socialists and Republicans.

Immediately the Chamber of Deputies was forced to face up to the burning issue of abortion, which poses the main threat to the Government's survival.

The debate finds the lay and left-wing parties lined up apparently irreconcilably against the Christian Democrats and neo-fascists, yet failure to pass the Bill in the next few weeks will mean a national referendum on the issue, which only the neo-fascists want.

Time is scarce because Parliament will be in recess for most of next month while four parties hold congresses. Meanwhile, the neo-fascists are attempting to stop the debate on a constitutional point and have listed 35 members to speak, while the Christian Democrats have put down 12.

Speaking in the foreign relations committee on the CIA and Lockheed corruption allegations Signor Rumor said the Government would continue to

do everything necessary to obtain all the documentation from the United States Congressional committee of investigation.

"It is necessary that an atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion should not accumulate in such an important area of our international relations", he said. It was in the interest of both Italy and the United States to eliminate any "deviations".

Signor Umberto Candia, a communist, replied that Signor Rumor did not seem to have realized the importance of the revelations by the Pike committee investigating the CIA.

He asked whether "besides cases of political and electoral corruption, other streams of money have not been diverted by the United States secret service to fuel terrorism".

Claiming that the United States had spent more than 51,000m lire (about £34m) in Italy to prevent the Communists attaining power, Signor Candia called for a firmer reply "because otherwise (Italy) would lose its description as an independent country".

The Turin daily newspaper *La Stampa* today published what it claimed were extracts of the Pike commission report, linking a former American Ambassador in Rome with General Vito Miceli, former head of the Italian secret service, who is charged with plotting a coup, and 50 Italian politicians.

The alleged documents indicated that about \$800,000 (about £400,000) said to have been paid by Mr Graham Martin, the former ambassador, to General Miceli to finance a right-wing press campaign were not used for that purpose.

Instead, General Miceli is alleged to have confessed later to Mr Martin's successor, Mr John Volpe, that he passed the money on to 50 politicians. At the same time he begged Mr Volpe to continue the flow of funds because otherwise the 50 would "turn against" him. Mr Volpe refused, *La Stampa* said.

The incident allegedly took place a year before General Miceli was arrested.

ess is inimical to our security; our ability to obtain future SALT agreements has been seriously compromised.

Moreover, the proposed Ford rules are probably unworkable and will eventually break down. For example, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, following the practices of his predecessors, disclosed in his recent annual report that the Russians are deploying three new classes of missiles. This information clearly comes from still-classified photographic satellite systems; does this disclosure absolve other individuals from any liability for revealing other information coming from this source?

Our intelligence community has gotten along quite satisfactorily for more than 20 years without any such secrecy act. At least until recently, our intelligence gathering collection techniques have not been compromised. The U-2 operated successfully for four years until Gary Powers' plane was shot down in May 1960. Communications and other electronic intelligence have continued for 20 years to provide excellent information on Soviet missile testing. None of our intelligence failures can be attributed to leaks. Even the publication of the House Intelligence Committee Report in the *Village Voice* does not reveal significant information on sources and methods that was not already widely known by foreign intelligence agencies.

The greatest damage to our intelligence capabilities has come from the revelations of questionable activities by these agencies and by top governmental officials. The illegal operations of the U.S. Government in Chile have probably done more harm to our intelligence capabilities and indirectly exposed more intelligence operatives than all the leaks of intelligence. The corrective here is not burying such abuses in secrecy but in avoiding their repetition.

Thus, an analysis of President Ford's overall plan shows that he has his priorities inverted. The new restrictions on intelligence activities are so bound up with exceptions and qualifications that they will give no one any confidence against a repetition of earlier abuses of personal privacy and civil rights. Combining this confused executive order with a secrecy act which would make anybody wishing to blow the whistle vulnerable to criminal penalties will only nurture suspicions that nothing is changed. Instead President Ford should have proposed legislation establishing criminal penalties for persons at all levels who participate in activities which infringe on civil rights or violate the law.

President Ford's Oversight Committee is a weak reed to rely on to ensure adherence to proper standards of conduct. Since President Ford's actions will not restore much-needed public confidence, it now is up to the Congress, but unfortunately, its record in this area does not provide much basis for optimism.

NEW YORK TIMES

28 Feb. 1976

## Buckley Says Senate Report On C.I.A. in Chile Is Biased

WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 (UPI)

—Senator James L. Buckley, Conservative Republican of New York, says that the report on Central Intelligence Agency activities in Chile issued last December by the Senate Intelligence Committee is "slanted and biased."

In a Senate speech, he further charged that the report "excluded relevant information" and discounted testimony by Edward M. Korry, the United States ambassador at the time the Marxist Government of Salvador Allende Gossens was

overthrown in 1973.

Specifically, Senator Buckley charged that the panel failed to deal honestly with President Allende's relationship with Moscow, the way the Kennedy and Johnson administrations protected United States interests in Chile and the allocation of United States Government funds for political purposes in the 1960's.

"The credibility not only of the select committee but of the Senate itself depends on the honesty with which that committee completes its much publicized work," Mr. Buckley said. "It cannot allow the results of that work to be impugned or discredited by charges of partisan or ideological bias."

HERALD ADVERTISER, Boston

1 Feb. 1976

## The other side of the coin

# What CIA has done for U.S.

By KINGSBURY SMITH

National Editor, The  
Hearst Newspapers

WASHINGTON — In the most destructive sabotage ever conducted against a nation against its own intelligence service, the Central Intelligence Agency has been portrayed to the American people — and the world — as a sinister organization engaged in illegal activities which have included political assassination attempts, the overthrow of foreign governments and intervention in civil wars.

What is the other side of the coin? What are the good things the CIA has done for America — and the Free World?

To find out, I spent an hour with CIA Director William E. Colby, who has spent a quarter of a century striving to safeguard the security of America and the political freedom of its allies and foreign friends.

I found that the CIA's covert, so-called "dirty tricks" operations, some of which Colby candidly concedes were wrongly done through an "excess of zeal," represent an almost minute part of the organization's functions. Most of CIA's attention is concentrated on intelligence gathering and analysis. It is in these fields that it has accomplished its greatest achievements.

Listening to the quiet, soft-spoken, trim-looking "professional's professional," one comes away with the impression history will record the following:

- That the "fantastic" surveillance techniques developed by the CIA may well have averted a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union;

- That the CIA information on the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons made possible the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) agreements;

- That without that information it would have been impossible to conclude the anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) agreement which saved the American taxpayers \$100 to \$150 billion;

- That the CIA has averted foreign wars by providing information which enabled the American government to prevent the conflicts;

- That the CIA, by aiding anti-Communist political parties, helped prevent the Communists from gaining control of countries in Western Europe, Latin America and the Middle East;

- That the CIA has saved the lives of foreign political personalities, prevented the kidnapping of others, and provided a new life in America for "defectors" from Communist-ruled countries who brought invaluable information to the United States.

COLBY ALSO DISCLOSED that America has lost close to 50 foreign intelligence contacts and its intelligence operations have been "very badly" hurt in the last few weeks by the leakage of secret information given to Congressional committees.

Last year Congress enacted a law requiring the CIA to report its covert operations to six committees. Almost everything reported to those committees, Colby said, has been leaked to the news media and spread around the world.

"Some of our best contacts... have said they just cannot continue to work with us because of our inability to keep secrets," Colby said. "Some of the foreign intelligence agencies which have cooperated fully with us have reduced the level of information they give us."

Colby believes that Congress, which presently has no effective system for keeping secrets, must discipline its own members to stop leaks which harm America's national interests, endanger the lives of its patriotic intelligence agents and weaken American leadership of the free world.

He also feels strongly that severe criminal sanctions should be applied against Congressional staff members who leak intelligence secrets given in confidence to members of Congress. Similar penalties should, in his opinion, be imposed on those CIA employees who leave the service and then betray their colleagues and country by disclosing names and other highly confidential information to which they had access while serving under oath with the agency.

COLBY SAID the CIA has never assassinated anyone. "We did take steps to try to bring about the demise of two individuals (Cuban dictator Fidel Castro and Congo leader Patrice Lumumba), neither of whom died as a result.

"There were certain other activities that involved people getting killed in the process of a coup or something like that but they were not assassinated by us. To create the impression that our business is plotting assassinations gives a totally false image of the CIA."

The 56-year-old, St. Paul-born CIA veteran, whose intelligence work dates back to 1944 when he parachuted behind the German lines in France to join a resistance group, was appointed Director in May, 1973. Formerly head of the CIA's clandestine (covert) operations, otherwise known as the "Department of Dirty Tricks," Colby thinks the good things achieved by the agency's covert work have been ignored while attention has been focused on some illegal activities which he admits were wrong and should not be allowed to happen in the future.

However, he points out the wrongdoing was mostly due to an excess of zeal encouraged by a long time presidential and Congressional policy towards the intelligence service of:

"That was dangerous," he said. "I believe one of the reasons we did get into trouble was because we were not supervised. There should be active supervision by responsible people, but the leakage of secrets and confidential information concerning intelligence activities must be plugged."

THE RUSSIANS are far behind the U.S. in technology and analysis, which he regards as the most important aspects of modern intelligence, Colby disclosed.

The Soviets are still trying to recruit Americans abroad, offering them as much as \$10,000 to steal American secrets, he said. There have been 400 known attempts to recruit Americans in the last five years alone, he reported.

"The Russians are spending a lot more on secret intelligence than we are," Colby said. "Their operations in the clandestine field are more than ours. They have 40-odd ships around the world constantly shadowing our fleets. Tracking along right on the horizon. They usually have one off Cape Canaveral when we have important space launchings. Last year they had one of their intelligence ships operating off the California coast near the Navy's Pacific firing range, where its newest submarine missiles were being tested.

Following is a condensed text of the exclusive interview with Director Colby:

Q — What do you consider the outstanding achievements of the CIA?

A — I think in the first place it is important to point out that the name of the agency is intelligence. Most of the attention goes to the covert influence operations which are really a small portion of our total effort. During the main days of the Cold War, they were a substantial part of the effort, but now it is about 5 percent. That is, about 5 percent of our budget goes for covert operations. That includes all the ones you have heard about.

The main effort in CIA is intelligence. Now what have we done for intelligence? We have revolutionized it. Intelligence is so different today from the normal image of the James Bond or the Mata Hari that it bears no similarity. Sure we do have a few people collecting intelligence in the old clandestine way. And they are doing a very good job.

What we have achieved in the technological field is fantastic — absolutely fantastic. The U-2 developed in this agency. I cannot go into details on the improvements since then — in photography, electronics—but what we have been able to do has changed the nature of intelligence.

nuclear missiles the Soviets possess. We count them. We tell exactly where they are.

Q — What was achieved on the anti-ballistic missile system was made possible by our intelligence. This country was saved between \$100 and \$150 billions in not having to set up an anti-ballistic missile system. If we did not know through our intelligence system that the Soviets do not have any ABM systems besides the one around Moscow which is part of the agreement, we would have to build a system at a cost of between \$100 and \$150 billions.

Q — Would it have been possible to have the SALT negotiations without the intelligence information on Soviet nuclear capability that you provided?

A — No, absolutely not. We insisted from the beginning on some system of inspection — monitoring. The only thing anybody could think of 10 years ago was on-site inspection, and the Soviets would not agree to it. We don't need teams to go round and look now. We look without them.

Q — You have said the CIA played a major role in saving the Western European countries from Communist subversion?

A — Yes, and not only Western Europe. In the early 1960s the general impression was that the Cuban revolution was going to sweep like wildfire through Latin America. How did we meet that threat? With a political program through the OAS; with an economic program through the Alliance for Progress, and with CIA assistance.

As a result, Latin America is not hostile to the United States today.

THE WASHINGTONIAN  
March 1976

Spook Blotter: An Eastern European intelligence officer brought along a girlfriend when he defected to the West in the late 1960s, and so describe her charms to CIA debriefers who spent weeks talking to him at the secret compound at Fort Meade, Maryland. Now there are problems. The defector, his identity and physical appearance altered, is living in the Washington area. But he complains bitterly that his woman friend is "hopelessly enraptured" with the Agency's contact man, who is said to have done little to discourage her. The defector is telling less-amorous Agency people that he is considering two alternatives: going back to Rumania, or to one of the Congressional committees studying the CIA.

LONDON TIMES  
14 Feb. 1976

## Names of 'KGB men' in US published

From Our Own Correspondent  
New York, Feb 13

The names, addresses and telephone numbers of five members of the Soviet mission to the United Nations were published today, together with the allegation that they were members of the KGB, the Soviet secret police.

They were published by a group of four émigré organizations, known as Free Poland,

Guevara and revolution did not sweep like wildfire through Latin America. I am not saying that CIA did it alone, but it made a major contribution as part of a national program on a strategic level.

The Bay of Pigs was a mistake. It didn't work. It went wrong, but to characterize the CIA's operations in Latin America as the Bay of Pigs is just plain wrong also. A lot of things the CIA did were very successful.

I don't mean the overthrow of Chilean President Allende. We did not overthrow President Allende. What the CIA did in Chile was to try to support the democratic forces there, as we had done in Western Europe.

President Allende got himself in a position where the Chilean Congress, the Supreme Court and the Controller General all issued statements saying the president was operating outside the constitution. Imagine what would happen in this country under such circumstances.

Q — Has the CIA helped to save the lives of allied or friendly foreign leaders and political personalities?

A — I know of one situation in which we got a tip on an assassination plot against an individual and passed the word along. He is still alive, though he is not very friendly towards us.

Q — In what part of the world?

A — The Middle East. There have been other occasions when we have alerted foreign governments about possible assassination attempts on exiles from the east. Certain Eastern intelligence services have assassination units who have been out in the West looking for people.

Q — Were lives saved?

A — Sometimes. Sometimes not. A

ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT  
25 February 1976

## Schorr Leave

The co-culprit along with Daniel Schorr in the leak of the secret House Intelligence Committee report clearly is the person who provided the suspended CBS newsmen with the document he was not entitled to have.

In pursuing its investigation, the House Ethics Committee should concentrate on finding the worm within its own woodwork, whether Schorr chooses to cooperate or not. Little good may come from citing Schorr for contempt. He has admitted his misdeed of making the report available to the Village Voice, a New York weekly publication that printed the classified information.

CBS News may have acted in its own interest by relieving Schorr of his role as a Washington correspondent pending the outcome of the case. He remains on the payroll and the network says it will provide him with legal counsel.

Schorr cannot be defended for accepting and passing onto others material whose publication is deemed damaging to the national interest. Nor can his appeal to his own "journalistic conscience" justify his

decision "not to suppress" the report.

By no legitimate standard of newsgathering was Schorr entitled to the report. It was not enterprise on his part. Rather, he was the recipient of stolen goods. The person who gave him the report betrayed a trust.

The House Ethics Committee, which does a poor job of policing misdeeds by its own congressional members, will be whistling in the wind if it cites Schorr for contempt because he refuses to divulge his source. This will only make him a martyr in some misguided eyes.

The House should have the ability to close its own sieve of security leaks. CBS must decide whether a person of Schorr's character deserves continued employment. And the Justice Department should be looking into the Village Voice.

If the transmittal and publication of classified reports is to become accepted practice, perhaps Benedict Arnold should be disinterred and turned into a national hero for the Bicentennial Year.

Ukrainian exile leader, was killed in Munich. It was pure murder. You don't win them all. We have a very careful way of handling people like that. When they come to this country, we give them another name, a new identity and resettle them some place with a background that enables them to explain theoretically where they came from so that they disappear into our society. We support them.

Q — Have the activities of the CIA generally been within the scope of the practices of the world's leading espionage services?

A — I would say yes. CIA has run an American service.

Twenty years ago America was deeply concerned about the Cold War. We did a lot of things to fight that war and, with a few exceptions, we did it within American standards of decency.

Take the mail interception, for instance. There is a law which says you cannot open 1st class mail. We shouldn't have opened 1st class mail, but transport yourself back to the 1950s when this happened. At a time when we had Soviet spies in this country, when they were stealing our atomic and other secrets.

The misdeeds in CIA history have, I think, been the result either of a direct order by the President or because there was a gray area as to what was proper and what was not. Some things we did were wrong. They were done through an excess of zeal and because it was believed they were in the interests of our country at the time. I think the CIA is a lot milder than most other intelligence services.

subversion by the five they had named.

Dr. Konstanty Hanff, a spokesman for Free Poland, said that they did not conduct or condone any violence on United States territory, but that they wished to make it clear that the deaths of nine of their people in Western Europe in recent months at the hands of "communist assassins" did not go without retributions.

**GENERAL**

Los Angeles Times

Sun., Feb. 29, 1976

# America in the World: Do We Have a 'Duty'?

BY RICHARD H. ULLMAN

Since the beginnings of the republic, those who have concerned themselves about the relations of American society with the rest of the world have been vexed by the question of how that society is affected by, and should react to, the ways in which other societies are governed.

No other issue of foreign policy arouses responses more shaped by a combination of moralism, ideology, expedience, and principle. In recent years, Czechoslovakia, Chile, East Pakistan, Portugal, India and the Soviet Union all, in different ways, have brought this question to the center of active public attention—and, at least in the case of Chile, we now know, to the point of covert subversive action.

Our rhetoric and behavior have been internally inconsistent and often mutually contradictory. Indira Gandhi had our inconsistency in mind when, last August, she replied to those who criticized her for leading India toward authoritarian rule. "Let them be angry," she said. "But why are they not angry about China? Does China have democracy? They are not angry about all the other regimes in other parts of the world whom they are supporting morally and financially."

Concern about the relationship between rulers and ruled in other societies stems in good measure from concern about one's own society, and from the belief that the two sets of concerns are related. This has been especially true in the case of the United States. The rhetoric of colonial revolt two centuries ago—and the explicit or implied comparison with the Old World revolted against—has been amplified throughout the course of American history. The special characteristics of the American polity—the first large constitutional democratic republic constructed upon an explicit statement of values—were, of course, emphasized from the outset in order to justify the act of revolution, and they have been a mainstay of American nationalism ever since.

In recent years, under the weight of Vietnam, Watergate, and the sudden popular awareness of limits to continued economic and technological growth, the theme of American uniqueness has been somewhat muted. But the bicentennial celebration will surely bring it back full-blown.

Nowhere has our belief in the uniqueness of American institutions had more important consequences than in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. From the very outset of American national history, two streams of thought, or motifs, have coexisted unevenly, each derived from this notion of the uniqueness of American institutions, each, however, consistent with very different behavior both abroad and at home.

These two motifs are alike not only in regarding American institutions as unique, but

also in regarding them as relatively easily undermined. They were justifiably regarded as such in the infancy of the republic. One of these motifs is represented by Washington's Farewell Address, with its adjuration to a prudential isolation. The new, weak United States should take advantage of its physical distance from Europe and steer clear of the rivalries which beset that continent.

Obviously, even in its infancy, America could not "withdraw from the world." But it could, as its first President suggested, weigh carefully every prospective involvement with societies beyond its frontiers—in particular, beyond the oceans.

The second strand of rhetoric/policy which has been a constant motif of American foreign relations throughout our national history is one commonly identified with a later president, Woodrow Wilson. Rather than giving rise to withdrawal and isolation, the second strand dictated, if anything, increased involvement.

Like the founders of revolutionary regimes everywhere, those who established the American democracy knew that the plant they nurtured at home would be regarded as a menace to other societies. But where some of their number sought to protect their revolution by insulating it, others sought to protect

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**'Obviously, America  
could not withdraw  
from the world'**

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it by further propagating the democratic ideal. Reactionary states would be confronted by progressive ones. Supporting this strand, and reinforcing it, was a missionary zeal.

These two contrasting strands of thought—each premised upon the uniqueness, and also the fragility, of the American "experiment"—have commingled, sometimes even within the same administration, throughout the course of American history. The period since World War II has been marked by the predominance of the second strand, although at various times, and certainly at present, the first has seemed paramount.

This has been the period of the greatest extension of American global influence. Many of the steps taken since 1945 to extend the sweep of America's writ have been based upon the proposition that the prosperity—even the survival—of free institutions in the United States depended upon nurturing free institutions elsewhere.

Essentially, it amounted to a contention that authoritarian regimes—and, particularly, totalitarian regimes—naturally and inevitab-

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ly seek to expand their sphere of power, and that the larger that sphere becomes the more the United States will be isolated and ultimately endangered. Deliberate isolation as a means of protecting our society would, it was argued, only hasten the process by which it would be endangered by creating vacuums of power into which aggressors would move.

These views permeated the Kennedy Administration and extended into the Johnson years: To dismiss them as fig leaves cynically designed to cover American imperialism is profoundly to misunderstand both the time and the spirit which gave them life.

In retrospect, it is now painfully obvious—as in fact it was obvious at the time—that too often, despite the rhetoric underlying American policy, we did not attempt to use our influence to bring about democratic solutions, but instead deliberately lent our support to reactionary and repressive regimes if they were (in a phrase often used at the time) "with us in the struggle against communism."

We often ignored the fact that some of our allies in the "free world" were as antithetical to ordinary notions of liberty as were any members of the Soviet camp. We tolerated abuses of our principles by our allies under the assumption that they were necessary to protect embryonic democracy—such as South Vietnam's or South Korea's. The details (such as meaningful elections) could be sorted out later.

The combination of an eroded American credibility and the inevitable distortions which have afflicted even some of the most enlightened policies in the process of their translation into "action programs" by the bureaucracy, imposes severe handicaps on American efforts to promote constitutional democratic government abroad.

Since the late 1960s, the "Washingtonian" strand—as distinguished from the "Wilsonian"—has predominated: Wilson's spirit was laid to rest, once again, the ashes of Vietnam (and Watts, Newark and Detroit?).

"Steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world," was Washington's advice. However, twice in his brief message he emphasized that he excluded "already formed engagements": new ones he abjured. Thus the present American mood is not one favoring withdrawal from the world, but one which treats even friends at arm's length. The sudden change toward Peking; the assiduous courtship of Moscow at the expense, some would say, of traditional allies; the em-



phasia, as in the Nixon Doctrine, on self-help; the sudden and drastic shattering of the monetary world of Bretton Woods; the willingness abruptly to suspend exports of soybeans to Japan—all these smack not so much of withdrawal or isolation but of greater detachment, and of national interest more narrowly construed.

If something like an act of faith lies behind the assumption that the survival of democratic forms in the United States depends upon the survival of democracy abroad, the connection between overextension abroad and the threat to democratic institutions at home seems much more readily demonstrable.

Since World War II we have seen countless inroads into our constitutional liberties in the name of national security—not, however, as once feared, because of the exigencies of living in a "fortress America" behind a policy of isolation, but rather because we abandoned the notion of a fortress in favor of the role of international gendarme.

For the past two years, the American media have been filled with accounts of unconstitutional acts, in direct abridgment of the rights of American citizens, undertaken by

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*Wilson's spirit was  
laid to rest, once again,  
in the ashes of Vietnam*

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agents of the executive branch from the President on down, all in the name of an endless campaign on behalf of "freedom." Whether or not these actions were necessary in order to further American interests, broadly construed, is an issue of heated debate. Nevertheless they occurred, and they furnish the strongest element in the case of those who argue that only by the most far-reaching measure of self-restraint against the pursuit of activist policies abroad can we protect our institutions from ourselves.

Coincidentally, the last half-dozen years have been an easier time in which to abandon the goal of propagating democratic liberties abroad, for those liberties have increasingly come to be regarded as something of a rich man's luxury, ill adapted to the needs of the poor and the hungry who make up such a large proportion of the globe. It is fashionable now throughout the West to take a more "realistic" view, and say that political democracy is a sham without economic and social democracy as well. We are often reminded of the contrast between China and India.

We face a further dilemma, moreover. Outside of a relatively small number of states—mostly Western, a few Eastern—the political classes of many societies (i.e., that part of the population whose interests are most directly reflected in the governing authority) are devoted, at best, to nothing more than a formal conception of democracy which allows the population to go through the motions of electing a leadership while in fact it serves to preserve their own privileges. We in this country have over the past decade and a half become increasingly aware that constitutional guarantees of rights are not enough to assure that they are meaningfully accorded.

In this connection, the demand of the poorer states for a "new international economic order" places the United States, and the other advanced, industrialized nations, in a dilemma. Virtually every one of the governments most vociferous in demanding a "new interna-

tional economic order" is authoritarian. Most of them are repressive. In those rare moments when they feel compelled to justify acts of repression, they insist that it is poverty, and the urgent need to husband scarce resources for developmental purposes, which makes repression necessary and makes political democracy, as the term is commonly used in the West, impossible, at least for now.

There is, of course, much that is valid in this contention. Hungry people are unlikely to take much of an interest in deliberative democracy.

At the same time, however, the Third World leaders who are crying for a "new deal" internationally are unlikely to attract much of a following among the publics of the advanced, industrialized nations. Without this popular support, the prospects over the foreseeable future for measurable redistribution seem dim.

What then is the relevance of the two strands of rhetoric/policy with which this essay began—what we have called loosely the Washingtonian and the Wilsonian—for the future of American foreign policy? It could be a mistake to foresee alternation between them—or their coexistence in the same era, sometimes within the same administration—on into the future. If we are all a bit Wilsonian, we are more Washingtonian. The democratic crusades of the two decades following 1945 are not likely to be repeated.

The United States is still capable of exerting decisive leverage at particular focuses, providing, as in the case of Israel, that the domestic political motivation is there. But it is most unlikely that we will soon again—if ever—see the fervent ideological campaigns on behalf of liberal, "free" institutions which we saw, for instance, in the Kennedy era.

Yet, regardless of the cloud under which the evangelistic strand of rhetoric/policy now labors, it would be a mistake to write it off as a force in American political life and as a determinant of future U.S. foreign policy. Regardless of whether one still can feel quite as certain as Woodrow Wilson that American constitutional democracy is unique among the social experiences of mankind, it is undoubtedly true that the quality of political life in the United States is indeed affected by the quality of political life in other societies. The extinction of political liberties in Chile, or their extension in Portugal or Czechoslovakia, has a subtle but nonetheless important effect on political liberties within the United States itself. When dissenting voices are stifled and become, instead, mouthpieces for regimes, the quality of critical discourse, worldwide, is diminished.

It is likely that pressures for stringent restraints upon political action and expression will increase in coming years as governments, worldwide, find it more and more difficult to cope with demands made by their populations.

Indira Gandhi's actions during the past year to muzzle dissent and stifle criticism of her government received universal attention only because of India's size and tradition of adherence to liberal democratic norms, but hers is only the most recent of many governments among the developing states to decide that democracy—and its concomitant freedom of speech and publication—imposes intolerable inconveniences and disruptions.

These conditions are likely to grow more acute in the foreseeable future. In such an environment, the pressures will undoubtedly mount upon any American administration to overlook such matters as whether or not another government is repressive toward its own population.

It will take courage for an American administration to swim against this tide—although not as much courage as would be required by the government of a country less able, by its sheer economic and political weight, to strike a hard bargain when it must. More than courage, however, it will take a clearer definition of policy, and a more defined ranking of priorities, than recent administrations have displayed. If the various arguments presented here are valid, they suggest the following propositions as guidelines for policy making:

—The urgings of both Washington and Wilson have continued but decidedly limited validity. American physical security would not in any immediate sense be affected by drastic changes in the internal political structure of any other state or states, although American psychological security might be. Moreover, the health of democratic institutions in the United States depends not on the further enlargement of the sphere of "democracy" but on the continued existence of a core of advanced, industrialized, mostly Western states committed to the maintenance of a constitutional democratic polity which allows for and protects the genuinely free expression of ideas. Washington's advice is perhaps more relevant than Wilson's, but for the present, at any rate, Americans do not need instruction in the potential disadvantages of entangling involvements with other societies.

—The quality of life in other societies does matter to Americans. Just as most of us find it morally intolerable that some of our neighbors here in the United States should exist at near-subsistence levels while most of us are affluent, so will an increasing number of us find the prospect of starvation in the poorest countries morally repugnant. Callousness toward misery abroad will eventually affect the way we lead our lives.

—Just as the presence or absence of mass misery abroad matters to Americans, so too does the quality of political life in other countries. Here, however, the issues are more complex. The presence or absence of democratic rights as we know them in the United States and in other Western societies is not akin to the presence or absence of hunger. There are societies—Tanzania seems to be one, Yugoslavia another—which have achieved a certain degree of openness and tolerance, combined with genuine mass participation, within an all-embracing single party structure.

—What should matter to American policymakers is the amount of evident repression with which another government accompanies its rule. (Repression should not be equated with violence; absence of obvious use of force within a society is not necessarily indicative of the absence of repression.)

—Over the past 30 years, official American policy has embraced and supported many repressive foreign regime—always on exceptional grounds. A central goal of American policy over the coming years should be the breaking of those embraces where they can be and the avoidance of new ones.

Even in instances where military backing might be denied us, the same sorts of military functions can be almost always carried out from alternate facilities, although admittedly at higher costs. Short of those very few cases such as South Korea, where weakening the American embrace might lead either to a major war or else toward the substitution of one repressive regime for another—in the Korean case, a repression of a more far-reaching, sys-

tematic, and ruthless nature—we can well afford to be much more forthright in using the quality of political life and of human rights in another society as primary determinants of the degree to which the U.S. government should become involved in its support.

—We should rid our foreign policy of any vestiges of the democratic crusades of the 1950s and early 1960s. But, at the same time, we should be more clear in our own minds re-

*'The quality of life in other societies does matter to Americans'*

garding the intrinsic value to American society of preserving and maintaining healthy, working, genuinely democratic political systems where they now exist. For too long we have justified our treaty commitments to the nations of Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and our tacit but scarcely less real commitment to Israel, on the ground that their independence is vital to our own physical security—a justification which is increasingly less easily demonstrated.

In the future we should emphasize the inherent value of preserving nonauthoritarian governments which are protective of human rights and liberties. Our commitment to help this core of "likeminded" states to help defend themselves against external attack should be much stronger than—indeed, fundamentally different in kind from—the sort of obligations we have, say, under the charter of the United Nations regarding a wider circle of states.

—In this respect, we should not confuse the maintenance of political democracy with the maintenance of a capitalist economic order. Too often over the past 30 years official American appeals for the former have in fact been regarded as code words for the latter, and our motives suspected—in most instances properly so. Our opposition to the Allende government in Chile came largely, one cannot help but think, because of the threat he and his colleagues seemed to present to American economic interests and to the fabric of Latin-American capitalism, not because of their threat to Chilean democracy.

—A final point: Just as the level of political freedom in other societies affects our own society, so the quality of our own political life has an important impact abroad. Watergate is an example. The fact that our constitutional system was able to hold the highest officials of our government accountable for actions often winked at even in many of the most "advanced" nations, strengthens the position of those abroad who seek to introduce similar standards of governmental accountability into their own countries.

Fifteen years ago, John F. Kennedy came to the White House calling on Americans to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

Few who heard those words did not thrill to them. But few will read them gratefully today. Time after time during the intervening years the gap between our rhetoric and reality has been too painfully apparent. The measures sketched out here are not in keeping with the embattled tone of that inaugural address. They are not put forward as the basis for an "action program" in the cause of democratic liberties. But they should not be regarded as modest. Quite the contrary: Their implementation would require us, to a much greater degree than we have done over the past three decades, to make our practice fit our principles.

NEW YORK TIMES  
3 MAR 1976

## United States, Pusher

The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union accounts for 60 percent of the world's military expenditures, which are now pushing \$300 billion a year; but the other 40 percent may prove to be more dangerous.

Mutual deterrence has prevented a Soviet-American armed conflict for three decades. But wars in other places involving scores of nations—mainly in the developing world—have taken literally millions of lives since World War II. And military spending in the developing countries is now spiraling upward much faster than anywhere else, partly as a result of the large-scale supply of arms, including the most advanced technology, made available by the United States and other industrial nations.

While arms spending by the major nations increased about 45 percent from 1960 to 1975, the developing countries almost tripled their expenditure to more than \$39 billion in 1974, measured in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars. A study by Ruth Leger Sivard, the former chief economist of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reveals that military expenditures of the developing countries have increased twice as fast as the economic base to support them. They doubled in Latin America in this 15-year period and went up eight-fold in the Middle East.

The international arms traffic that has made this possible is at least as much the responsibility of the pushers as the addicts. The chief pusher is the United States, which sells more arms abroad than all other countries combined—with a staggering \$12 billion originally estimated for the current fiscal year, although the Pentagon now asserts that a 13 percent slippage is appearing. Major moral as well as political questions are raised by this munitions profiteering.

The time has clearly come for the United States to pull back from this increasing militarization of the developing world. The sale of arms for commercial purposes—to aid the United States balance of payments—is the most shameful aspect of the arms trade. The Congress for more than a year has had the right of prior review and veto over the bulk of American arms sales abroad, but it has asserted itself significantly only once. Now, major reforms have been voted by the Senate in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 to tighten up and improve Congressional oversight. But that alone does not give Congress the will to act.

The House International Relations Committee version of the authorization bill, which is scheduled for a vote today, contains a major improvement over the Senate bill. It would limit the annual total of government-to-government and commercial sales of arms abroad to \$9 billion. It is not a big enough reduction, but it would constrain a program that now appears dominated by the determination to sell as much arms abroad as possible to almost any buyer.

That constraint, for the first time in years, would force the Pentagon and the State Department to take first steps toward the real reform that is needed; limiting sales to allies and other countries where important American foreign policy or security considerations are at stake.

That was the case when most arms exports were grants, paid by American taxpayers. It needs to be the chief guideline again.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN  
23 Feb. 1976

MARTIN WOOLLACOTT follows the heroin trail in the borderland of Burma and Thailand

# Squaring off the Golden Triangle

THE POPPIES are blooming now in the "Golden Triangle" area of North East Burma and Northern Thailand which supplies an increasing proportion of European addicts with their heroin, and the harvesting begins this month.

Much of the between 400 and 500 tons of opium that will be produced this year will reach Europe. Some of it will be seized there or en route in Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. But there will be little disruption of the trade in Thailand itself, according to narcotics experts here.

For Thailand is now the weakest link in the anti-drug enforcement chain. Since the reorganisation of the Triangle drug trade after the Indo-China war, Singapore has set up an effective Central Narcotics Bureau and has imposed the death penalty for possession of more than 15 grammes of heroin.

Malaysia, worried about the growing number of addicts in its own cities and the unfavourable international publicity after the discovery of the Kuala Lumpur-Amsterdam drug "run," has also intensified its efforts.

Hong Kong, still a major destination for Triangle opium and heroin both for local use and onward shipment to America and Europe, has made an impressive number of seizures and arrests of big traffickers.

In Europe, police forces, particularly the Dutch, are finally organising themselves to meet the threat. Even Burma, in whose uncontrolled Northern territories the bulk (an estimated 80 per cent) of the opium is produced before being taken over the border to Thailand, has taken some action, partly because it too now has a significant addicts population.

Thailand also has a growing addiction problem, with

an estimated 300,000 victims, mostly young urban people, including children under 12. But, in spite of this, and in spite of the fact that the US Drug Enforcement Agency, with its South East Asia headquarters in Bangkok, funds the Thai anti-drug programme to the extent of half a million dollars a year, the Thai anti-narcotics record is appalling. "We cannot point to a single major Thai trafficker in gaol," an American drugs expert said.

Some traffickers who have been arrested have escaped or been released under extremely suspicious circumstances. Early last year, the Public Prosecutor's Office released six people, including a trafficker who had been caught redhanded. Later a police lieutenant colonel who was arrested at a heroin laboratory on his own property in Northern Thailand was allowed to go to the lavatory without escort — and escaped through the window.

In another case a former head of the Thai Narcotics Suppression Centre suspected of corrupt involvement in the trade was released under an amnesty for minor criminals.

The improved efficiency of police forces in the neighbouring countries and in Hong Kong has thus concentrated illegal drug operations in Thailand. Previously much processing and distribution was centred outside Thailand, and particularly in Hong Kong. Now there are an increasing number of laboratories or "factories" in Northern Thailand, many of them staffed by "chemists" from Hong Kong. Often with primitive but adequate equipment made up of such items as bamboo tubing and bicycle pumps, these "factories" convert raw opium into the much more valuable, compact, and less easily detectable morphine base, or the various grades of heroin.

The raw opium reaches the factories from Burma and remote sites in North Thai-

land carried by single porters or in small mule trains and, sometimes, it is alleged, on light planes or helicopters. The processed drugs are then taken south by truck, bus, car, or plane.

Some then goes farther down the peninsula to Malaysia or Singapore by land or on small coastal vessels, but most is smuggled out of Bangkok by a variety of ingenious means. These include trawlers to Hong Kong and Singapore.

In one famous case the joints of crates containing fresh eggs for air shipment to Hong Kong were hollowed out and filled with heroin. In another case last year, an American servicemen's shipment of furniture was found to be riddled with heroin caches.

But the most common method seems to be to use an air courier for direct shipment to Europe. The couriers are usually not professional criminals and may simply be greedy European tourists, down on their luck hippies, or local men tempted by the prospect of a free holiday with ample pocket money. Arrests or seizures at this stage do the trafficking organisations little real harm: the quantities of heroin lost are small, and the courier can tell the police nothing about the organisation.

One bright idea which surfaced last year was that the United States should buy the entire Triangle crop at source and burn it. The notion has an attractive simplicity, but, as one agent said: "This would be directly financing the Burmese insurgents" (who survive on the profits from the drug trade in this area), "and what would prevent the growers from doubling the crop?"

The Thais meanwhile have not been wholly inactive:

they made a dramatic swoop on one Northern "factory" last month, and are planning an anti-drug publicity campaign later this year. But there is still no sign of real inroads into the trade.

Corruption is obviously one reason why the Thais are lagging so badly behind other concerned countries in the suppression of the Triangle drug trade. Another is the proliferation of Thai drug agencies. Four different police agencies and departments are assigned to drugs, and the foreign experts here want to see them replaced by a single and more powerful central narcotics branch. Finally the Thai Government, beset by many problems, has yet to make it clear that it regards an attack on the drug trade as a real priority.

The Americans, who maintain narcotics agents throughout South East Asia, are worried that the Thai traffickers who at present supply only a small amount of heroin used in the United States (most comes from Mexico now) will in time manage to make the connections to expand their US trade.

But it is the European countries, including Britain, which should be most concerned. There has been a "tremendous increase," say the agents here, "in the amount of heroin going to Europe." In 1975, approximately 500 kilos of Triangle heroin were seized at European destinations, mainly Amsterdam, Vienna, and Paris.

The narcotics agents' rule of thumb is that seizures normally represent between 5 and 10 per cent of total trade. This would mean that between 2,500 and 5,000 kilos reached Europe last year — a horrifyingly large total that can only be seriously reduced at the source, that is, by more effective action in Thailand.

## Eastern Europe

WASHINGTON POST  
28 FEB 1976

# Morale Low at Moscow Embassy

## 'Strong Letter' Demands Information on Radiation Hazard

By Peter Osnos  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Feb. 27—American diplomats in Moscow have written a "very strong" letter to top State Department officials demanding to be told the full extent of the radiation problem at the embassy here and whether it represents a serious health hazard, sources said today.

Morale in the embassy, one of the largest and most important American posts abroad, has plummeted since reports of the radiation began to circulate three weeks ago, the sources said. Although employees have been briefed, a full explanation of the situation including its causes and its dangers has been withheld.

The letter was drafted last week by the local branch of the American Foreign Service Association and was intended for Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. At the request of senior embassy officials, only a copy of the letter was sent to Washington with the original going to Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel.

"People are incensed," said one of those responsible for preparing the letter. So far no response has been received and further action—including possible legal action—is being considered.

At the outset, the impression given to embassy employees was that the radiation was caused solely by Soviet surveillance equipment which included microwave beams focused on the embassy. There have been reports from Washington this week, however, that the purpose of the Soviet radiation was to block American eavesdropping.

In any event, the true story is apparently known to very few people in the embassy, perhaps only Stoessel himself. Kissinger is responsible for the way the matter is being handled, it is understood, and he has stressed on several occasions that it is highly sensitive. He said that "discussions" are under way to solve the problem.

Since Monday, Sam Zwicfel, a State Department physician, has been in Moscow performing blood tests on all embassy personnel and their families. It is not clear whether these tests were precipitated by discovery of specific problems at the embassy, as a report from Washington today suggested, or are simply a precaution.

One explanation for Dr. Zwicfel's presence is that the regular embassy physician, Thomas Johnson, is on a vacation that was postponed when the radiation issue surfaced.

In Washington, the State Department said it has sent a medical technician to Moscow to conduct blood tests on U.S. embassy personnel who may have been exposed to the microwave emissions. William Watson, the

department's medical director, said: "The medical division has found no medical problems that it believes to be related to the situation at the embassy."

The report from Washington also said that Stoessel suffered from anemia, which may have been aggravated by the radiation here. The embassy has already denied an earlier report that

Stoessel is ill, but the ambassador refused to comment on today's report, he did deny that he plans to leave Moscow for reassignment. Stoessel has been here for two years.

At earlier briefings and again today, embassy officials strongly implied—but did not say directly—that there appears to be no great danger from the radiation to people living in or working at the embassy. But the uncertainty is apparently beginning to have its effect on some embassy personnel and their families.

"We have a need and a right to know what this is all about," said one angry American. "How long is this going to continue?"

### U.S. Paid Widower In Radiation Case

Reuter

The United States compensated the husband of a woman who died of cancer in 1969 after she had been exposed to microwave emissions at the American embassy in Moscow, informed sources said yesterday.

The sources said the woman developed a mole on her face while working as a secretary from 1960 to 1962 in a part of the embassy exposed to microwave emissions believed to be from Soviet radio jamming devices.

The mole developed into melanoma—a usually malignant tumor—and the woman, for whom the sources requested anonymity, died in 1969.

Her husband applied for compensation from the government on the grounds that her death may have been caused by her exposure to microwaves beamed at the embassy, the sources said. His claim, for less than \$10,000 in lost wages, was honored.

Saturday, February 21, 1976 The Washington Star

# Radiation at U.S. Embassy Long Known, Ex-Agents Say

By Thomas Love  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The United States has known for years that the Soviet Union was bombarding the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with high and possibly harmful levels of microwave radiation, but the government withheld the information—even from Embassy employees.

According to two ex-CIA agents, Lewis Regenstein and Victor Marchetti, the radiation was well-known within the agency and a matter of concern during the 1960s.

Regenstein, who was with the CIA from 1966 to 1971 and now is an environmental writer here, said yesterday the situation was "common gossip" within the CIA by 1970 but that disclosure would have required a decision at a higher level.

He charged that the information was withheld as part of a general and continuing cover-up of Soviet activities that could endanger "detente" if they became public knowledge. He termed the long period of silence "a major scandal."

MARCHETTI, a frequent critic of the CIA and author of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," said high levels of radiation "were well known at least by the early 1960s. This is an old turkey."

Embassy employees were not told of the possibly dangerous radiation until two weeks ago. An Embassy doctor reportedly assured the staff later that no health hazard existed.

Nobody but the Soviets seems to have any firm idea why the radiation is being beamed at U.S. facility, and

and they now claim that U.S. electronic equipment may be a contributing factor. Other theories range from operation of a Soviet bugging system to efforts at destroying the effectiveness of Embassy personnel by making them tired and



The Washington Star

Saturday, Va.  
February 28, 1976

# Embassy Feared Own

By Jeremiah O'Leary  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The State Department was as concerned that U.S. counter-electronic measures might be affecting the health of Moscow Embassy employees as it was about microwaves beamed at the building by the Soviet, a U.S. official disclosed yesterday.

The official, who asked that he not be named, said that when the current radiation scare started several weeks ago the State Department thought it was as likely that U.S. equipment might be to blame for reported illnesses as Soviet jamming devices.

State Department spokesman Robert Funseth said yesterday, however, that the department's medical division has found no medical problems related to the situation at the Embassy. A medical technician was sent from Washington six weeks ago to run blood tests and other checks on the 500 or more U.S. personnel, he said.

FUNSETH SAID a new physician, Dr. Samuel Zweifel, was sent to Moscow a week ago, but he said Zweifel was only there to

BALTIMORE SUN  
2 March 1976

## Solzhenitsyn calls West 'on verge of collapse'

London (AP)—Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the exiled Russian author, said last night the West "is on the verge of a collapse" because of "capitulations" in pursuing detente with the Soviet Union.

"I wouldn't be surprised at the sudden and imminent fall of the West," Mr. Solzhenitsyn told Michael Charlton, a British Broadcasting Corporation interviewer on the weekly television news program "Panorama."

"I would like to make myself clear: The situation at the moment is such that the Soviet Union's economy is on such a war footing that, even if it were the unanimous opinion of all the members of the Politburo not to start a war, this would no longer be in their power.

"To avoid this," the author went on, "would require an agonizing change from a monstrous war economy to a normal peace economy. The situation now is such that one must think not of what might happen

permit the regular Embassy physician, Dr. Thomas Johnson, to take annual leave.

Another source Zweifel was sent to Moscow specifically because of concern for the health of Embassy employees.

The disclosure that U.S. counter-intelligence electronic measures were regarded as possible health threats goes a long way toward explaining the careful and limited explanations being given by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his spokesman about the situation.

At a press conference two weeks ago, Kissinger said only: "This issue is a matter of great delicacy which has many ramifications. We have made unilateral efforts to reduce any dangers and we are also engaged in discussions on the subject. But I do not believe it would serve these purposes if I went into any greater detail."

At the time, the phrase "unilateral efforts" had no special meaning, and reporters were left to speculate it might mean the United States was reducing its use of listening devices so the Soviets Union might reduce its listening or jam-

## Radiation

ming devices.

NOW IT appears that there may have been greater potential threat from the kind of microwaves generated inside the Embassy than from the microwaves beamed at it by the Russians.

Soviet officials privately admitted to the New York Times earlier this week that microwaves were beamed at the Embassy to jam U.S. listening devices on the roof. It is no secret that such microwave emissions have been used by both countries in Moscow for at least 15 years.

Aware of the Soviet capability to listen in on Embassy conversations from posts at least a block away, the U.S. Embassy has equipment capable of erecting an electronic wall to jam such interceptions.

One U.S. official said the "unilateral" action referred to by Kissinger may have been a decision to reduce the level of the Embassy's own counter-intelligence emissions for the protection of Embassy employees.

was awarded the Nobel prize for literature in 1970, said he was not against East-West detente but against the way it is being conducted.

"Detente is necessary, but detente with open hands," he said. "Show that there is no stone in your hands. But your partner's with whom you are conducting detente have a stone in their hands and it is so heavy that it will kill you with one single blow. Detente becomes self-deception, that's what it is all about."

Asked by Mr. Charlton whether detente wasn't an alternative to nuclear war, Mr. Solzhenitsyn replied that during the 1950's "this nuclear threat hung over the world, but the attitude of the West was like granite and the West did not yield.

"Today this nuclear threat still hangs over both sides, but the West has chosen the wrong path of making concessions."

"You Western people, you simply can't grasp the power of Soviet propaganda," Mr. Solzhenitsyn said. "You [the West] cannot be turned away from detente so simply. To turn you away from your present posi-

unexpectedly in the Soviet Union, because in the Soviet Union nothing will happen unexpectedly.

"One must think of what might happen unexpectedly in the West. The West is on the verge of a collapse created by its own hands."

Mr. Solzhenitsyn, visiting his publishers in England, said he has noted a particular decline in the strength and resolution of the West during the two years since he was expelled from his homeland.

He attributed the decline to an illusory detente and cited the success of Soviet-backed forces in Angola as the latest indication of the Soviet Union's long-range goals.

"You don't have to be a strategist to understand why Angola is being taken," Mr. Solzhenitsyn said. "This is one of the most recent positions from which to wage most successfully world war. A wonderful position in the Atlantic."

Mr. Solzhenitsyn, 57, who

irritable.

Marchetti has another theory. His guess is that there really is no practical use for the radiation, and that it is designed to confuse U.S. officials and make them waste time and money trying to figure out what is happening.

IF THIS IS the case, he said, it appears to have worked. "We were very concerned since this was something we didn't know about. We worried and worried."

As Marchetti sees it, the long-known radiation was disclosed at this point to divert public attention from bad publicity the CIA and other intelligence agencies have received lately.

"There will be a few more exciting revelations until the issue is forgotten," he predicted. "It's designed to help (President) Ford shove through his national security law and preserve the 'imperial presidency,'" he said.

Embassy personnel in Moscow were told two weeks ago that there had been some low levels of microwave radiation directed at the Embassy previously, but that the high levels were something new. Both ex-CIA agents insisted, however, that the levels had been high enough all along to cause serious concern.

REGENSTEIN has been a frequent CIA defender since leaving the agency and said he has been careful not to divulge any classified information. He agreed to discuss the Moscow situation only because existence of the radiation now was known.

When told of the situation earlier this month, Embassy employees reportedly were told their health might have been endangered and were given the opportunity to request a transfer. The Boston Globe reported, also, that Ambassador Walter Stoessel might have a leukemia-like blood ailment possibly caused by the radiation, but this was strongly denied by the State Department.

Microwaves are used by radar to detect distant airplanes and in ovens to cook food. Cataracts and other eye damage have been discovered among microwave oven repairmen while sterility and blood damage have been produced in experimental animals. There is also evidence that heavy dosage can produce a genetic effect on chromosomes.

tion one would need a year or two.

"But in the Soviet Union one morning, one command is enough. Newspapers come out with the news the British imperialists have become so brazen that the situation has become intolerable . . . and detente—there is not detente. It's just gone."

WASHINGTON STAR  
9 FEB 1976

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1976

# Supergiant With Clay Feet

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—The Soviet Union has become the world's strongest military power and this is the salient fact of this week's Communist Party Congress where Leonid Brezhnev celebrated a self-confident personal triumph. The meeting coincided with Washington admissions indicating the C.I.A. had seriously underestimated Russian military budgets and nervous warnings from Peking.

New China News Agency said the U.S.S.R. was now "the foremost country in military spending by outstripping the United States," and added: "About 60 percent of Soviet industrial enterprises are engaged directly or indirectly in the production of armament." Washington reckons Moscow has more than twice the number of U.S. armed forces, more than four times as many tanks, more than two and a half times the megatonnage of nuclear warheads, a larger fleet and is pushing hard on laser weapons.

The fact that this military edge was achieved under Mr. Brezhnev's administration is to a degree accidental. Heavy industrialization and massive

fers from today are in nonmilitary domains like economics and ideology.

Mr. Brezhnev represents a dual Soviet policy—encouragement of "wars of liberation" but simultaneous "peaceful coexistence." What this really implies is having his peaceful cake in Europe while eating it in Asia and Africa. The West, for a variety of reasons imposed by its search for economic progress and social harmony plus its hope that what we call detentes will eventually be succeeded by true peace, agrees to play along.

Mr. Brezhnev's gradualist approach to extending Marxist ideology helps him to persuade many non-Communist nations and parties of his logic—although enraging China and its adherents. It encourages the growth of foreign trade with the U.S.S.R., especially the export of materials Moscow particularly covets and is willing to pay for.

Nevertheless, the Soviet economy still falters. All the goals set for the past five years fell short of their targets—save for foreign trade, forced to fill the gap. There is no doubt that living standards rose far less than anticipated. This sorry truth is scarcely compensated for by pride in overseas triumphs, for example in Angola.

And there is another curious political problem which cannot help but trouble a citizenry already nagged by a small but biting number of dissident gadflies: That is the question of ideological universality.

The gospel as interpreted in Moscow has already been seriously challenged in Peking, Belgrade, Tirana and (up to a point) Bucharest. But now the Communists of Western Europe are suddenly proclaiming a kind of Marxist Protestant movement, championed by the vitally important Italian and French parties and by the potentially key Spanish party.

Each of these, led by experienced veterans, proclaims that it understands better how to apply the ideals of Socialism-Communism to its own country than anyone in the Kremlin. Each also speaks with increasingly forceful philosophical heresy.

It is too soon to know with any certainty whether this is a harbinger of fundamental change in doctrine abroad or merely a tactical shift that, should it succeed, will eventually be repaired by a new and harmonizing global strategy. Nevertheless, at this moment, a fundamental weakness in the Soviet political position is implied.

When the latter is added to glaring weakness in agriculture and technology, the combination indicates that no matter how immense the Russian giant has become, it still has clay feet.

## Nader a Big Target Of Communist Spies?

Associated Press

Consumer advocate Ralph Nader has been one of the prime targets of Communist bloc intelligence operations in the United States, according to testimony released by the Senate internal security subcommittee.

A high-level defector from the Czechoslovak intelligence service told the subcommittee that "a quite exceptional amount of interest" has been devoted to Nader because "he is such a powerful figure in public life of the United States."

The defector, identified by the cover name of Joseph Frolik, told the subcommittee that in 1968 he had been ordered to arrange for the surveillance of Nader's relatives in Lebanon.

"THE CZECH Service collected a file on him, his contacts with the government, and other people, and the power of his organization, and decided that it would be useful to recruit him, if such a chance would exist in the future," Frolik said.

Asked by Sen. Strom

WASHINGTON POST  
2 8 FEB 1976

## CIA Raises Estimate of Soviet Force

The dollar value of Soviet military forces was 30 per cent higher than American forces in 1974 and 40 per cent higher in 1975, according to revised Central Intelligence Agency estimates released yesterday.

The CIA stressed in its eight-page report that the dollar comparison is useful for showing relative trends in military investment but should not be read as how much the Soviets are actually spending on de-

Thurmond, R-S.C., if he knew whether Nader had ever been approached or recruited, Frolik replied, "to the contrary, there was nothing in the file which shows that Mr. Nader was contacted by the service."

Frolik testified in closed session last November.

Nader said the report "is news to me," adding that "it's sort of crazy."

"It's unbelievable the money these intelligence services have to spend. My relatives in Lebanon are shopkeepers. It's like they (the Czech intelligence service) had to make work," he told a reporter.

FROLIK TOLD the subcommittee the efforts of the Czech service were "directed and coordinated by the KGB (Soviet secret police)" from Moscow. He said that other major targets were the AFL-CIO, NAACP and the American Civil Liberties Union, as well as various government agencies such as the Defense Department, State Department, Justice Department, White House and National Security Council.

rearmament programs began in Stalin's era and have continued ever since, regardless of shifts in economic emphasis.

"We have overtaken the U.S. but we are still poorer than you are," Nikita Khrushchev once told me. "Yet we use the means at our disposal better." At that time Russia was far behind the United States in output of such basic materials as petroleum and steel but now exceeds us in both.

Its major inferiority, relatively speaking, remains qualitative technology and food production. But the West, led by America, is doing its utmost to help out in both respects. It exports to the U.S.S.R. advanced tools and equipment and huge amounts of grain. Whether Russia, with an unusually snowy winter, will require as much grain this year—or whether the U.S.A. will be able to export as much—are open questions.

What remains indisputable—confirmed by Soviet gains in Somalia, India and North Vietnam, and emphatically reconfirmed by events in Angola—is that the militarized Russian state is now a global power with no need for inhibition vis-à-vis any rivals on any continent or sea. Such tangible weaknesses as Moscow suf-

fense.

The agency explained that the estimates stem from figuring how much it would cost the United States to build here the kind of weapons the Soviets are deploying.

The method does not show what the Soviet Union is actually spending on de-

fense nor its burden on the Soviet economy.

Last October, the CIA estimated the Soviet dollar difference at 35 per cent for 1975. The new estimate in the CIA report released yesterday by the House Armed Services Committee is that the Soviet dollar cost was 40 per cent higher in calendar

# Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST  
3 MAR 1976

*Michael Ledeen and Claire Sterling*

## Standing Accused: The Italians Are

## Upset

For some 30 years Italians have nurtured two basic beliefs about themselves and the world: that they would stumble, connive and procrastinate their way from one crisis and scandal to another, and that the United States would rescue Italy from the Italians. This last was a particularly cherished conviction, and was held by people with the most diverse political attitudes. Communists believed it because they felt American imperialism could not tolerate the collapse of a central element of NATO's southern flank. Christian Democrats believed it because they were convinced America could not risk Italy's "going Communist." Italians in general believed it because they were

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led to believe that in some vague way an Italian collapse would be very risky for the economic and political stability of the West in general, and to America's goals in particular. Thirty years of generally excellent relations between the two countries reinforced this article of faith.

Now the release of information from three congressional investigating committees has seriously weakened Italians' belief in the good will of the United States. While the information comes from different sources (the Church subcommittees on intelligence and on multinationals and the Pike committee on intelligence), the impact in Italy has been one and one alone: Italian politicians have been accused of corruption by the United States Congress. A highly placed observer in the Italian chamber of deputies spoke the other day of "horrified" deputies in a state of "near shock," wondering what the "unpredictable Americans" would do to them next. Moreover, he said, there was a growing tide of anti-Americanism among those who had been among the United States' most enthusiastic supporters, and he speculated that it would take some time for these passions to run their course. "Can anyone imagine a more schizophrenic country than the United States these days?" He asked, "Has it not become dangerous for us to deal with Americans?"

The most recent accusations to reach Rome are those of the Senate subcommittee on multinational corporations, and deal with the presumed bribery of two Italian defense ministers, Mario Tanassi (a Social Democrat) and Luigi Gui (a Christian Democrat). Both men have initiated legal procedures against newspapers that openly accused them of accepting bribes from Lockheed

agents, and Gui has taken a step that is most unusual for an Italian minister accused of involvement in a major scandal: he has resigned, and has himself demanded a judicial inquiry into the matter. In a lengthy conversation in his office, the former minister spoke calmly but with evident emotion about the scandal. "The first thing which shocks an Italian reader of the Church subcommittee report is the incredible patchwork nature of the document, and the incoherence of the charges," he observed. The pages that deal with Gui's presumed involvement in the payoffs are indeed peculiar, for the minister is referred to only as "the previous minister," or "the MOD," and these references have been written into the report in ink into spaces where something previously typed has been cancelled. Moreover, the crucial paragraph contains shifts in tense that render it very difficult to understand: "Early in 1970 Lockheed recognized the necessity for additional special expenses of \$78,000 and this amount was to have been paid upon receipt of the letter of intent. These expenses actually were to compensate the previous minister and certain members of his team who are now in the ministry and who will review the contract."

The problem revolves around two words: "team" and "now." In the Italian bureaucracy, ministers bring a very few members of their own "team" with them, and they inevitably leave when the minister does. Hence, it is unthinkable that any of Gui's personal assistants or advisers remained in the ministry of defense when Tanassi (a member of a different party) replaced him in March 1970. Moreover, the word "now" appears to refer to the date of the Lockheed report itself, which seems to be 1971. (This information is surprisingly lacking from the subcommittee report.)

Gui observed that, quite apart from the incoherence of the reference to him, the "charges" of corruption were based entirely on internal Lockheed correspondence, without a shred of evidence that the alleged cash transactions ever took place. All that is known is that Lockheed's agents requested and were given the \$78,000 (receipts from the agents are reproduced in the report). The former minister said that he was innocent of the charges, and that he was rather mystified by the entire operation. There were some in Italy, he noted, who suspected that the question had more to do with internal American political struggles than with the much-vaunted American passion to uncover the truth at all costs. Such people, he observed, wondered why the matter of the cancellations and insertions in the report had never been clarified by the sub-

committee, or why such obviously damaging documents had been released without an attempt to ascertain if the charges were true.

"The investigation of this congressional committee has brought about the resignation of the Italian minister of the interior, and this is no small matter in the relations between two countries," Gui pointed out. "It cannot help but affect the mutual trust and esteem which has always existed between our two nations," he said.

Regardless of the quality of the evidence, the Italian and American press have shown little interest in awaiting the results of formal investigations, especially since these have rarely produced any substantial results in this country. Yet there is already a hint that the wrong targets may have been singled out. The Washington Post, in a story datelined Bonn on Feb. 11, reported that a Lockheed representative in Germany appears to have pocketed a bribe ostensibly intended for German political parties. In Italy, for example, the Lockheed intermediary has simply disappeared. There are now suspicions that at least some "bribed Italians" may never have been bribed at all. A New York Times editorial, which, of course, accepted the truth of all of Lockheed's admissions, suggests that American prestige will inevitably suffer as a result of the scandals, as if it were the government that was responsible for the presumed bribes. Instead, the behavior of the Congress, and the "schizophrenia" that Italians now see emanating from Washington, have produced an image abroad of a country that does not have the capacity of leading the Western world. It is not so much the image of a corrupt country as that of a nation unable to make policy. This is particularly clear in the instance of the CIA scandals.

The Pike committee report, much of which has already been leaked to Italian journalists in America, specified that some \$66 million had been spent in Italy from 1948 to 1968, in support of non-Communist parties and labor unions. Of this, one million dollars was spent during the elections of 1948 (a sum much smaller than most informed observers had suspected), which produced a substantial victory for De Gasperi's Christian Democrats at the expense of the Communists. While no politicians' names appeared in the report itself, journalists seem to have learned from committee (or government?) sources that CIA funds went not only to the Christian Democrats and other members of governing coalitions (the report says "political parties associated with center or cen-

ter-left governments"), but also to individual politicians, including the highly respected Social Democrat Giuseppe Saragat "and his faction."

Now, quite aside from the question that here, as in the Lockheed scandal, one is dealing with (highly limited and selected) internal documents, it seems that someone might have attempted to put this spending in context, as the authors of the CIA memoranda tried to do. In justifying the expenditure of \$10 million in the parliamentary elections of 1972, the CIA said that "the opposition, apparently heavily financed by Moscow, had scored gains in regional elections and trailed the incumbents by only a few points in the opinion polls." In this context, it would appear to be highly dubious to speak of "corruption," and probably closer to the truth to talk about compensating "emergency campaign funds" of a sort that has been all too common in Italy's postwar history. It has been common to both "sides," not just to an American government that now seems to question whether opposition to Stalinism over the course of the past quarter-century was morally or politically justified. Turin's *La Stampa*, one of the country's most respected publications, was not inclined to regard these funds as either massive (they amounted to less than 10 per cent of the expenses of the parties in question) or as corrupting:

*It seems beyond discussion that the Communist party was assisted by the Soviets, first directly and then through economic enterprises linked with the Soviet Union, and the extreme left in Italy has been supported in various ways by Moscow or by Prague. It would be juvenile to expect that Italian political groups, who were close to Washington by free choice, not for a handful of dollars, refused or failed to solicit aid from the United States. During and following the cold war Italy was at the*

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
17 February 1976

*center of the competition between the two superpowers, and prior to the public financing of the parties they desperately needed funds.*

It is worth observing that there appears to have been little, if any, funding of Italian political parties since 1972 on the part of the CIA. If we can believe the latest reports, Kissinger and Ford wanted to send some money last December, but the transfer did not take place.

If the support of non-Communist parties in Italy can be justified in the context of the cold war, the same cannot be said for the \$800,000 that Ambassador Graham Martin seems to have given to the shadowy Gen. Vito Miceli, then head of the SID (Defense Intelligence Service) in 1972. This money, which was to be used to aid the campaign and propaganda efforts of the extreme right, was obtained over the vigorous protests of the CIA, whose station chief objected repeatedly to giving money to such suspect and subversive groups. Martin finally got the money after threatening to order the embassy's marine guards to lock the CIA station chief out of the embassy on the Via Veneto, and put him "on the airplane." Events of this sort, it should be noted, do little to damage the reputation of the CIA in Italy, but they confirm the proclivities that the Nixon government had for flirting with groups on the far right. They may also explain in part why the present Secretary of State is so reluctant to open the Pandora's Box of covert American activities in recent years.

Kissinger is quite correct — and recent events in Italy bear him out — that information stemming from congressional investigations severely damages America's relations with many of its allies. But one must also say that attempts by the administration to plug

the leaks and "save our friends from embarrassment" have been at least equally counterproductive. Our friends would be better served now by genuinely full disclosure.

The anti-American elements of the Italian press have not hesitated to take the leaks of the congressional committees as gospel, while those accused find it impossible to defend themselves. Two Communist journalists are permitted to see important documents, which are then denied to those who wish to check them. Italian newspapers carry translations of the Pike report, and American newsmen in Rome find it impossible to get a copy from the embassy. Indeed, as recently as February 12, the embassy had not even received a copy of the Lockheed documents released by the Church subcommittee. It would seem that the administration's penchant for secrecy is, in this case, far more damaging to our friends than to our friends' enemies.

The continued refusal to "go public" on the history of American activities in Italy guarantees that the very important discussion of the future role of the Italian Communist party will be based on mythology, rather than history. If it is true, as the Communists claim, that they have become a democratic party, to whom should the credit go for this remarkable transformation? Should it not go in large part to the United States and to the forces of the Italian center, and non-Communist left who for 30 years opposed a monolithic and Stalinist PCI? Is the "new face" of communism in Western Europe not a tribute to the success of a policy that is today the object of scorn and — unbelievably — embarrassment in Washington?

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## The soft underbelly of Nato

WHILE Russia is intent on strengthening her strategic position in Africa by force of arms, using Cuba as proxy, a still more dangerous, though more subtle, situation is developing throughout Nato's politically soft underbelly from the Caucasus to the Atlantic. Over the past 10 years it has become commonplace to deplore the increase of Russian influence at the expense of Nato throughout the Mediterranean. Nothing effective has been done to rectify the situation. Britain's contribution being to declare her intention virtually to withdraw by 1979.

Now, at a time when Tito's health gives grave cause for anxiety and in the face of the serious developments in Yugoslavia which could follow his demise, Nato's southern flank is crumbling. Unless this trend can be checked Nato could well be ejected from the Mediterranean, as was the Royal Navy temporarily withdrawn in 1796 in the face of the success of the revolutionary armies of France in Italy and elsewhere, the defection of Spain,

### Brig. W. F. K. THOMPSON on the West's weaknesses against Russia in the Mediterranean

the neutrality of Russia and rebellion in Ireland. Political advances, though usually slower than military ones, are far harder to reverse.

Any assessment of the situation along Nato's southern flank must be seen in the context of the strategic factors that have determined Nato's organisation in the area.

The economic life of the Nato allies, Turkey, Greece and Italy, is entirely dependent on seaborne trade through the Mediterranean. Who rules that sea exerts great political influence. On any day some 1,200 ships of the alliance, out of 1,500, are at sea there. Access to the Mediterranean is by three narrow straits: the Dardanelles, controlled by Turkey; the Suez Canal, controlled by Egypt; and the Straits of Gibraltar, controlled by Britain. Malta in the central narrows is also of great strategic importance.

So far as land warfare is concerned, Turkey, Greece and Italy form separate theatres. Turkey having a frontier with Russia, and all three being bound together by the sea. Nato's command structure is designed to meet this situation. Under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the command of Allied Forces Southern Europe is exercised by an American four-star admiral with headquarters in Naples. Under him the Italian theatre is defended by Allied Land Forces Southern Europe supported by the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, both formations being commanded by Italians.

Defence of Greece and Turkey is the responsibility of Commander Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe supported by the 6th Allied Tactical Air Force, both under American command.

The primary role of the powerful United States Sixth Fleet is to



port to the land battle. The defence of sea communications is the responsibility of the Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, an Italian admiral with a British chief of staff. There are a number of subordinate national naval commands and two specialist commands for submarines and maritime air forces to which hitherto Britain has made a valuable contribution. There is also close liaison with the French Navy.

In 1961 the Mediterranean was virtually a Western lake. Since then not only has Russian maritime power steadily increased but Britain's has as steadily withered. The approaching crisis in the Mediterranean is, however, as much due to the weakness and political ineptitude of the Allies as it is to the machinations of the Russians. It is also due, in my opinion, to Nato plans and dispositions being too rigidly geared to deterring and if necessary fighting a shooting war, World War IV, and too little to the immediate needs of what may be called World War III, which if lost in the Mediterranean would undermine the Alliance's ability to stand up to the threat of a shooting war. Such rigidity is the negation of the principal asset of maritime power—flexibility.

### Propaganda war

The greatest present threat to Nato's southern flank stems from anti-Americanism, which is being fully exploited by Russia and Left-wing politicians but owes its origin largely to the ill-considered antics of Congress and the near-treasonable way in which the investigations into the CIA are being conducted. The United States Congress in attempting to wrest the conduct of foreign affairs from the President is courting disaster. Congress contains men eminent in international affairs. It also contains many parish pump politicians. One such on a recent fact-finding tour in the Mediterranean said: "Don't talk to me about Turks—there isn't a single Turk in my constituency".

Moreover, the Americans have for too long been left by Nato's northern allies in a politically exposed position in the Mediterranean, made the more so by Britain's run-down.

Nato has always suffered from this north/south split, the northern allies holding a puritan concept of democracy which fails to comprehend the limitations on the democratic process which history and temperament place on many peoples around the Mediterranean. They have therefore stood aside and left it largely to the Americans to deal with those Governments which from time to time they regard as unsatisfactory: Turkey and Greece within the alliance and, outside it, Spain—whose territories are of great strategic importance. This has made it all too easy for the Communists to depict Nato bases in the Mediterranean area as bases for the exercise of American imperialism.

Turkey and Greece have been to

the brink of war over Cyprus. This has led to the withdrawal, for the third time, of Greek officers from Nato Headquarters in Izmir. If they do not return before June, when the American Commander Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe is due for replacement, his successor will appear as an American commanding three Turkish corps, and this in their present mood the Turks will dislike.

Turkey is almost entirely dependent on America for the supply of arms. Against Presidential advice Congress has embargoed arms suppliers for Turkey until the Turks make substantial moves toward a settlement in Cyprus. The Turks, a proud people, immediately closed a number of important American bases and put restrictions on others. They have withdrawn 10,000 to 12,000 troops from Cyprus, which Congress might have regarded as a substantial concession, but the Turks made no political capital from this, not wishing to appear to act in response to Congressional blackmail. Nato suffers.

Internally weak, the Turkish Government has acquired considerable external freedom of action for Washington fears to lean too heavily and risk pushing them towards Russia while the Russians are in the midst of trying to induce Turkey and Cyprus to loosen their ties with Nato and move to a neutral position.

In Greece anti-American feeling also runs high following events in Cyprus and the consequences of military government. The new Government of Mr Karamanlis is trying to mend fences with Turkey and has negotiated a new status of forces agreement with the United States which will close some US bases and put new restrictions on others. Much more dangerous, however, is the competition between Mr Karamanlis and Mr Mavros to outflank the other to the Left. This is strengthening the Communist position—they are being given much rope but seem unlikely to hang themselves with it.

In her campaign to loosen Greek and Turkish ties with Nato, Russia invited Greek and Turkish observers to attend Russian manoeuvres in the Caucasus. This was accepted, and received wide publicity in the British Press as a gesture in the spirit of Helsinki—while Nato's invitation to representatives of all nations attending the Helsinki conference to attend major Nato manoeuvres in Bavaria last October was ignored by the whole Warsaw Pact.

Let us now look at Italy. The Nato bases in and around Naples are the mainstay of the Alliance's position in the Mediterranean. Throughout Italy there is a virulent and well orchestrated anti-American campaign based on the alleged misdeeds of the CIA as leaked by Congress and on the supposition that large sums of American money have gone to support the Social Democrats, in much the same way as Russian funds support the Communists.

Unfortunately the Communist party provides the only practical alternative in Italy to the

Social Democrats whose long rule has shown little competence. The Italian Communists, already in power in many urban governments—the Mayor of Naples is one, and the next Mayor of Rome may well be also—are moving towards a position from which they can take power nationally. They declare that they are not subservient to Russia and that in power would not withdraw Italy from Nato until both blocs were dissolved. The latter is a Russian aim whose achievement would greatly favour her.

### Anti-American

Whether subservient to Russia or not, an Italian Government including Communists would be a grave embarrassment to the Alliance both from the security angle (Italy is a permanent member of the Nuclear Planning Group) and for purposes of crisis management. Moreover, such a Government would certainly be anti-American.

Anti-Americanism is the most destructive force at work on behalf of the Russians in World War III. Some responsibility for this must rest on the northern members of the Alliance and on Britain with her proclaimed plans of withdrawal from the Mediterranean.

Britain's withdrawal plans stem from the Government's Defence Review which laid down defence priorities as the central front and Eastern Atlantic and the Northern flank. These are undoubtedly the right priorities for a shooting war, but as we have already seen the Alliance will be in no shape to stand up to the threat of such a war if Nato has had to abandon the Mediterranean and if the allies of Nato's southern tier have gone either neutral or pro-Russian.

Until now Britain in the Mediterranean has played a very important part as the jam in the Nato sandwich between the Americans and the Mediterranean allies. It can be argued that we still do, that no decision to withdraw British members of Nato's staff has yet been taken and that more units of the Royal Navy have exercised in the Mediterranean since the decision to withdraw than before, that we still participate in Nato's "Naval On Call Force Mediterranean," and that the RAF's Maritime Reconnaissance Squadron has not yet left Malta.

Fortunately, too, we are anchored to our Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, short of some act of utter irresponsibility, until there is a long-term settlement between Greek and Turk. The future of Malta's relationship with Nato after 1979 is still in doubt, and its use by a hostile Power must be prevented.

### Not obvious

Likewise, it was re-assuring to read Stephen Barber's view on this page the other day that, despite all appearances, America remains sound at the grass roots. Unfortunately the soundness of America's grass roots is not apparent to the peoples of Italy, Greece and Turkey. Neither is the continued participation of Britain in Mediterranean affairs. What is apparent is the exposure of the CIA and the declared intention of Britain to withdraw. Psychological factors are of the greatest importance in World War III. The generality

of mankind like to back a winner, the winning of minds is more important than the winning of hearts. A psychological counter-stroke by Nato is of the utmost importance. I suggest: First, Nato bases must be made less conspicuously American, even if this entails some security and other risks; Secondly, conspicuous efforts must be made to associate all members of the Alliance with the southern flank. Nato Ministerial meetings must be held more frequently in the area. Nato ambassadors from the northern allies should visit Nato's southern bases not as thieves in the night but with a flourish. Thirdly, naval forces and maritime air forces from as many northern allies as possible should carry out more conspicuous, more frequent and more prolonged exercises

in the Mediterranean — ending with the Allied fleets flaunting their national colours, drawn up in the home waters of their hosts and at home to the public. Allied unity is every bit as important to deterrence as maintaining the balance of power. It matters not that such exercises may differ from World War IV plans. Let us fight one war at a time. The present one demands that we mobilise and co-ordinate the use of all available political, economic, and psychological weapons imaginatively. The suggestions I have made seem trivial in relation to the magnitude of the threat but do, I think, point the way in which we should be looking, for unless the West can hold its own we will eventually face a choice between a new dark age of universal tyranny or a world in ashes.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Monday, February 23, 1976

## Europe worries about America

By David Mutch

Bonn

There is a growing opinion in Europe that the United States is in the midst of a constitutional crisis that weakens the West.

The view is based on the fight between Congress and the administration over foreign policy.

That 1976 is an election year across the Atlantic only heightens the concern in Europe.

The focal point of this view — which is expressed privately more in terms of regret than anger — is that Congress, for whatever mix of reasons, is pursuing a near-sighted, short-term, and selfish internal political power struggle which prevents the U.S. from formulating an objective, coherent, and effective foreign policy.

Because the U.S. is the free West's one and only leader, this lack of a meaningful foreign policy is seen as entirely inconsistent with the closely knit political and economic needs of the West.

This opinion is not limited to West Germany — often accused of being a jittery border state when it comes to defense questions. Nor is this view limited to the conservative side of the political spectrum.

For example, a top diplomat from a neutral European country governed by Social Democrats said in an interview:

"Our knowledge of you in America comes from you, and your disappointment over Watergate and Vietnam carries over now as a lack of vigor and a lack of self-confidence. We begin to wonder if you can ever stop digging. A great power needs an effective CIA. And

sometimes real armament is more important than moral rearmament. You needn't worry about appearing nonliberal. After all, one of your exports is radicalism."

An experienced diplomat from a friendly allied country — not Germany — said: "We in Europe just don't know where the U.S. stands anymore. Almost all Europeans would feel it highly improper to reveal the kinds of secrets that have been leaking out of Congress. There is entirely too much short-term and selfish internal politics at work to befit a superpower. There are varying views about Angola in Europe, but all of us are truly concerned now about what comes after Angola."

The heightened concern in Europe about the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy relates closely to the growing evidence of the rapidly increasing military might of the Soviet Union. It also relates to the need for the West to coordinate its economic policy.

Europeans view detente as does Henry Kissinger, as a two-edged sword of cooperation on the one hand and decisive moves on the other to parry expansionist steps by the Soviet Union.

The growing feeling is that Congress is fast blunting one edge of the sword — the ability to parry Soviet moves — at just the time the Russians are taking full advantage all over the world of the political disunity in the U.S.

One source says: "The communists are more and more convinced that their theory of the inherent weakness of the West is right."

The West Germans, out of concern for the strength of NATO, now are starting to voice their concern. Defense Minister Georg Leber

publicly criticized the U.S. Senate recently for holding up arms sales to Turkey. His misgiving is that the Russians — just as they have moved into Angola so dramatically — might try the same in the vacuum the Turkey-Greece situation presents.

The conservative forces in Germany — especially Christian Socialist Union leader Franz Josef Strauss — have criticized the internal dissent in the U.S. for some time.

Now it is clear that the government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt — long considered a friend of the U.S. — is also full of concern that when the U.S. administration does come up with much needed policies in energy for example or in many other areas vital to the West, Congress will block them.

One spokesman says: "We stress that Congress has a full right to fulfill its constitutional role, but Europeans are concerned that some members of Congress are not fully aware of what this does to the West when the U.S. is unable to formulate a foreign policy."

In the interviews conducted it was clear the concern about U.S. foreign policy is not necessarily a defense of Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger often comes in for heavy criticism in Europe just as he does in the U.S., especially for some of his superpower politics.

As one German says with a light touch: "We consider Henry still a German, and a Bavarian at that, so of course we can criticize him."

The more fundamental view is that a divided U.S. has lost its sense of direction.

Mr. Mutch is staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor in Bonn.

# Near East

WASHINGTON POST

23 FEB 1976

## Iran Cleanup Viewed as Token Effort

### Shah's Relatives Called 'Worst Offenders' in Corruption

By Lewis M. Simons

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN — With a great blare of publicity, the Iranian government has started a campaign to root out the widespread and growing corruption in the country, but it seems unlikely that there will be a crackdown on those who are perceived here to be the worst offenders—the royal family.

"It remains to be seen," said a prominent lawyer who represents many large foreign corporations here, "whether there'll just be a few sacrificial lambs, or if they'll go after the big bad wolves. I think the first alternative is the route they'll take. To take the second course would cause far too much embarrassment in very high places."

"Very high places" or "people at the top" is the type of euphemism commonly used by Iranians for members of the Shah's family. "There's always been a lot of smoke about corruption in the royal family," said a Western diplomat, "but it's very rare that it bursts into flame."

Noting how other anti-corruption drives have been short-circuited, a Tehran University professor recalled a campaign last spring to eliminate profiteering. Some 7,500 businessmen were accused of price gouging.

According to the professor, Commerce Minister Feridun Mahdavi, who led the campaign, made the mistake of touching people with connections. "Complaints against Mahdavi reached the right ears," he said. The minister was dismissed earlier this month and put in charge of administering Iran's only legal political party.

The lure for fortune-hunters is a piece of the action in Iran's vast imports bought with oil revenues. Iranian orders for military hardware from the United States alone now total about \$10 billion. A U.S. official who tries to put American businessmen in touch with the proper Iranian authorities said, "When you're dealing with business on this scale, there's bound to be corruption. There's no way

around it."

Although Iran's economy slipped badly last year because of reduced revenues from oil, there are still fortunes to be made in government contracts, and the fierce competition has created a thriving system of payoffs and official corruption.

The Shah has pledged to "wage merciless war" against such graft. But the corporate lawyer expressed doubt that Iran would ever have spotlighted its own corruption if not for the recent U.S. congressional investigations of illicit payments abroad by major American aircraft manufacturers.

Those few Iranians in the civil service and private business who speak to foreigners with any candor about the commonly held belief that there is corruption in high places doubt strongly that an imperially appointed investigative committee will go after the Shah's relatives.

"The reason is simple," said one well-informed Iranian, who asked that he not be identified, even obliquely. "The worst offenders are members of the royal family." Another Western diplomat supported the allegation. "Any number of the Shah's relatives are on the take," he said. "Whether or not the Shah knows about it, I couldn't possibly say," he added, "but at least it's not as bad as it was in the mid-60s."

A decade ago, he explained, "it was impossible to get anything done in this country without paying off someone in the royal family. By now, I guess, they've salted away enough in Swiss banks that they can afford to relax."

With Iran's enormous economic advances of the last two years, the bureaucracy has taken on many areas of decision-making that formerly were subject to royal judgments.

This has created far more opportunities for illicit payoffs outside the family circle than in the old, tightly controlled days.

According to another highly informed Iranian, the Shah has "laid down the law" in the past to several relatives who had been par-

ticularly blatant. In one case, according to this source, he took away the Pahlavi family name from a nephew and another relation was "sent into limbo" for five years, "until he cleared up his affairs."

One of the Shah's closest relatives who continues to be surrounded by widespread suspicion is his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, a world leader in the women's rights movement. The princess, whose three marriages and jet-set living style have offended many Iranians, is said to be deeply involved in a number of "shady deals."

"Take the trucking industry," said a wealthy Tehran businessman. "Not a truck can move anywhere in this country without a payoff going to Ashraf."

In the days before Iran was swimming in oil wealth, it was widely believed that Princess Ashraf profited from illegal opium deals involving Iran's large poppy production. There have frequently been allegations in the European press about her involvement.

The reason for the trepidation with which Iranians approach the subject of high-level corruption, and why they insist on anonymity, is that Iran is run as a police state. To be found discussing a subject as sensitive as this is an extremely grave offense.

The government employs repression rather than issuing at least some basic information regarding imperial wealth.

This has led to speculation, for example, that the Shah himself profited from sales of royal lands for redistribution a number of years ago. One informed European banker maintained that there was "every reason to believe" that the money was put into the court-owned Pahlavi Foundation and that the Shah received none of it.

The foundation, from which the Shah and his family do not profit directly, owns real estate and other property in the United States and Iran. One of its U.S. lawyers is former Secretary of State William Rogers.

"If the royal court would release some firm informa-

tion of the family's sources of income, I'm sure a lot of these rumors would abate," said a Western diplomat, who added, "I'm sure the royal family makes far more money from legitimate business deals than through graft."

In addition to the Shah's family, another sector where investigations are likely to prove very sensitive is the military. Although a large number of senior military officers, particularly in the navy, are understood to be involved in taking payments from foreign arms companies and contractors building military bases and ports, a thorough investigation is considered unlikely. According to one Western source with military connections, Iranian naval graft has involved "absolutely prodigious sums." He added that "it has exceeded all norms, even by Iranian standards."

"One thing to bear in mind," said a lawyer with a large Tehran corporate law firm, "is that the commander-in-chief of the armed forces is the Shah himself. Any admission of guilt among top officers would tend to point the finger toward the throne. And the Shah prides himself on keeping a close watch on his armed forces."

Perhaps for this reason, a case involving the commander of the navy, Vice Adm. Ramzie Abbas Attai, his deputy and a third senior officer, has been handled with the utmost discretion in the tightly controlled local press.

Conversely, a case against two undersecretaries in the Ministry of Commerce and two businessmen from the British conglomerate Tate and Lyle, has been given front-page treatment day after day.

The Commerce Ministry aides are charged with cheating the government out of \$45 million through fraudulent sugar transactions. The publicity splash appears to indicate that Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who heads the investigative committee, wants to make an example of people, but not so important as to touch any of

the empire's biggest names.

"When people feel that heads at any given level would get into trouble, it is a lesson for others," Hoveyda said in a recent interview. "And also," he added, "it is equity."

But, when Adm. Attaie and his aides were dismissed from their posts, the local newspapers gave no reason. According to Hoveyda, this is because the case is "still under investi-

gation."

The reason, sources here say, was that the two top officers were being charged with corruption, more specifically with swindling the government out of millions of dollars, perhaps as much as \$10 million, through naval contracts. According to one informed Iranian source, Attaie had a number of huge contracts passed on to his brother.

The case came to light, according to a widely believed rumor, when a member of the royal family learned that an extremely expensive ring she wanted to buy had already been purchased by Attaie's wife.

Premier Hoveyda stressed that most corruption now plaguing Iran is "imported corruption, like imported technology." While insisting that the illicit payments usually make their way back

to foreign hands, Hoveyda did concede that "there are also cases where Iranians are involved."

Hoveyda said that the naval officers would be tried in court and would be subject to "administrative" decisions. "They could be put out of the navy without pension or something like that. That kind of thing could happen," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES  
29 Feb. 1976

## U.S. Freezing Out India In Reaction to Mrs. Gandhi

By PAUL GRIMES

Besides postponing a plan to resume economic aid to India, the Ford Administration has quietly but firmly turned its back on other cooperation until Prime Minister Indira Gandhi becomes openly friendlier toward the United States.

The Administration has decided not to renew a contract under which an American space satellite has provided educational television to 2,400 Indian villages. It has also acted coolly toward efforts to increase American private investment in India.

And it has snubbed the Indian Ambassador in Washington, T. N. Kaul, who for the last year has had virtually no direct access to President Ford or Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

### Allusion to C.I.A. Seen

Word of these moves became available last week from Americans and Indians who have been close to them. The moves were attributed largely to continuing American displeasure—confirmed by Administration officials—with a speech by Mrs. Gandhi early last month.

In what was generally interpreted as a reference to the United States and its Central Intelligence Agency, she spoke of the "gravest danger of outside interference in India." She said that "some powers, which tasted success in their destabilization game in Chile nurtured similar designs against India."

In interviews in Washington last week, American officials recalled that a high State Department officer had stated at the time:

"As for C.I.A. activities these days in India, she knows there is nothing going on, or if she doesn't know, she should."

As far as could be learned, little Washington attention has been paid to a statement in Parliament a few days later in

which the Prime Minister said: "We may not agree with the United States on everything, but it is a dynamic nation and society which constantly throws up new ideas all the time. I congratulate them on their bicentenary."

Among the American responses to Mrs. Gandhi's earlier speech, one was reported in The New York Times recently. It was a Ford Administration decision to postpone talks with India about nearly \$75 million in aid, which New Delhi had requested.

### Was to Be First Since '71

The \$75 million package for economic development was scheduled to be the first such American aid to India since 1971. The aid program was halted then because of a Nixon Administration decision to "tilt" toward Pakistan in the Indian-Pakistan war that December. The resumption had been requested by India.

Late last month, officials said, India was quietly but officially notified that plans to negotiate such a package for this fiscal year were being suspended. It was reported last week that the negotiations had been going on for several months, but American and Indian officials said later that they had never begun.

They emphasized, however, that the United States still proposed to ease India's purchase of American grain this fiscal year and would consider reviving developmental aid in the next fiscal year, which begins Oct. 1.

A knowledgeable American official declined to confirm directly that the decision against renewing the satellite television contract was directly related to

Mrs. Gandhi's critical speech. But, he said, "it would not be wrong to assume" that a connection existed.

Under the program, an American satellite that was launched in May 1974 gives India four hours a day in which to teach rural villagers such subjects as hygiene, agriculture, birth control and nutrition. The one-year contract expires this summer.

### Freeman Visit Recalled

It was understood that the official explanation given India for deciding not to extend the contract was that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration could no longer spare the satellite. Sources in the State Department said the contract had a renewal option and probably would have been renewed if a different political climate had existed.

Former Agriculture Secretary Orville L. Freeman was in India early this month for talks among American and Indian businessmen and officials on prospects for private investment in India. Mr. Freeman, who is now affiliated with Business International, a New York-based magazine that promotes investment abroad, said in a telephone interview this week that he had found the State Department to be "completely supportive" of his delegation.

He acknowledged that, once in New Delhi, the group had run into trouble. He said that as a result of criticism of the United States in an official publication of India's governing Congress party, Ambassador William B. Saxbe reneged on an invitation to speak at a dinner hosted by the Freeman group.

### 'Spitballs' Being Thrown

Mr. Freeman said he had not seen Ambassador Saxbe after the dinner, but "I got the impression that as long as India continued throwing spitballs at us, he was damned if he was

going to have his people there."

The Indian Government retaliated, Mr. Freeman said, by withdrawing Cabinet Ministers from the investment talks, although lower-level Indian officials remained.

Mr. Freeman said he had met several Ministers and had had a "cordial" 45-minute talk with Mrs. Gandhi. He said he had suggested that the Indian Government make an "official statement" that it welcomed private investment.

"I got bugged by the press there about this," he said. "Some of them thought it was a bit presumptuous of me."

He added that he felt India really wanted private investment, was in an "excellent position" for it and thus should say so.

In the United States, meanwhile, Ambassador Kaul is speaking widely across the country, mainly expounding the view that his Government does not really dislike the United States, that Americans and Indians have a lot in common and that even if they do not always agree, there is no real reason why they cannot get along.

The Ambassador is clearly chagrined at his inability to meet President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. Mr. Kaul once claimed the Secretary as a close friend.

As an example of contrast to this treatment, Indian officials sources in Washington cite the presence of Mrs. Gandhi, who rarely attends diplomatic functions, at an American Bicentennial reception given by Ambassador Saxbe in New Delhi on Friday.

Mr. Kaul will complete a three-year term in May. He is expected to be replaced by Kewal Singh, currently Foreign Secretary, the highest career position in the Indian Foreign Ministry. Mr. Kaul held that post before coming to Washington.



# Africa

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
19 February 1976

## After Angola, time for the West to unite

**T**HE West has suffered a serious defeat in Angola — a defeat which will have repercussions far beyond Angola itself or even its neighbours. The Western allies have been openly challenged by the bare-faced military intervention in an African country of the Soviet Union, and a 15,000-man Cuban army acting in a mercenary capacity on its behalf.

What has been the response? The pro-Western Governments of Zaire and Zambia as well as South Africa were led to believe that if they took a stout line against Soviet intervention they could expect support from the United States, though at no point was it suggested that this would involve the commitment of any US troops. In the event, thanks to the determination of the US Congress to indulge in a seemingly endless orgy of self-denigration and publicly wash America's dirty linen in the Potomac River, the response of the United States and its allies was painfully inadequate, compared with the army deployed by Cuba at the instigation and expense of the Soviet Union.

The difficulty faced by the Western alliance in making any serious, collective response to the Soviet challenge was highlighted by Mr Wilson's squeals of invective against the handful of British mercenaries who were on their way to fight against the forces of Soviet imperialism. Meanwhile the far graver intervention of the Soviet Union and her allies was allowed to pass with only mild censure, and Britain's UN representative, Mr Ivor Richard, clearly feels it is more fun to attack Mr Daniel Moynihan for robustly defending Western interests, than to condemn Soviet military adventurism in Africa, on which he has been so notably silent.

Round One of the struggle for Africa has gone to the Soviet Union. Recognition of the MPLA has followed even though, without the intervention and continued presence of the Soviet-Cuban military force, it is doubtful that the MPLA meets the criteria for recognition laid down by Mr George Thomson, then Minister of State in the Foreign Office, on Feb. 27, 1967, and accepted by successive Governments that "the new Government enjoys, with a reasonable prospect of permanence, the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of much of the greater part of the territory of the State concerned."

Of course, apologists for the Soviet Union have suggested that once the MPLA is established in power the Russians and Cubans will withdraw and the new Angolan Government adopt a policy of non-alignment. Such an

# The red tiger at Africa's throat

By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, MP

assumption is unwarranted unless it can be believed that the Soviet-Cuban intervention was based purely on altruistic motives and prompted by Soviet love of the African peoples. Certainly the Egyptians and other Arab countries have come to learn from bitter experience over the past 20 years that, whatever else may have been the motivation of Soviet policy in the Middle East, an inherent love of the Arab peoples is not one of them.

It would require an unaccustomed caution and self-restraint on the part of the men in the Kremlin not to seek to reinforce their success and capitalise on the appalling feebleness and disarray of the Western alliance. After a brief pause for consolidation, we may expect Phase Two to be opened shortly. Besides the force of Cubans with some 300 Soviet tanks and armoured cars which are now within striking distance of South West Africa and the western borders of Rhodesia, there is a guerrilla army of Africans, estimated to be 15,000 strong, massing in Mozambique on Rhodesia's eastern border.

A Soviet-backed onslaught against South West Africa or Rhodesia would represent an even more direct challenge to the West and unless handled with consummate skill could accentuate the divisions within the Western alliance rather than mend them.

In particular, it raises several thorny questions for Britain, first and foremost: what would be the reaction of the British Government to a Soviet-backed invasion of Rhodesia? Rhodesia is, after all, still regarded by the British Government as British territory. Mr David Ennals, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in a radio interview last Sunday declared: "It shouldn't be thought that somehow or other we would be committed to rescuing kith and kin who have shown such extraordinary neglect of responsibilities in Rhodesia." But for Britain to maintain sanctions against Rhodesia under such circumstances would be tantamount to becoming the accomplice of Soviet imperialism. A further difficulty faced by the British Government is the fact that there is probably a majority

of Labour MPs more concerned to see the overthrow of the Europeans in Southern Africa than to forestall the expansion of Soviet imperialism in the continent.

## Not racial

The West is in danger of being manoeuvred by the Soviet Union into a "Heads-I-win, Tails-you-lose" situation in which either there will be no Western response to a renewed Soviet challenge or, alternatively, where the West identifies itself with the so-called "racist" régimes of Southern Africa, but is eventually inhibited by the pressures of the pro-Communist Left, liberal sentiment and a population of 30 million blacks in the United States from supplying sufficient resources effectively to match and neutralise the Soviet Union in hard-ware and physical support.

The only way the West can effectively meet this challenge is by making it clear that the struggle being waged in Africa today is ideological, not racial, and that the military intervention of the Soviet Union and her satellites represents a threat to the independence of every African State. Dr Kaunda, President of Zambia, has already sounded a warning to the independent nations of Africa when he declared: "The plundering tiger, with its deadly cubs, is coming in through the back door."

Little time remains. The West must take urgent and concerted action in defence of its own interests and to restore the credibility of its will to resist Soviet expansionism. The first step must be swift action to support the pro-West Governments of Zambia and Zaire which have been badly let down by the United States and are today threatened by internal subversion fomented from outside. The West should immediately make available important economic assistance to both Governments, with advance purchases of copper and other mineral resources, the shipping of which has been held up by the fighting in Angola.

Secondly, the Organisation of African Unity must be encouraged to call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Africa.

Thirdly, the whole question of Soviet-Cuban military intervention

should be raised as a matter of urgency in the Security Council. Had a pro-Western military force been on the rampage in an African country, it is certain that the UN would have discussed nothing else in recent weeks, yet so far no move has been made by the West to secure the condemnation of the Soviet-Cuban intervention.

Fourthly, the West should now freely supply South Africa, Zaire and Zambia with all weapons required for their self-defence, including armour, anti-tank weapons and jet aircraft.

Fifthly, every pressure should be brought to bear on Mr Smith and the Rhodesian Government to reach an early settlement with Mr Nkomo, which, more than anything else, would facilitate a strong stand by Western Governments against Soviet expansionism.

Sixthly, the Nato allies, principally the United States, Britain and France, should concentrate an important naval task force in the Southern Atlantic to ensure that the area does not fall under the domination of Soviet naval and air power.

Finally, and most important of all, the time is overdue for the United States, as the only nation of the Western alliance powerful enough to speak to the Russians on equal terms, to make unequivocally clear to the men in the Kremlin that their build-up of a war machine far beyond any requirement for self-defence and their brazen intervention in Africa are incompatible with the Western understanding of "détente" and must cease forthwith. This must be backed by a determination to cut off access to Western grain,

technology and capital to drive home the point and, as a last resort, a willingness to re-arm.

It must be Britain's task, as it was during a previous era of Soviet expansionism when at the end of the Second World War the Red Army, having swallowed up Eastern and Central Europe, was menacing Western Europe, to mobilise the United States to defend her own interests. Our intervention then proved timely and effective. The Nato alliance was the result. The latest expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union can be checked without a shot fired, but only if the United States and her allies are prepared to show the same resolution and unity of purpose which proved so successful in the past.

BALTIMORE SUN  
22 FEBRUARY 1976

# South Africa, U.S. secrets

By BRUCE OUDES

It's said the White House's Angola venture began early last year and it was through some sort of accidental convergence that the U.S. and South Africa found themselves on the same side of the Angolan war.

While there is some truth in both of these summations, they are in part superficial and even misleading.

The fact is that sentiment favoring an attempt to isolate and if possible eradicate the MPLA, the long-standing ally of the Soviet Union in Angola, began to gather in Washington in 1974 following the Portuguese coup.

And the "tacit" cooperation between the U.S. and South Africa simply happens to be a public expression of what has been for several years a deliberately two-tiered policy toward Pretoria.

Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, has developed an excellent rapport in private with the South African government, but for the sake of appearances, every once in a while there is a public outburst of anti-apartheid rhetoric by the State Department to keep liberals assured that the traditional U.S. posture toward South Africa remains intact.

This administration approach has, in part, pleased South African officials, but it has also exasperated them. From their standpoint, southern African affairs are receiving the same type of casual condescension from the U.S. that black Africa is getting.

At the same time, the perpetuation of American rhetoric about South Africa has served to stifle the development of public debate about the genuine com-

plexities of the South African dilemma and the American problem in developing a domestic consensus on policy toward South Africa.

Beneath the layers of official ooze, here is a summary of how U.S. policy toward South Africa has changed in the past decade:

Some time before the end of the Johnson administration, American diplomats came to the conclusion that abrupt changes in South Africa of the type forecast in the early 1960's were unlikely. They proposed some modest changes in policy in a 1968 study for the then Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, but Mr. Rusk declined to approve the recommendations because, he told aides, he did not want to tie the hands of an incoming administration.

Early in 1970, with decisions like the Cambodia invasion looming, President Nixon took time to approve a January 15 memorandum from Mr. Kissinger recommending policy based on the premise that there was no possibility of political change, not only in South Africa, but throughout all of southern Africa. This memorandum was kept so secret that to this day few officials at the State Department's Africa bureau have seen it.

On January 28, 1970, in the top-secret National Security Decision Memorandum 38, Mr. Nixon, however, explicitly said the arms embargo against South Africa "will be maintained." An arms embargo, however, is—as most students of the subject eventually learn—to a large degree an economic embargo because of the large number of industrial products that are useful for both civilian and military purposes.

This posture soon clashed with Mr. Nixon's desire to expand U.S. trade with South Africa. So on August 17, 1970, Mr.

Kissinger signed National Security Decision Memorandum 81, classified secret, which created loopholes in the Johnson administration's guidelines governing the South African embargo. Mr. Kissinger explained the timing of the move by saying that "the President is concerned with the delays that have attended the handling of applications for 'gray area' export licenses."

Since 1970, U.S. exports to South Africa, particularly aircraft, have ballooned to well beyond \$1 billion annually. South Africa, which could now buy types of aircraft forbidden by the Johnson administration, imported a total of \$151 million in U.S. aircraft in 1971 and 1972 as compared with an earlier five-year (1966 through 1970) import total of \$124 million in U.S. planes.

South Africa set up at least one parietal airline, operating exclusively on government contract, which acquired aircraft from the U.S. that Washington would not sell directly to the South African military. Since these aircraft and others imported from the U.S. are playing a major support role in the South African effort in Angola, these classified 1970 guidelines, never before published, are worth quoting.

From National Security Decision Memorandum 81:

"1. Non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly employed for civilian use will be licensed to either civilian or military buyers. Such items will generally not be manufactured to military specifications, and will not have any direct and clear application in combat, or to internal security operations. Items on our 'Munitions List' are automatically excluded from this category.

"2. Non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly used by military forces, but which do not have a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security operations, will be licensed for sale to civilian purchasers for civilian use, and may be licensed to military buyers upon the recommendation of the Department of Commerce and with the concurrence of the Department of State.

Such items will generally be built to military specifications.

"3. Whether preponderantly employed for civilian or military use, dual-use items with a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security operations (including aircraft for troop transport), will not be licensed to military buyers. Such items may be licensed for sale to civilian purchasers for civilian use, only upon recommendation of the Department of Commerce and with the concurrence of the Department of State."

A senior State Department official who has had to deal with some of the numerous complicated decisions arising out of NSDM 81 describes its logic as a "nightmare."

The current "gray areas" guidelines contrast with those set in January, 1984, which state that, "Items having distinct non-military utility, but in no case any arms, ammunition, or other items of a weapons nature, may be exported to or sold in South Africa if ordered by and for civilian non-governmental users."

During Mr. Nixon's first term, according to a State Department source, the South African ambassador was the only envoy from Africa south of the Sahara that Mr. Kissinger would receive. Secretary Kissinger, who now seeks to aid Zambia to counter growing Soviet influence in neighboring Angola, seemed to accept in the 1970-1974 period the South African view that Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian president, was a dangerous leftist. Mr. Nixon canceled an appointment with the Zambian leader in 1970, and in 1973 the FBI arrested Mr. Kaunda's personal security adviser, an American citizen, on a series of charges, most of which were later dropped.

Meanwhile, in 1970 the CIA under White House instructions closed down its small stations in Angola and Mozambique and cut off its small flow of payments to both sides in Portugal's colonial wars thus allowing the U.S. to be caught flat-footed by the Portuguese coup.

In sum, while we tend to think of the Angolan crisis of the past year as the first major American crisis in Africa since the Congo era, it in fact was preceded by a five-year secret policy crisis complete with credibility gap. State Department spokesmen routinely deny there have been changes in the South African embargo.

The current phase of U.S. policy in Angola dates from June, 1974—three months after the Portuguese coup—when Lawrence R. Devlin, the CIA's director of clandestine operations for

Africa, told colleagues he was retiring from the agency to become the representative in Zaire of a New York diamond firm at an annual salary of \$100,000 plus expenses.

Mr. Devlin, who since has virtually commuted between the U.S. and Kinshasa, first went to Zaire in 1960. In 1965, shortly before Mobutu Sese Seko took full power, Mr. Devlin became the CIA station chief in Kinshasa. (He later served a tour as station chief in Laos at the apex of the bombing campaign.)

Although a number of Mr. Devlin's former colleagues in the CIA and at the State Department have questioned the propriety of a senior intelligence official rekindling his old "assets" for private gain, neither the administration nor Congress appears to have investigated the matter.

Within weeks after Mr. Devlin's return to Kinshasa in his retirement job, an informed U.S. diplomat says, the then Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Donald Easum, began to resist pressure from the CIA to intervene in Angola on the side of the forces opposing the MPLA. Mr. Easum's successor, Nathaniel Davis, continued the unsuccessful attempt to resist the tilt.

Congress, in its investigation of the Angolan affair, also has yet to focus on the extent to which the U.S. and/or the Soviet Union was responsible for the gradual collapse last year of the fragile coalition in Angola.

But what is certain in the events of 1975 is that the administration, through its track record if nothing else, played an important role in deepening the South African involvement in Angola.

The South African embassy in Washington regularly warned Pretoria last summer and fall that the U.S. might not be able to maintain its commitment to the anti-MPLA coalition in Angola, informed sources say.

However, the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, familiar with U.S. concern with protecting the oil routes around the Cape, the escalating level of U.S. involvement in Angola, and the excellent—if private—state of bilateral relations with the U.S., based his decisions on a U.S. determination to resist MPLA hegemony in Angola.

As for the immediate future, Mr. Kissinger has several issues to consider as he weighs whether to follow through on his announced trip to Africa this spring.

One obvious issue is how much aid to extend to Zaire whose president, Mobutu Sese Seko, has become, with the passing of Haile Selassie, the dean of U.S. clients

in Africa.

He runs one of Africa's more corrupt governments, is regarded as one of the world's richest men, and has yet to apologize to the U.S. for having falsely accused the U.S. last June of attempting to overthrow him. There is substantial although thoroughly disorganized anti-Mobutu sentiment in Zaire, but many observers believe that Zaire without Mr. Mobutu would mean a return of the political vacuum and chaos of 1960.

Less obvious is the question, now under intensive study within the administration, of whether and how to improve the facilities on Ascension Island, the British-owned base in the South Atlantic. Any decision by the administration in this direction that becomes public could touch off a debate in Congress analogous to that over Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean while at the same time whipping African paranoia about the U.S. to a new pitch.

Looking a bit farther into the future, the two most important scheduled events regarding the future of southern Africa are the U.S. elections this fall and the South African elections that Mr. Vorster must call at some point within the next three years.

In the South African political context Mr. Vorster is a dove, and the hawks can be expected to be highly critical of any political settlements in Rhodesia or Namibia (South-West Africa) that does not adequately protect white interests in their view.

Meanwhile, South Africa most certainly will follow the U.S. election more closely than ever. It is certain that the Democratic party's platform will be as pro-Israel as it will be anti-South Africa, but just how far a Democratic president would go in implementing that rhetoric would be something else again.

For the past 20 years, U.S. policy in Africa has fluctuated wildly depending on the party in power. Already the Democrats are gushing apple-cheeked rhetoric about making a "fresh start" in Africa policy.

Regardless of who wins in November it seems unlikely that the country will get the moderate bi-partisan policy that the U.S. needs in order to best protect its interests in Africa and Africa needs in order to begin to cope with the baffling complexities of a powerful and unpredictable America.

Mr. Oudes is a writer on foreign affairs who recently visited southern Africa.

# East Asia

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

24 Feb. 1976

As the first Summit conference of ASEAN opens, MARTIN WOOLLACOTT looks at the way the countries of South-east Asia have formed into two opposing camps

## Dominoes piled against Vietnam

EVEN as leaders of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) are meeting in Bali this week for their first summit, the signs are that South-east Asia has already drifted into a new polarisation as tragic in its way as the one imposed by the Vietnam war.

KGB agents running around Bangkok with money to spend, the Thai Prime Minister's lavish reception in Peking, Pathet Lao troops machine-gunning Thai patrol boats, the Malaysian Government's new emergency measures, Singapore's economic ambitions, Hanoi's return of the remains of US pilots and the surly American response — these are all bits of the jigsaw that can now be put together.

The picture that emerges, less than a year after the end of the Vietnam war opened up the possibility of release from the straitjacket of old hostilities, is of a Sino-American camp on the one hand, and a Vietnamese-Soviet camp on the other.

The situation has come about through a confluence — some would say a collaboration — between the American and Chinese foreign policy establishments, working on the fears and prejudices of governments in the area.

The result is that, in spite of all its protestations, ASEAN is shaping up as a group of nations held together by their common hostility to Vietnam, and their common friendship with the US and China, although Indonesia still lags anachronistically behind.

The scramble to deal with China, of course, followed the first Nixon trip to China and pre-dated the end of the Vietnam war. But, with the end of that war, the Sino-American connection, now the main plank of foreign policy, at least in Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, has acquired a new anti-Vietnamese connotation.

American policy towards Vietnam since the end of the war, in spite of statements to the contrary, seems to have been governed mainly by a desire to isolate and harass. That desire at first extended to Cambodia as well, as the Mayaguez affair indicated, and it is extremely interesting that Cambodia appears no longer to be a target of American propaganda.

The initial pique of the United States was understandable but, as the months have gone by, the policy of hostility to Vietnam looks less emotional and more a settled element in American planning.

American pressure was at first exerted to prevent the Thais from even considering the return of the South Vietnamese Air Force planes that ended up in Thailand in the latter days of the war. The issue of the planes was of no great importance in itself but the evidence is that the Vietnamese saw the question as a test of Thai goodwill.

What the Vietnamese were actually suggesting, it may be argued, was a deal with the Thais, under which each country would agree that its principal foreign policy relationship should be with the other.

The return of the planes would have been the "gate" opening up such a relationship. Ideologically, capitalist Thailand and Communist Vietnam could never be close partners. But they could have had a hands-off policy in each other's internal affairs, a beneficial trade, and above all, agreement to run foreign policies based on true "equidistance" from the three world powers.

If Thailand and Vietnam had made that breakthrough, the rest of the region might well have followed. So little is known about Hanoi's real regional ambitions that it is impossible to prove that any of this would have worked. But the point is that because of great-power pressure and the fears of governments in the region, the option is not even being explored.

Instead the Thais seem to have already made up their minds that post-war Vietnam is bound to be an enemy, working through support for Thai insurgents to bring about the downfall of the monarchy and the State, and that their best diplomatic defence against this is to gratefully seize the available Peking-Washington formula.

So, ignoring Vietnamese efforts to pre-empt their plans the Thais went off to China two months after the end of the war. Within a few weeks of establishing diplomatic relations, the Thai Foreign Ministry could already point to the first pay-off — "the arrival," as one official put it, "of Ieng Sary, the Cambodian leader, wearing a Mao suit, in a Chinese plane, flown by a Chinese pilot."

Good relations were swiftly established with the extraordinarily amenable Cambodians. But at the same time relations with North Vietnam and Laos were deteriorating, a fact that the Thais now more or less

cheerfully accept.

The fear and hatred of the Vietnamese among Thais of all classes has to be experienced to be believed. "Inherently hostile" was a former Minister's comment. Briefly, the Thais even convinced themselves that the Vietnamese might invade their country.

Although that scare is not credible now, Thailand is a long way away from that moment last May when friendship with Vietnam was a possibility.

With Thailand setting the tone in this way the other members of ASEAN have mainly followed. The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, has said that a strong Thai-Chinese relationship is essential to the stability of the region. The Philippines and Malaysia agree. Indonesia, for the time being, only wants the American half of the ticket.

Indonesia is to receive increased American military aid, and America, like most countries, looked the other way during the invasion of Timor. The Chinese condemned it. About the other ASEAN countries and about ASEAN as a whole, the Chinese have, on the other hand, been positively fulsome. Whatever their intention, the effect has been to widen the already considerable distance between Peking and Hanoi.

Meanwhile, Vietnam has made some efforts to find a way out of the trap and one of them has been to push for a better relationship with the US. In his so-called "New Pacific Doctrine" speech in Hawaii last year, President Ford praised ASEAN in terms almost identical to the Chinese.

But he did also say: "We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of goodwill, particularly the return of the

remains of Americans killed or missing in action" in Vietnam. The Vietnamese, seeing a chink of light there, are said to be searching for such bodies and have already sent several back. But there has been little response, in spite of Mr Ford's words, from the US.

The truth is that the presumption has already been made, in Thailand above all, that Vietnam is the enemy. Both American and Chinese policies have reinforced an instinctive choice, and left no time for reflection.

The Thais have loosened relations with the Soviet Union as an afterthought and token of "equidistance" and the Russians are now working hard in Thailand — their most recent move was to condemn the Thai Communist Party — but with little prospect of gaining a serious foothold in that country, or anywhere else in the region, except in Vietnam and Laos.

It could be that the perception of Vietnam as a dangerous state that must be contained, of the Soviet Union as an intrusive power that must be kept out, and of China and America as joint guarantors of the region is the right foreign policy choice for South-east Asia.

But the opposite point of view — that, with Vietnam's strength added instead of subtracted, the region might have a chance of a considerable degree of collective independence — has not even been considered, let alone tested.

Perhaps the die is not yet cast for a new round of conflict in South-east Asia, but we are very close to that situation, which is a sad and depressing thought in the light of the drawn-out agonies of the struggle that has only just ended.



NEW YORK TIMES  
23 Feb. 1976

## NIXON CASTS DOUBT ON SUCH ACCORDS AS HELSINKI PACT

Toast In Peking Is Taken  
as Criticism of Roles of  
Ford and Kissinger

1972 SIGNING PRAISED

Chou's Successor, in First  
Public Speech, Assails  
'Expansion' of Soviet

By Reuters

PEKING, Monday, Feb. 23—Former President Richard M. Nixon, in a toast in China's Great Hall of the People, said last night that some people naively believe that "the mere act of signing a statement of principles or a diplomatic conference will bring instant and lasting peace."

The statement was taken by observers as an allusion to the meeting of leaders of 35 nations last year at Helsinki, concluding two years of conferences on European security. The Helsinki meeting, called at the initiative of the Soviet Union, resulted in an agreement, in

NEW YORK TIMES  
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## WHITE HOUSE SEES NO SLAP BY NIXON

It Disagrees With View That  
Remarks in Peking Were  
Directed at Detente

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23—The Ford Administration disagreed today with press interpretations that former President Richard M. Nixon's dinner remarks in Peking yesterday had amounted to criticism of the policies of President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

The White House spokesman, Ron Nessen, said: "We have looked at the entire toast and we do not interpret it as being critical of United States foreign policy."

A senior State Department

which the United States joined, on a broad range of East-West issues.

Some observers took the Nixon remarks as veiled criticism of President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for their trust in the Soviet Union and in the Helsinki accord.

### Praise for 1972 Accord

Mr. Nixon devoted most of his toast, which was delivered without notes, to United States-Chinese relations and to praise of the Shanghai communiqué that he signed at the end of his visit to China as President four years ago.

"That historic document ended a generation of confrontation and conflict and began an era of negotiations and consultations and progress toward those goals we share together," he said.

He said that President Ford and Acting Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng had affirmed their support of that communiqué and that although the leaders had changed since 1972, the two countries' interests remained the same.

Mr. Nixon asserted that the future of the world depended on "our two nations working together for the cause of peace with security for all nations."

Watched intently by his wife, Pat, the former President, who is here on a private visit at the invitation of Chinese officials, appeared confident and clearly impressed Chinese officials.

### Treated Like a Chief

official who said that he had no admiration for Mr. Nixon said that, nevertheless, he had seen nothing to suggest that Mr. Nixon was not supportive of Mr. Ford in his remarks.

### Officials Are Annoyed

[In Peking, Mr. Nixon met for an hour and 40 minutes with Chairman Mao Tse-tung described as a "friendly conversation" in which the Chinese leader asked his visitor to convey his regards to President Ford. Page 3.]

White House officials, with the important New Hampshire primary tomorrow, were annoyed by the stress placed on one paragraph in Mr. Nixon's toast by some news accounts—and particularly by two front-page dispatches in The New York Times today, one a news agency report from Peking and the other a dispatch from Hong Kong by a Times correspondent.

In his toast, commemorating the fourth anniversary of his own trip to China as President in 1972, Mr. Nixon said China

His speech climaxed a day in which the Chinese treated their visitor virtually as a head of state. The Great Hall was floodlit; red flags flew from every pole.

Earlier, Mr. Nixon spoke for two hours and 20 minutes on international questions with Mr. Hua and a high-level delegation in the conference room used by President Ford on his visit here last year.

A Chinese spokesman said the discussions covered international questions of common interest and would continue today.

In their travels around the capital, the Nixons were driven in a black limousine with the Stars and Stripes and the Chinese flag fluttering from its fenders. Last night's nine-course banquet included shark's fin, casserole, roast beef and duck cutlets. A People's Liberation Army band played "Home on the Range" and "America the Beautiful."

Mr. Hua made his first public speech since he was appointed Acting Prime Minister two weeks ago predictably attacking the Soviet Union for "rabid expansion." He also referred to the domestic campaign against rightists in China.

"In China," he said, "a revolutionary mass debate is going on in such circles as education, science and technology. It is a continuation and deepening of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It fully demonstrates the extensive democracy practiced in our country under the system of socialism. We are confident that through this debate, Chairman Mao's proletar-

ian revolutionary line will find its way deeper into the hearts of the people and our socialist motherland will be further consolidated."

The Nixons spent 55 minutes with Teng Ying-chao, the widow of Prime Minister Chou En-lai, the man who helped him rebuild Sino-U.S. relations four years ago. It was the first engagement of this Nixon visit here, and it took place in the Great Hall, where the former President and Mr. Chou toasted each other.

### 'Truly a Great Leader'

Mr. Nixon arrived seven minutes late for the meeting but relaxed after expressing personal condolences to Miss Teng on the death of her husband at 78 last month.

He told the widow, who is 72, that he had seen many world leaders and Mr. Chou stood out as a great man. He praised Mr. Chou's understanding of the international situation and his ability to analyze problems and make pragmatic decisions.

"The word great is used so much when leaders pass away that it begins to mean nothing, but in Mr. Chou's case, he truly was a great leader," Mr. Nixon said. "He left a legacy."

Mr. and Mrs. Nixon, who arrived here late Saturday night, were told that Mr. Chou was informed of the plans for their visit shortly before he died of cancer in a Peking hospital on Jan. 8. Mrs. Chou said her husband was pleased to hear the news, and added it was a pity that he could not greet the Nixons, "as he has left."

on security and cooperation in Europe.

But White House and State Department officials said Mr. Nixon's toast "on the surface at least, could be generally applied to include documents he signed as President with the Soviet Union."

"I really think that Nixon was...truisms—that what is important are deeds and not words—and that if his Chinese wanted to interpret it as anti-detente that's fine with him" on State Department official said.

Officials said Mr. Ford, in his speech at Helsinki on Aug. 1, made the same point when he said "peace is not a piece of paper." Mr. Ford said the conference would be judged "not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep."

Many China experts in the Government have viewed the invitation to Mr. Nixon as a sign that Peking wants the United States to know despite the recent high-level political changes following Prime Minister Chou En-lai's death, relations with the United States have not been impaired.

There is curiosity within the

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1976

# Thailand and U.S. Negotiating on American Presence

By DAVID A. ANDELMAN

Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Feb. 29 — Thailand and the United States are locked in a series of negotiations that within the next month should determine the shape and size of the American presence in this key Southeast Asian country.

This series of discussions is the subject of increasing comment both in Thailand, where a bitter election campaign is just under way, and by the new Communist countries of Indochina. Now, nearly a year after they began in earnest, these talks are just coming to a head.

Nearly two weeks ago, in a secret meeting at the Foreign Ministry here, Thailand presented the United States with a document that has become known in the negotiating circles as "the seven points." It calls for complete redrawing of the status-of-forces agreements here that is expected to cover for the first time all military facilities in Thailand, including the top-secret American electronic espionage base called Ramasun.

With the new complexities raised by these seven points—together with the issue of what functions the American forces who remain will perform—it seems likely that many basic questions will remain the subject of discussion, even bickering, well beyond the deadline of March 20 that the Royal Thai Government has set for the "complete" American withdrawal from Thailand.

Yet for all the fanfare and accusations of the last several months as this March 20 deadline has grown closer, the issue of the American presence here is not a new one. The issue is which facilities will be turned over to the Thai Government, which of them will remain under American control, what that control will be and how many American personnel will remain in the country.

In late 1969, at the height of the Vietnam War, the United States had more than 48,000 military personnel stationed in Thailand, with some 93 installations and sites throughout this kingdom. Most of the personnel were concentrated at fewer than a dozen major Air Force bases, from which B-52 bombers struck targets deep in Indochina.

But as the war in Indochina wound down, so did the American presence in Thailand. By September 1973, the first American installation, a Marine facility at Nam Phong in northeastern Thailand, was turned back to the full control of the Royal Thai Government.

## Issue Becomes Sensitive

Last March and April, as Communist troops rolled through South Vietnam and Cambodia and as the Government in Laos peacefully acquired Communist rulers, Thailand became increasingly sen-

sitive about the military presence that remained in Thailand.

Last March 19, the Thai Prime Minister, Kukrit Pramoj, told reporters that "within one year, all American troops would be gone from Thailand." It was, at the time, an offhand remark, but his political opponents quickly took note of it, as did the new Communist rulers, particularly of Vietnam.

It was clear from the start, however, that even within the Thai Government, the call for a total United States withdrawal did not originate from a full consensus. The Thai military, which until October 1973 ruled Thailand firmly, was not about to see itself dragged out from under the American military umbrella so quickly.

On Jan. 30, Gen. Boonchai Bamrungphong, commander in chief of the Royal Thai Army, held a rare and significant news conference in Bangkok.

"The main principle or policy of countries surrounding us is to make Thailand their satellite, or to join their socialist bloc," General Boonchai began. "It is a fact that should we be off our guard any time they would swallow us up."

## Risk to Survival Cited

Then, emphasizing each word, he added: "If the Government considers it no longer needs America, it is its affair. We must carry on, using our own might, and not depending on anybody. This is most difficult because everybody else has friends, but we have none at all. It causes grave concern. Our nation might not survive."

Two weeks later, North Vietnam's official party newspaper, Nhan Dan, in its latest commentary on the subject, said it "resolutely demands that the Thai authorities stop allowing the United States to use Thai territory against the Lao, Vietnamese and Cambodian people."

Fewer than 7,000 American military personnel remain in Thailand. Fewer than two dozen installations or sites have not yet been turned over to Thailand and American officials remain at only about a half dozen of these.

The United States, according to American officials, would like to keep about 3,000 military personnel here, "maybe an iota less," which under the present understanding would be possible. After last March's ultimatum by Mr. Kukrit, the understanding was modified to read that all American "combat forces" be withdrawn from Thailand by March 20.

American officials here say that this has already been completed. The final American combat personnel left with the departure of the last Air Force fighter last Dec. 20, one senior American military official said. The 20 or so American air-

craft remaining—C-130 cargo transports and U-21N seven-seater personnel transports—are all noncombat aircraft, he said.

## Key Difference Remaining

Two key differences remain between the two countries. One concerns the status of the United States forces here, including Thai jurisdiction or supervision of the remaining facilities. The other concerns the functions the remaining personnel will perform.

These issues were clearly behind the seven-point message that was passed to the Americans on Feb. 4.

One senior American official here said the message was not an ultimatum. As for the seven points, he said: "We won't accept them verbatim—we want to discuss language and make some countersuggestions. They made no objections to this."

Today the United States turned over to Thailand the sprawling Kirat air force base, including some \$30 million worth of buildings and military equipment. About 200 Americans still remain at the facility to finish the shipment of other equipment but will be withdrawn when the shipping process is completed.

There is also the question of Ramasun—a highly sophisticated electronic-eavesdropping facility in northeastern Thailand to which, until very recently, no Thai military official has ever been allowed routine access. At Ramasun, huge dish antennas using the most sophisticated and ultrasecret techniques are able to pick up communications from Communist field radios throughout Indochina, as well as domestic and foreign Communist broadcasts.

All of these are areas of immense complexity, and there is little doubt that there will be negotiations for months if not years to come. More than \$500 million in facilities and equipment are involved and must be accounted for, and there is wide room for misunderstanding and error.

Last week, for instance, a memorandum appeared mysteriously, announcing that the United States "intends to offer a complete and serviceable five-ton lox plant to the Royal Thai Government."

There was some confusion in the embassy until suddenly someone realized that what was meant was the military abbreviation for liquid oxygen. "That's quite a relief," one embassy official sighed. "I was starting to have nightmares wondering where they were going to get the bagels."

diplomatic community here on the substance of Mr. Nixon's conversations with Mao Tse-tung and the Acting Prime Minister, Hua Kuo-feng.

It is widely believed that Mr. Kissinger himself may meet with Mr. Nixon in California next week to get a first-hand report, although the White House and State Department insisted that no plans had been made on how to debrief Mr. Nixon.

**Kissinger Going to California**  
Mr. Kissinger's wife, Nancy, is in Palm Springs, Calif., convalescing from a recent stomach operation, and it is expected that he will fly to California this weekend to be with her. He returns from Latin America late tomorrow night.

Because of the New Hampshire primary, the White House has tried to keep distance between Mr. Ford and Mr. Nixon. Officials have stressed that Mr. Nixon is making his trip as a private citizen.

A discrepancy between the White House and Mr. Kissinger has developed over how and whether Mr. Nixon would make any report to the Administration upon his return next week.

Mr. Ford in an interview with The Boston Globe on Saturday said "at the present time" there were no plans for any debriefing. He said that would be decided after Mr. Nixon returned to the United States.

"I would assume that if he has any valuable information that he would communicate it to us, but we have no plans at the present time," Mr. Ford said.

That has been the position of the White House, in effect leaving it up to Mr. Nixon to report to the Administration.

But Mr. Kissinger, in Brasilia, said on Saturday that "we will of course wish to learn about the nature and the result" of Mr. Nixon's trip. This reflected his desire for a thorough report on the discussions with Mr. Mao and Mr. Hua.

## Kissinger Revises Estimate

Special to The New York Times

BOGOTA, Colombia, Feb. 23 —Secretary of State Kissinger said today that he interpreted the invitation extended to former President Nixon to Peking as an attempt by the Chinese to signal the Ford Administration that relations between the two countries would not be affected by any political shifts in China.

Mr. Kissinger said he thought at first that the invitation might be an attempt by the Chinese "to needle" the Ford Administration.

But after reading reports and transcripts of the toasts offered at a banquet attended by Mr. Nixon in Peking, the Secretary of State said he concluded that "this reception is one notch below what they gave" to President Ford during his visit to Peking last year.

# Latin America

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## The Latins and the U.S.

### Kissinger's Tour Just Made More Clear That Congress Complicates Relations

By JONATHAN KANDELL  
Special to The New York Times

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica, Feb. 25—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's recent tour through six Latin American countries has dramatized a new element in an often troubled relationship: the increasing role of Congress in the making and execution of United States policy.

In the United States, the growing Congressional participation in foreign policy may largely be identified in the public eye with liberal causes, such as concern for human rights abroad, surveillance of clandestine intelligence activities, efforts to bring multinational companies under control, and attempts to block a repetition of United States involvement in a Vietnam-type of war.

But in Latin America, Congressional activity in foreign affairs appears far less ideologically coherent. Governments as politically far apart as the left-wing military Peruvian administration and the right-wing military Brazilian regime have taken bitter exception to a number of bills passed in Washington.

Virtually all Latin American governments have at one time or another wondered aloud who speaks for the United States on foreign policy—the executive branch or Congress. During his trip, Mr. Kissinger repeatedly found himself asked whether he could guarantee his hosts anything given the current muscle-flexing by Congress.

"We can tell the Latin Americans just so many times that the executive does not agree with an action taken by Congress," said a high State Department official. "But inevitably after a while, Congressional actions become viewed here as part of the landscape of American foreign policy."

The complicating element imposed by Congress on the conduct of United States foreign policy in the hemisphere was apparent during Mr. Kissinger's brief visit to Lima.

The left-wing Peruvian military Government clashed with Washington soon after taking power in 1968 when the Peruvian subsidiary of Exxon was nationalized without compensation. For the next six years, the United States angered the Peruvians by trying to restrict credits to Lima from the Ex-

port-Import Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank.

In 1974, relations took a turn for the better with the conclusion of the Greene Agreement, under which the Peruvians agreed to pay \$150 million in compensation for expropriated United States companies.

When Mr. Kissinger arrived in Lima, United States-Peruvian relations were at a high point. The Secretary of State enjoys a warm personal relationship with the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel de la Flor. Mr. Kissinger also went further than any previous high Washington official by declaring the United States was "fully sympathetic with Peru's struggle to create a social democracy."

On the Peruvian side, a bloodless coup last year brought Gen. Francisco Morales Bermúdez to power. He is considered more pragmatic and less outspokenly anti-American than his predecessor, Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado. Then also, an economic crisis and worsening balance-of-payments deficit has forced the Peruvians to seek warmer ties with Washington.

But a repetition of the United States credit squeeze against Peru could easily develop in the coming months unless negotiations over compensation for a nationalized United States subsidiary are brought to a successful conclusion.

The company is the Marcona Mining, the only iron producer in Peru. The Peruvian Government and the United States concern do not appear to be close to a final settlement. And Mr. Kissinger felt obliged to bring up the case with his hosts, injecting a sour element into his visit.

#### Human Rights an Issue

Congressional initiatives in foreign policy have touched on a broad range of issues in Brazil.

For the last 12 years, Brazil has been ruled by a right-wing military Government that has frequently been accused of torture, illegal detentions, and other violations of human rights.

The Brazilian President, Gen. Ernesto Geisel, enjoys arbitrary powers to dissolve Congress, and suspend the political rights of any citizen in cases deemed by the Government to involve national security.

The U.S. Congress held hearings on the human rights issue in Brazil in 1971, 1973 and 1974. There are now efforts under way in Congress to suspend

military sales to Brazil if human rights continue to be violated.

Mr. Kissinger has insisted that the best way to deal with the human rights issue is through private talks with Brazilian officials. His aides note that during his visit he met for almost an hour with Golbery do Couto e Silva, the Brazilian Cabinet member most identified with efforts to liberalize the regime.

But both supporters and opponents of the Brazilian Government view Washington's concern with human rights as more a product of Congressional pressure than initiative from the executive branch.

These views were probably reinforced by Mr. Kissinger's public remark during his visit that "there are no people whose concern for human dignity and for the basic values of man is more profound in day-to-day life in Brazil and the United States."

Congress has also caused difficulties between the United States Government and Brazil on economic issues, particularly trade.

The high point of Mr. Kissinger's swing through Latin America was the signing of an agreement under which the United States and Brazil will consult each other regularly on both mutual and international economic and political issues. The agreement, which considerably enhances Brazil's aspirations to become a world power, was warmly welcomed by Brazilian leaders.

But Brazilian officials made clear that they would have been happier with the Kissinger visit if it had produced some headway on economic problems.

Brazil suffered a \$1.6 billion trade deficit with the United States in 1975. The worsening

balance-of-payments situation has been a key factor in ending the high economic growth rate, sometimes called the "Brazilian miracle."

The Brazilians have concentrated their complaints over trade on what they view as the growing protectionist sentiment in the United States Congress. They are concerned that countervailing duties imposed by Congressional action on some Brazilian manufactured exports to the United States, such as shoes and leather bags, might be extended to other Brazilian goods.

#### No Promises by Kissinger

Mr. Kissinger was unable to promise the Brazilians any turnaround in Congressional attitudes on countervailing duties, especially in an election year in the United States.

Nor was the secretary of state able to guarantee to the Venezuelans that they would be extended preferential trade treatment given to other Latin American countries. A trade bill passed last year by Congress excluded Venezuela and Ecuador from such preferential treatment because the two countries are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, even though neither government has participated in an oil embargo against the United States.

In Central America, the main issue of controversy involving Congressional forays into foreign affairs is the negotiation of a new Panama Canal treaty. The Panamanians, who enjoy support on the canal issue throughout Latin America, are far more confident that they can reach an agreement with the State Department than they are about the chances of the agreement getting through Congress.